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Subject ofProceedings: Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 243  
r n r  inr A ~ X T T  rroc -I 
This being the time fixed pursuant to written notice for hearing of the 
defendants/counter plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this case, Court noted 
the presence of counsel. 
In response to inquiry from the Court, both counsel indicated the parties were 
prepared to proceed. 
Mr. Landeck moved that the Court consider the Affidavit of Harold L. Osborne in 
ruling on this matter and argued in support of the motion. Mr. Landeck moved that the 
Court view the property prior to rendering its decision. Mr. Schwam argued in opposition 
to the Court's considering Mr. Osborne's affidavit in lieu of hearing his testimony. Mr. 
Schwam had no objection to the Court viewing the property. Court deferred a decision on 
both of the motions. 
Mr. Schwam presented an opening statement on the part of the defendants/counter 
plaintiffs. 
Mr. Landeck presented an opening statement on the part of the plaintiffs/counter 
defendants. 
Defendants' Exhibits A, Quit Claim Deed, and B through F, Warranty Deeds, and 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit #l, Survey, were marked for identification and admitted into evidence 
by stipulation of counsel. 
Todd Green was called, sworn and testified for the defendants/counter plaintiffs. 
Defendants' Exhibits G and H, photographs, were marked for identification, offered and 
admitted into evidence without objection. Defeidants' Exhibit I, photograph, was marked 
for identification, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct 
examination continued. Defendants' Exhibit j, photograph, was marked for identification. 
Direct examination continued. Defendants' Exhibit K, photograph, was marked for 
identification. Dired examination concluded. 
Court informed the parties that it had engaged in colloquy with counsel in 
chambers and outside of their present prior to convening this hearing in an effort to 
determine if there was possibility of settling this matter short of hearing. 
Court recessed at 11:44 A.M., reconvening at 11:53 A.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Defendants' Exhibits J and K, photographs, were offered and admitted into 
evidence without objection. 
Todd Green resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the 
defendants/counter plaintiffs on cross examination by Mr. Landeck. 
Ter~y Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
O ~ T  lnv n nrh ir rrcc 1 
Court recessed at 1222 P.M., reconvening at 1:35 P.M., Court, counsel (excepting 
Robert Magyar) and the parties being present as before. 
Mr. Landeck resumed his cross examination of Todd Green. Redirect examination 
by Mr. Schwam. [Mr. Magyar returned to the courtroom at 1:57 P.M.] Redirect 
examination continued. Recross examination by Mr. Landeck. Court questioned the 
witness. Mr. Landeck examined the witness on the Court's questions. 
Steven Ross Shook was called, sworn and testified for the defendants/counter 
plaintiffs. Defendants' Exhibits L and M, photographs, were marked for identification, 
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendants' Exlubit N, diagram 
and attachments prepared by Shook, was marked for identification and offered. Mr. 
Landeck objected lo the offer. Mr. Schwam argued in support of defendants' offer of 
Exhibit N. Direct examination resumed. Mr. Schwam again moved admission of 
Defendants' Exhibit N. Mr. Landeck examined the witness in aid of objection. Mr. 
Landeck stated his objection. Court overruled the objection and admitted Defendants' 
Exhibit N into evidence. Direct examination continued. Cross examination by Mr. 
Landeck. Redirect examination by Mr. Schwam. No recross examination. Court 
questioned the witness. Mr. Landeck examined the witness on the Court's questions. Mr. 
Schwam examined the witness on the Court's questions. Court questioned the witness 
further. The witness stepped down. 
Defendants/counter plaintiffs rested. 
Consuelo Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs/counter 
defendants. 
Court recessed at 400 P.M., reconvening at 426 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties 
being present as before. 
Consuelo Weitz resumed the witness stand and direct examination continued. 
Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. Court questioned the 
witness. Mr. Landeck examined the witness on the Court's questions. 
Gerald Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs/counter defendants. 
Court recessed at 5:59 P.M., reconvening at 6:07 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties 
being present as before. 




Steven Ross Shook was called, having been previously sworn, and testified for the 
defendants/counter plaintiffs in rebuttal. Cross examination by Mr. Landeck. No redirect 
examination. The witness stepped down. 
No surrebuttal. 
Mr. Schwam presented closing argument on the part of the defendants/counter 
plaintiKs. 
Court ordered that no party may alter the state of the disputed property during this 
litigation. Mr. Schwam stated that he would prepare an order. 
Mr. Schwam continued his closing argument. 
Mr. Landeck presented closing argument on the part of the plaintiffs/counter 
defendants. 
Mr. Schwam argued in rebuttal. 
Mr. Landeck argued in surrebuttal, 
Mr. Schwam argued further. 
For reasons articulated on the record, Court granted the motion for preliminary 
injunction. 
Court set bond in the amount of $5,000. 
In response to inquiry from Mr. Landeck, Court stated that he did take the Osborne 
Affidavit into consideration. 
Court denied Mr. Landeck's motion to view the scene. 
Court recessed at 7:08 P.M., Subject to Call. 
APPROVED BY: 
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Robert M. Magyar #I667 
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(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
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v. 1 EVIDENTIARY ORDER 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
1 
Defendants. 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANlAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 




GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all parties to lhis action, their agents, employees, attorneys 
and any persons acting in concert with or in participation with them, are not to take any action that 
could lead to the destruction of, damage to, or interference with, any evidence that might be relevant 
to this case. Such evidence includes but is not limited to the conditioi: of any roads or trails, any 
remnants of barbed wire or fencing, or trees which may be indicative of fencing, that exist in or near 
the disputed area and the true surveyed boundary between the NE ?4 and the SE L/4 of Section 8, 
Township 40 North, Range 5, West Boise Meridian, in Latah County, Idaho. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any such destruction of, damage to or interference with 
any evidence that might be relevant to this case by any such person will be considered contempt of 
this Court, and punished accordingly. 
T " .  
Dated this day of Apr~l, 2005. 
27 1 G 
Jo n R. Stegner 
District ~udge  
ORDER - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this - /pAday of April, 2005.1 caused a trne and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing O R ~ E R  to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck ($Overnight Mail 
Attorney for Plaii~tiffsICounterdefendai~ts U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 9344 ( Facsimile 
Moscow, ID 83843 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Robert M. Magyar U.S. Mail 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 8974 
P
( ) Facsimile 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Andrew Schwam ( ) U.S. Mail 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs ( ) Overnight Mail 
514 South Polk Street ( ) Facsimile 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 (& Iiaand Delivery 
Clerk of District Court 
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Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
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(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles 
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TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) PRELIMNARY INJUNCTION 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SI-IOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) I.R.C.P. 65 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
Defendants. 1 
I 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 





GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 




Defendants/Counterplaintiffs brought on for hearing their Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
on April 15, 2005. Evidence and testimony was produced by DefendantsICounterplaintiffs in 
support of their Motion, and by Plaiiltiffs/Counterdefendants in opposition to said Motion, and the 
Court heard arguments of counsel for and against said Motion, 
Based upon the evidence, testimony and the arguments of counsel produced at said hearing, 
the Court being hlly informed, and good cause appearing therefrom, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DefendanislCounterplaintiffs have established all 
elements required by 1.R.C.P. 65, and their request for a Preliminary Injunctioil is granted. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDEmD that a Preliminary Injunction is issued against all Plaintiffs, 
and their officers, agents, servants, einployees and attorneys, and upon those persons in active 
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or 
otherwise, preventing them from going upon the real property legally described as the SE !4 of 
Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5, West Boise Meridian, in Latah County, Idaho. 
This Preliminary Injunction shall continue during the pendency of the above entitled action. 
This Preliminary Injunction is issued because the evidence and testimony produced at the 
hearing demonstrate the DefendantsICounierplaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is 
not granted. 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursual~t o the requireme~~ts of I.R.C.P. 65 (c), the 
DefelldantslCounterplaintiffs are required to post security in the amount of $5,000.00, which 
security shall be held by the Clerk of the Court until furfher Order of this Court. 
Dated this 5Zy of April, 2005. 
7 
2 +  
Jodn R. Stegner 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this &day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION to be served on the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Ronald J. Landeck #Overnight Mail 
Attorney for Plaintiffslcounterdefendants U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 9344 ( ) Facsimile 
Moscow, ID 83843 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Robert M. Magyar ( ~ u . s .  Mail 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterplaintiffs ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 8974 ( ) Facsimile 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Andrew Schwam ( ) U.S. Mail 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs ( ) Overnight Mail 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 Hand Delivery 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 3 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
TRAPPER STEWART 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAIvf, P.A 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Landeck ISB No. 3001; Stewat ISB No. 6369 
Attorneys for PlaintiffslCounterdefendants 
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J. WEITZ, wife and wife, CaseNo. CV2004-000080 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 
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TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 1 
GREEN, wife and wife, 1 
STEVEN R SHOOK and MARY E. 1 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANLAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 1 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANKN.A, ) 
) 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs. ) 
Plaintiffs, through counsel of record, hereby disclose the names, and if known, addresses 
of all lay witnesses Plaintiffs intend to call at trial, together with a brief summay of the issues as 
to which each such witness is expected to testify; 
Allen Drew, 1271 Saddle Ridge Road, Viola, ID 83872, participant in hunting and 
PLAINTIFFS' LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURE - 1 253 
cutting wood on the disputed property for over 40 yeass; condition of ridge road and fence and 
understanding of property lines. 
Dale Schoepflin, 851 Ringo Rd., Palouse, WA 99163, engaged in siding motorcycles and 
snowmobiles on disputed property; condition of road and fence and understanding of proptnty 
lines. 
Joe Weitz, 17237 SE 262nd, Covington, WA 98042, engaged in hunting, siding 
motorcycles and snowmobiles on disputed propelty; condition of road and fence and 
understanding of property lines. 
Ed Weitz, 17237 SE 262nd, Covington, WA 98042, engaged in hunting, iiding 
motorcycles and snowmobiles on disputed property. Installed the blue gate and the fence 
running north and south of it; condition of road and fence and understanding of property lines. 
Rocky and Dusty Weitz, 1131 Four Mile Rd., Viola, ID 83872, use of disputed property, 
condition of road and fence; grandfather's road work; understanding of property lines and 
ownership of disputed property. 
Jim Hagedosn, Viola, ID 83872, familiar with area since the 1960's; ridden horses on the 
ridge road; condition of ridge road and fence and understanding of property lines. 
Chuck Goetz, 1120 Chaney Rd, Viola, ID 83872, ridden snowmobiles on ridge road; 
condition of road, understanding of property lines. 
Dan Iiowasd, 1050 Meckel Lane, Potlatch, ID 83855, Steve Ely, Potlatch, ID 83855, 
Randle Buck, Sandpoint, ID and Dan Ginter, Missoula, MT: logged timber for Rogers' family, 
respected fenceline as boundary between Rogers and Weitz properties; condition of road and 
fence. 
Walter Caslson, 1059 Flannigan Creek Rd, Viola, ID 83872, observations of logging in 
PLAINTIFFS' LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURE - 2 
1964 in disputed property; constructed fence and shelter for horse used while logging; condition 
of road and fence. 
Josh Ritter, 5301 Highway 95, Viola, ID 83872, use of ridge road; condition of fence and 
ridge road. 
Dana Townsend, 447 East Eighth, Moscow, ID 83843, condition of fence and ridge road; 
fence building activity in disputed area. 
Fred Schoepflin, 4240 NE 74th St., Seattle, WA 981 15, fence maintenance on disputed 
property; use of ridge road and other roads on SchoepflinJWeitz property; understanding of 
property lines and ownership of disputed property. 
Curtis Wiggins, 24661 Arrow Highline Rd, Juliaetta, ID 83535, snowmobile use and 
firewood cutting on disputed property; condition of ridge road and understanding of property 
lines. 
Bobby Thoinas, 7907 Spieden Dr., Pasco, WA 99301, snowmobile use on disputed 
property; condition of ridge road. 
Tom McKinney, Rt. 2, Box 160, Colfax, WA 991 11, motorized activity on ridge road and 
firewood cutting in disputed area; condition of road and fence; understanding of property lines. 
Josey and Josh Carlson, 1059 Flannigan Creek Road, Viola, ID 82872, motorcycle and 
snowmobile use on disputed property; condition of ridge road; understanding of property lines 
and ownership. 
Afton Swift, 16203 NE 12th Street, Bellevue, WA 98008, snowmobile use on disputed 
property; condition of road; understanding of property lines and ownership on disputed property. 
Michael Barber, P. 0. Box 8094, Moscow, ID 83843, hunts on disputed property and has 
knowledge of the road and property lines. 
PLAINTIFFS' LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURE - 3 
Jack Freeland 1076 N. Petersen Loop Rd, Moscow, ID 83843, use of disputed property. 
Gerald and Consuelo Weitz, 1224 Saddle Ridge Rd., VioIa, ID 82872, historic use on 
disputed property; condition of ridge road and fence; understanding of property lines and 
ownership of disputed property. 
Travis Tiegen, 273 Pintail Lane, Moscow, ID 83843, condition ofridge road. 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2005. 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A. 
eys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of May, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of this 
document to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR [ X] U.S. Mail 
IWAGVAR LAW EBM [ ] Overnight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 C JFAX 
P.O. BOX 8074 [ ] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW Id. SCHWAM 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET #6 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
[ ;il 7.7. S. Mail 
[ ] Oveinight Mail 
[ IFAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
PLAZNTLFFS' LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURE - 4 
* - "  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISXRICT 
! *--'( ,'&:, >...,.r ,, 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, WAND FOR THE COUNTY o @ L ~ T  r.,i~;~..i,:.OU~~ / , I  .'::j ,.... /,,, ! >  ,; 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, Case No. CV2004-000080 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC. an 
Idaho limited liability ) 
company, MOTION AND STIPULATION TO 
AMEND FIRST PRETRIAL ORDER 
PlaintiffsICounterdefendants, RE: DEFENDANTS WITN!3SS 
1 DISCLOSURES 
VS. 1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, ) 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL, T. 
) 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 
1 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., ) 
DefendanlslCounterplaintiffs. ) 
Plaintiffs and defendants, through counsel, move under I.R.C.P. 7 (b) (1) and stipulate to 
amend the court's First Pretrial Order to enlarge the time for defendants to disclose their lay and 
expert witnesses from no later than June 1,2005, to no later than July 1,2005. 
As grounds for this motion and stipulation, the parties assert that they have been involved 
in meaningful settlement discussions and that the likelihood of achieving a settlement will be 
furthered if defendants, while prepared to meet the court's June 1, 2005 deadline for disclosure 
of lay and expert witnesses, are relieved of the substantial costs associated with finalizing their 
lay and expert witness disclosures while meaningful settlement discussions are occurring. The 
parties opine that this enlargement of time will not adversely affect their abilities to be prepared 
for trial as presently scheduled. 
MOTION AND STIPULATION TO AMEND FIRST PRETRIAL ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANTS EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 1 
Respecthlly submitted this 20'" day of May, 2005. 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A. 
\ o h K Q A 4 L l a - ,  
for PlaintiffsICounterdefendants 
&A+- 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs 
MOTION AND STIPULATION TO AMEND FIRST PRETRIAL ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANTS EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 2 
CLERK 37 i?,i$TRiT WRT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
company, 
VS. 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHEIUNE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
1 
1 Case No. CV2004-000080 
1 
1 
1 ORDER AMENDING FIRST PRETRIAL 
1 ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS 













THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon the parties' Motion And Stipulation 
To Amend First Pretrial Order Re: Defendants Witness Disclosures filed herein and good cause 
appearing: 
IT IS ORDERED that the First Pretrial Order is hereby amended to provide that 
defendants shall make their lay and expert witness disclosures to plaintiffs no later than July 1, 
Q"- DATED this 29 day of May, 2005. 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
ORDER AMENDING FIRST PRETRIAL ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS WITNESS 
DISCLOSURES - 1 259 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this gfi day of May, 2005,I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
RONALD J. LANDECK [ x  ] U.S. Mail 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE [ ] Overnight Mail 
& GRAHAM, P.A. [ IFAX 
P.O. BOX 9344 [ 1 Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR [ x  ] U.S. Mail 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM [ ] Overnight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 [ IFAX 
P.O. BOX 8074 [ ] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCHWAM 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET #6 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
[ x  ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
E IFAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
ORDER AMENDING FIRST PRETRIAL ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS WITNESS 
DISCLOSURES - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS~_ICTT_,~..,.,'~~~jEPUTY 
J 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, ) Case No. CV2004-000080 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. ) 
GREEN, husband and wife, ) 
STFVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. ) 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. ) 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. i 
CASmE, and U.S. BANK N.A., ) 
) 
TO: The Court and Defersdants'/Counterplaintiffs' attorneys. 
Please be advised that Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A. 
hereby withdraws as counsel of record for 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Gerald E. Weitz and Consuelo J. Weitz, 
husband and wife, and Weitz and Sons, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company in the above-entitled matter, and in their place 
now appears Charles A. Brown, as Plaintiffs/Counterde£endants 
attorney of record. Please direct all further pleadings and 
correspondence for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants to Charles A. 
Brown, P.O. Box 1225, Lewiston, Idaho 83501. 
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL -1- 
DATED this 3lSt  day of May, 2005 
.DATED this 31St day of May, 2005.  
L&J/% l-/ 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 31St day of May, 2005,  I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be 
served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE 
& GRAHAM, P.A. 
P.O. BOX 9344 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
[A U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ I FAX 
[ JI Hand Delivery 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR [ I / ]  U.S. Mail 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM I ] Overnight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 [ 1 FAX 
P.O. BOX 8074 [ I Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCHWAM [ J] U.S. Mail 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM [ ] Overnight Mail 
514  SOUTH POLK STREET $6 [ 1 FAX 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 [ ] Hand Delivery 
SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL - 2 -  
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbuy St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
5 14 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
Plaintiffs, 1 OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO 
v. 1 STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
1 WITNESS LIST 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 





TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 




OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO STlUIQ? 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS LIST - 1 
1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 




COME NOW DEFENDANTSiCOUNTERPLAINTIFFS, by and through their attorneys, 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR and ANDREW SCKWAM, and Object to Plaintiffs' Supplenlental Witness 
List, and Move to Strike, as follows. 
Plaintiffs served PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS LIST upon Robert M. 
Magyar by fax, and upon Andrew Schwam by mail, on May 27,2005. 
The FIRST PRETRIAL ORDER - ORDER SETTING TRIAL entered by the Court on 
November 16, 2004, required Plaintiffs to disclose to ,Defendants, in writing, the names and 
addresses of all lay witnesses whom Plaintiffs intend to call at trial on or before May 2,2005. 
DefendantsICounte~plaintiffs object to PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS LIST 
and move to strike it because it was not timely filed and is not in compliance with the FIRST 
PRETRIAL ORDER entered by the Court. 
DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs assert that Plaintiffs can only supplement their Witness List 
after the Court imposed deadline by subsequent Order of the Court permitting supplementation after 
the deadline.. 
DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs note that should the Court choose to allow Plaintiffs to 
supplement their original witness List after the Court imposed deadline, it is not necessary that the 
Court allow all the witnesses on the supplemental witness list to testify. This is important with 
regard to the effort to add Mr. Landeck to the list of witnesses. 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs further object because the SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS LIST 
does not indicate whether a witness is proposed as a lay or expert witness. 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs submit their Objection to PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
WITNESS LIST now because to properly prepare for trial we cannot wait to detennine if Plaintiffs' 
attempted supplementation after the Court imposed deadline will be permitted by the Court. 
This Objection is supported by the record, and by the FLRST PRETRIAL ORDER- ORDER 
OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS LIST - 2 
SETTING TRIAL, and PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS LIST. 
Leave of Court is requested to pennit Defendants/Counterplaintiffs to argue at the Hearing of 
this Motion. 
Dated this 1'' day of June, 2005. 
/Wb+ 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for Defendants/Cou~~terplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this kmday of June, 2005,I caused a true and conect copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' SWPLEMENTAL 
WITNESS LIST to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewistorr, ID 83501 
IW 44- 
Robert M. Magyar u *  
OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO STRIKl? 
PLAINTIFFS' SWPLEMENTAL WITNESS LIST - 3 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ~ u . s .  Mail 
(SfFacsimile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
5 14 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 




TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-04-000080 
MOTION TO PERMIT ACCESS BY 
DEFENDANTS AND THEIR EXPERTS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF DATING FENCE 
REMNANTS THAT FOLLOW THE TRUE 
BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES' PROPERTIES 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 




MOTION TO PERMIT ACCESS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY 
BY DEFENDANTS TO DATE FENCE REMNANTS - 1 
1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 





COME NOW DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAXNTIFFS, by and through their attorneys, 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR and ANDREW SCI-IWAM, and Move the Court to pem~it access by 
Defendants and their experts to Plaintiffs' property for the purpose of dating fcnce remnants that 
follow the true boundary line between the parties' properties. 
Defendants have already permitted Plaintiffs to go upon the land of Defendants with 
Plaintiffs' experts for the purpose of dating the fence remnants the Plaintiffs claim establish a 
boundary by agreement. There are fence remnants that follow the true boundary line between the 
property of Defendants and the property of Plaintiffs. Defendants should be entitled to go upon the 
land of Plaintiffs with Defendants' experts for the purpose of dating the fence remnants that follow 
the true boundary line between the parties' properties. 
Defendants therefore request the Court enter an Order permitting Defendants and their 
experts to go approximately 30 feet into the Plaintiffs' property to examine and test the fence 
remnants that exist there, and that follow the true boundary line between the parties' properties. The 
testing to be done by Defendants will be similar, if not identical to, the testing already done by 
Plaintiffs on the Defendants' property. 
This Motion is supported by the record. 
Leave of Court is requested to permit DefendantsICounterplaintiffs to argue at the I-Iearing of 
this Motion. 
Dated this 3d day of June, 2005. 
Andrew Schwam 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs 
MOTION TO PERMIT ACCESS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY 
BY DEFENDANTS TO DATE FENCE REMNANTS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of June, 2005, I caused a true and correct c py of the,/ p e n +  rrccry 70 rBLm+nr/-~ 
MOTION TO @d 
to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Andrew Schwam 
MOTION TO PERMIT ACCESS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY 
BY DEFENDANTS TO DATE FENCE IiEMNANTS - 3 
( ) Overnight Mail 
09 U.S. Mail 
(b0 Facsimile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fax) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cabloneone.net 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 





TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 









1 MOTION FOR ORDER 
TO EXAMINE DISPUTED 
1 PROPERTY 
1 
COME NOW the plaintiffslcounterdefendants above-named by and through their 
attorney of record, Charles A. Brown, and move the Court for an Order as follows: 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
EXAMINE DISPUTED PROPERTY 1 
Cliziilles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St 
Lewirtnn, Idaho 83501 
208-74649471208-746-5886 (fax) 269 
That in order for plaintiffs' counsel, Charles A. Brown, to investigate this matter and 
also prepare for the trial on this matter, said counsel will need to be allowed to go upon the disputed 
property in the accompaniment of his client, a witness or witnesses of his choice, whether they be 
a lay or an expert, and this will have to occur on multiple occasions. 
That the plaintiffs nor their witnesses will be allowed to go upon the disputed 
property without the accompaniment of plaintiffs' counsel, Charles A. Brown. 
As an officer of this Court, Charles A. Brown represents to this Court that he will 
conduct himself and ensure that the conduct of the others accompanying him upon the property in 
dispute shall be done in such a nature so as to not cause physical harm to the property interest 
thereon and shall be in conformance with the Evidentiary Order that this Court entered in regard to 
the preservation of evidence on April 18,2005. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED on this 4 day of June, 2005. w Char es A. Brown 
Attorney for PlaintiffsICounterdefendants 
Charles A. Brown. Esa 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
EXAMINE DISPUTED PROPERTY 2 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main st. 
Lewiston, Idalio 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fnx) 270 
I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
- mailed by regular first class mail, __ sent by lacsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwan 
sent by facsimile, mailed by - sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class inail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
- hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
N. 214 Main Street 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Office 
5 14 South Polk Street iti G 
Moscow, ID 83843 
day of June, 2005. on this 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
EXAMINE DISPUTED PROPERTY 3 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lcwirlon, Idalto 83501 
20s-746-9947nOS-746.5886 (fax) 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 ( f a )  
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cabloneone.ilet 
Attorney for Plai~~tiffslConnterdefendants. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 





TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SI-IOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATJBRINE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants1 
Counterplaintiffs. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. BROWN 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO EXAMINE DISPUTED PROPERTY 1 
Case No. CV 2004-000080 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. 
BROWN IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
EXAMINE DISPUTED PROPERTY 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaha 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax) 
2 72 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce 1 
CHAWES A. BROWN, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says: 
1. That y o u  affiant is the attorney of record for the plaintiffs in the above- 
entitled matter and that I nlake the statements herein of my own personal knowledge and belief. 
2. That y o u  affiant became attorney of record in this matter on May 3 1,2005. 
3. That your affiant has not been upon the disputed property in question and I 
need to do so in order to fully and competently investigate and prepare for trial in this matter. 
4. That your affiant needs and wants to have certain of his clients, andlor lay 
witnesses andor expert witnesses accompany me at different times and on different days which 
would constitute a part of my work product in preparing this matter not only for trial, but also in 
order to fully and completely investigate the matter. 
/ b  day of June, 2005. DATED on this 
A ,Q.# 
Charles A. Brown 
'uk 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this &day of June, 2005. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. BROWN 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO EXAMINE DISPUTED PROPERTY 2 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251321 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaim 83501 
208-746-9947n08-746-5886 (fax) 
I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
mailed by regular first class mail, - sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
1 sent by facsimile, mailed by sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
N. 214 Main Street 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Office 
514 South Polk Street # 6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
on this - lo day of June, 2005. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. BROWN 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO EXAMINE DISPUTED PROPERTY 3 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
208-746-9947120s-746-5886 (fax) 
274 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lew'ston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 ( f a )  
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cabloneone.net 
Attorney for PlaintiffslCounterdefendants. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife ) 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 






TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 











1 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
1 AMEND COMPLAINT AND 
) REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 
1 
COME NOW the plaintiffslcounterdefendants above-named by and through their 
attorney of record, Charles A. Brown, and move the Court for leave to amend their Complaint in this 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT AND REPLY TO 
COUNTERCLAIM 1 
Charles A. Brawn, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lcwiston, Idaho 83501 
208-746-9947iz08-746-5886 (fax) 
matter for the purpose of adding a claim for Adverse Possession and also amend the 
plaintiffslcounterdefendants' Reply to the Amended Counterclaim filed by the 
defendants/counterplaintiffs for the purpose of Affirmative Defenses.. 
This motion is based upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) and the court file 
herein. 
A copy of plaintiffslcounterdefendants' proposed Amended Complaint and Amended 
Reply to Amended Counterclaim are attached hereto and the relevant portions which the 
plaintiffs/counterdefendants' wish to amend are set forth herein as follows: 
Proposed Changes to Complaint: 
Minor changes were made to various parts of the Complaint, i.e., replacing 
Mr. Landeck's name withMr. Brown's and said changes are highlighted, and the substantial changes 
are by adding a fifth and sixth cause of action and deleting the demand for jury trial as follows: 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Adverse Possession 
51. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth 
here. 
52. That the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title have fully and 
completely satisfied the statutory requirements of Idaho Code section 
5-210 and its interpretive case law in order to establish title to tlle 
Disputed Property by way of Adverse Possession for the continuous 
5-year time period required by said statute. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Equitable Estoppel 
53. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth here. 
54. That the defendants herein should be equitably and legally 
estopped and prevented from setting forth any defense whatsoever to 
the above-stated causes of action due to the fact that the defendants 
have already received compensation from their predecessor in title in 
regard to the value of the Dispute Property as set forth above. Thus, 
the defendants should be equitably and legally estopped from again 
alleging or claiming any interest to the Disputed Property due to the 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT AND REPLY TO 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
PO. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewiston Idaho 83501 
20s-746-9947120s-146-5886 (fa) 
276 
equitable and legal estoppel concepts in common law or also due to 
the applicability of Idaho Code section 6-1606. 
Proposed Changes to Reply to Counterclaim: 
Again, minor changes were made to various parts of the Reply and said changes are 
highlighted, and the substantial changes are by adding the following responses and affirmative 
defense: 
10. As to paragraph 64 of the Amended Counterclaim, 
counterdefendants deny the same. 
11. As to paragraph 65 of the Amended Counterclaim, 
counterdefendants deny the same. 
12. As to paragraph 66 of the Amended Counterclaim, 
counterdefendants deny the same. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. That the defendantslcounterplaintiffs herein should be 
equitably and legally estopped and prevented from setting forth any 
defense whatsoever to the above-stated causes of action due to the 
fact that the defendants/counterplaintiffs have already received 
compensation from their predeceasor in title in regard to the value of 
the Dispute Property as set forth above. Thus, the defendants should 
be equitably and legally estopped from again alleging or claiming any 
interest to the Disputed Property due to the equitable estoppel 
concepts in common law or also due to the applicability of Idaho 
Code section 6-1606. In the alternative anv amounts received bv the 
defendantslcounterplaintiffs should be set off as against any amount 
allegedly due pursuant to their counterclaim. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED on this &day of June, 2005. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT AND REPLY TO 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 122SN24 Main St. 
Lowiston. Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax) 277 
I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
mailed by regular first class mail, - sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
b< sent by facsimile, mailed by sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivew 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
N. 214 Main Street 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Office 
514 South Polk Street # 6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
/a 
on this -day of June, 2005. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT AND REPLY TO 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746d886 (fax) 278 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
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Plaintiffs GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. WEITZ (hereinafter referred to 
as "WEITZES"), husband and wife, and WEITZ & SONS, LLC (all plaintiffs are collectively 
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referred to as "plaintiffs"), by and through their attorney, Charles A. Brown, for claims against 
defendants, and each of them, hereby allege as follows: 
JURISDICTION 
1. The Court, has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 1-705 and jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-514. 
Venue is proper in Latah County pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401. 
2. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division. 
PARTIES, CLAIMS, AND GENERAL FACTS 
3. The plaintiffs WEITZES are husband and wife and hold title in fee simple 
absolute, founded upon a recorded written instrument, to the East 112 of the Northeast 114 of Section 
8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian in Latah County, Idaho ("E 112 NE 114" or 
"Weitz property"). The plaintiffs WEITZ 62 SONS, LLC, is an Idaho limited liability company and 
holds title in fee simple absolute to the West 112 of the Northeast 114 of Section 8, Township 40 
North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian in Latah County, Idaho ("W 112 NE 114" or "LLC property"). 
(The Weitz property and LLC property are collectively referred to as "plaintiffs' property.") 
4. Defendants and their claims to real estate situate in the State of Idaho, County 
of Latah, affected by this action, are as follows: 
4.1 Defendants TODD GREEN and TONIA GREEN are husband and wife 
(hereinafter referred to as "GREENS") and claim title to the real property more particularly described 
in Exhibit A, attached to this Amended Complaint ("Tract 4"). 
4.2 GREENS granted a deed of trust on real properly they claim, including Tract 
4, recorded December 16,2002, as instrument No. 471 571, records of Latah County, Idaho, to U.S. 
Bank Trust Company, N.A., as trustee, in favor of Defendant U.S. Bank N.A., as beneficiary. 
4.3 Defendants DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE (hereinafter 
referred to as "CASTLES") are husband and wife and claim title to the real property more 
particularly described in Exhibit B attached to this Amended Complaint ("Tract 1"). 
4.4 Defendants STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK 
(hereinafter referred to as "SHOOKS") are husband and wife and claim title to the real property inore 
particularly described in Exhibit C attached to this Amended Complaint ("Tract 2"). 
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4.5 Plaintiffs have made a diligent search for all others having an interest in this 
action and havefound none. Therefore, plaintiffs allege a claim to quiet title against all unknown 
owners and/or interest holders. 
5. Tract 1, Tract 2, and Tract 4 (collectively "defendants' property") lie adjacent 
to and south of plaintiffs' property. The location of the shared boundary between plaintiffs' property 
and defendants' property is at issue in this case. 
6. Plaintiffs are successors in interest to Consuelo Weitz's grandfather, Fred J. 
Schoepflin, who acquired the NE 114 of said Section 8 by Warranty Deed recorded December 13, 
1929, under Instrument No. 113310, records of Latah County, Idaho. 
7. Fred J. Schoepflin deeded the NE 1/4 of said Section 8 to Consuelo Weitz's 
parents, Howard and Constance Schoepflin, in 1967. 
8. Constance Schoepflin subsequently passed away, and Howard Schoepflin 
re-manied. Howard Schoepflin and his then wife, Sylvia Schoepflin, deeded the E 112 NE 114 to 
Weitzes in 1977. Howard Schoepflin and Sylvia Schoepflin deeded the W 112 NE 114 to 
Sylvia Schoepflin's children ("Yeatts") in 2002. Yeatts deeded the W 112 NE 114 to Weitz & Sons, 
LLC, in February, 2003. 
9. All Schoepflindeeds referenced above, conveying the E 112NE 114 and W 112 
NE 114, contained legal descriptions by division of quarter section rather than by metes and bounds. 
The Yeatts deed referenced above, conveying the W 112 NE 114, contained a legal description by 
division of quarter section rather than by metes and bounds. 
10. A fence and fenceline were constructed no later than 1929 and have existed 
in the same place since that time in the vicinity and running easterly and westerly over the entire 
length of the quarter-section line between the NE 1/4 and SE 114 of said Section 8 (the "fence and 
fenceline"). 
11. GREENS employed Ronald P. Monson, professional land surveyor, who 
performed a survey in 2002 of the SE 114 of said Section 8 (the "Monson survey"). The Monson 
survey determined that said fence and fenceline are located as little as approximately 75 feet, and as 
much as approximately 150 feet, south of the quarter-section line and running easterly and westerly 
over the entire length of the quarter-section line between the NE 114 and SE 114 of said Section 8. 
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12. WEITZES claim ownership of the property lying between said quarter-section 
line and said fence and fenceline adjacent to the W 112 NE 114, and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, claims 
ownership of the property lying between said quarter-section line and said fence and fenceline 
adjacent to the E 112 NE 114. According to the Monson survey, the property claimed by plaintiffs 
collectively totals approximately 8.57 acres (collectively the "Disputed Property"). 
13. Fred J. Schoepflin and Howard Schoepflin (collectively "Schoepflins") 
consistently pastured cattle on the NE 114 of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property from 1929 
through 1972. 
14. By 1967, a road had been constructed by Schoepflins within the Disputed 
Property and north of the fence and fenceline running easterly and westerly for the entire length of 
the Disputed Property (the "road"). 
15. The road has been continuously used and maintained by the plaintiffs and 
Schoepflins since 1967 for hunting, hiking, motorcycling, snowmobiling, logging and vehicular 
access to areas within plaintiffs' property and the Disputed Property. 
16. WJZITZES have harvested firewood from the Disputed Property on a frequent 
and continuing basis since 1977. 
17. The Rogers family ("Rogers"), predecessors in interest to defendants in the 
SE 114 of said Section 8, never objected to any of the above-described activities undertaken by the 
Schoepflins and plaintiffs on the Disputed Property. 
18. In the 19501s, Fred Schoepflin selectively logged a portion of the NE 114 of 
said Section 8 and the Disputed Property, to the fence and fenceline and not southerly of the fence 
and fenceline. In 1991, WEITZES selectively logged a portion of the NE 114 of said Section 8 and 
the Disputed Property to the fence and fenceline and not southerly of the fence and fenceline. Neither 
the Rogers nor any predecessor in interest to the Rogers, ever protested or disputed the Schoepflins' 
or WEITZES' selective logging operations within the Disputed Property. 
19. The SE 114 of said Section 8 was heavily logged at least twice since 1929 by 
Rogers or their predecessor in interest to ihe fence and fenceline and not northerly of the fence and 
fenceline. 
20. In November, 1963, Fred Schoepflin and his wife leased a site within the 
Disputed Property to Merrill Hart for a "radio receiving and sending" station, for ten years, pursuant 
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to a Lease Agreement recorded in Book 14, Page 389, Instrument No. 223359. records of Latah 
County, Idaho. Mr. Harl concurrently thereto entered into an Agreement with Latah County and the 
City of Moscow to constmct said "radio receiving and sending" station for operation by the Latah 
County Sheriff's Office and the Moscow Police Department, which Agreement was recorded inBook 
14, Page 391, Instrument No. 223360, records of Latah County, Idaho. A structure was then 
constructed within the Disputed Property, north of the road, to house and operate the "radio receiving 
and sending" station. Remains of that structure are still visible within the Disputed Property and 
north of the road. The Rogers never disputed the Schoepflins' said lease activity or the construction 
of said "radio receiving and sending" station within the Disputed Property. 
21. In 1994, WEITZES installed a blue gate on the eastern boundary of plaintiffs' 
property and a connecting hogwire fence that extended southerly along the eastern boundary of the 
Disputed Property to its intersection with the fence and fenceline to keep intruders from trespassing 
on the NE 114 of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property. The Rogers never disputed the 
WEITZES' installation of the hogwire fence along the eastern boundary of the Disputed Property. 
22. The "true," actual boundary between the NE 114 and SE 114 of said Section 
8 was unknown to any owners of the NE 114 and SE 114 until the Monson survey was completed. 
23. On information and belief, some defendants or their agents, at some time 
during the month of July, 2003, damaged a significant portion of the fence and fenceline by cutting 
the fence wire approximately every twenty feet of its length, by destroying some fence posts, and by 
destroying rock piles that helped stabilize some of the fence posts. 
24. On information and belief, on or about July 28, 2003, defendant 
TODD GREEN trespassed on said NE 114 and the Disputed Property, while armed with a handgun, 
and acted in an aggressive and threatening manner toward an agent of the WEITZES. 
25. Defendants have asserted claims of ownership to the Disputed Property and 
demanded that plaintiffs not enter upon the Disputed Property. 
26. Defendants' conduct has hindered plaintiffs planned forestry, agricultural, and 
other operations and uses on the Disputed Property and continues to do so. 
F9RST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Quiet Title - Boundary by Agreement andlor Acquiescence 
27. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth here. 
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28. The true, actual boundary line between the NE 114 and SE 114 of said Section 
8 was unknown from at least 1929 until the Monson survey was completed in 2002. 
29. Said fence and fenceline were constructed in approximately 1929. On 
information and belief, there is no evidence as to the manner or circumstances of the original 
location of the fence and fenceline. 
30. The fence and fenceline have long existed and been recognized by the 
respective property owners as the boundary between plaintiffs' property and defendants' property. 
31. Since 1929, the respective property owners have treated the fence and 
fenceline as the property line or boundary between plaintiffs' property and defendants' property. 
32. Since 1929, plaintiffs and their predecessors have exercised dominion and 
control over the entirety of the real property north of the fence and fenceline consistent with 
ownership. 
33. The Disputed Property belongs to plaintiffs by virtue of the doctrine of 
boundary by agreement, and the Court should quiet title in plaintiffs against all other interests. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Quiet Title - Estoppel and Latches 
34. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth here. 
35. For approximately 70 years, defendants and their predecessors sat idly by and 
allowed plaintiffs and their predecessors to use the Disputed Property as their own and to maintain 
stewardship of the Disputed Property at the expense of plaintiffs and their predecessors. 
36. For approximately 70 years, defendants and their predecessors treated the 
fence and fenceline as the boundary between the NE 114 and SE 114 of said Section 8. 
37. For approximately 70 years, defendants and their predecessors took the 
position that the Disputed Property belonged to the plaintiffs and their predecessors. 
38. At the time GREENS, CASTLES, and SHOOKS purchased their respective 
parcels, they had actual, constructive, or inquiry notice that the Disputed Property did not belong to 
them, regardless of their respective deed language. 
39. It would now be unconscionable and inequitable for the defendants to take a 
contrary position to that previously taken by them and their predecessors and to act inconsistently 
with such prior conduct. 
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40. The doctrines of estoppel, including but not limited to quasi-estoppel and 
equitable estoppel, and latches apply to prevent defendants from asserting ownership over, or any 
interest in, the Disputed Property. 
41. The Court should quiet title to the Disputed Property in plaintiffs against all 
other interests. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Prescriptive Easement 
42. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth here. 
43. Plaintiffs and their predecessors have made open, notorious, continuous, and 
uninterrupted use of the road within the Disputed Property as described above and have consistently 
logged and harvested firewood within the Disputed Property, for a period of more than five years. 
44. Plaintiffs and their predecessors have made such uses within the Disputed 
Property under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the defendants and their predecessors. 
45. Plaintiffs axe entitled to a judgment confirming in their favor a prescriptive 
easement for continued use of the road and for logging and harvesting firewood within the Disputed 
Property. 
FOURTEI CAUSE OF ACTION 
Trespass 
46. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth here. 
47. As described above, on information and belief, defendant TODD GREEN 
andlor some other defendant(s) and/or their agent(s) entered upon plaintiffs' property and, among 
other damages, damaged plaintiffs' fence and fence improvements. 
48. Plaintiffs did not consent to such entry. 
49. Plaintiffs were harmed by such entry. 
50. Plaintiffs suffered damages by such entry in amounts to be proven at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Adverse Possession 
51. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth here. 
52. That the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title have fully and completely 
satisfied the statutory requirements of Idaho Code section 5-210 and its interpretive case law in order 
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to establish title to the Disputed Property by way of Adverse Possession for the continuous 5-year 
time period required by said statute. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Equitable Estoppel 
53. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth here. 
54. That the defendants herein should be equitably and legally estopped and 
prevented from setting forth any defense whatsoever to the above-stated causes of action due to the 
fact that the defendants have already received compensation from their predeceasor in title in regard 
to the value of the Dispute Property as set forth above. Thus, the defendants should be equitably and 
legally estopped from again alleging or claiming any interest to the Disputed Property due to the 
equitable and legal estoppel concepts in common law or also due to the applicability of Idaho Code 
section 6-1606. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, plaintiffs retained the 
services of Charles A. Brown to prosecute this action on their behalf, and plaintiffs have agreed to 
pay said attorney a reasonable fee for his services. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees 
against defendants, some or all of them, pursuant to Idaho law, including but not limited to Idaho 
Code section 12-121. 
RIGBT TO AMEND 
55. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this Amended Complaint as this matter 
proceeds. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray forrelief and demand judgment against the defendants, 
some or all of them, individually andlor jointly and severally, as follows: 
FLRST: Quieting title to the Disputed Property in plaintiffs against 
all other interests; 
SECOND: Awarding compensatory and special damages, in amounts exceeding 
the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division, to be proven at trial; 
THIRD: Ordering restitution of the Disputed Property to plaintiffs. 
FOURTH: Declaring an easement by prescription in the Disputed Property in 
favor of plaintiffs. 
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FIFTH: Enjoining defendants from entering the Disputed Property andor 
damaging plaintiffs' fence or fenceposts. 
SIXTH: Awarding reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho law, including 
but not limited to Idaho Code section 12-121; 
SEVENTH: Awarding costs as allows by Idaho law; 
EIGHTH: Granting such other relief as the Court deems just under the 
circumstances. 
DATED on this day of June, 2005. 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
mailed by regular first class mail, - sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
- sent by facsimile, mailed by __ sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
N. 214 Main Street 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Office 
514 South Polk Street # 6 
Moscow. ID 83843 
on this - day of June, 2005. 
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EXHIBIT 4- 
A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SEX of Section 8, T40N, 
R5W BM and being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest comer of SEX of Section 8; thence S 8g051'56' E, 
181 1.61 feet, along the north line of said SEX of Section 8, to the NW comer of 
Tract 4 and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Thence, continuing along said north line, S 8S051'56" E, 825.00 feet to the 
NE comer of said Tract 4 and the NE comer of the SEX of said Section 8; 
Thence S 1°09'40' W, 150.00 feet, along the east line of said SEX of 
Section 8, to a point of intersection with a fence from the west; 
Thence, S 8g027'56" W, 832.31 feet, along said fence, to a point on the 
west line of said Tract 4; 
Thence, leaving said fence, N 3O4I152" E, 160.00 feet, along said west 
line. to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION) 
total area in Tract 4 North of fence =2.95-acres. 
A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SE% of Section 8, T40N, R5W BM 
and being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest corner of SE% of Section 8 and the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Thence S 89'51'56" E, 800.00 feet, along the north line of said SEX of Section 8, 
to the NE corner of Tract 1; 
Thence S 4O45'00" E, 150.00 feet, along the east line of said Tract 1, to a point of 
intersection with a fence from the west; 
Thence N 84O38'17' W, 817.31 feet. along said fence, to a point of intersection 
with the west line of said SE% of Section 8; 
Thence, leaving said fence, N 1°00'27' E, 75.00 feet, along said west line of SEX 
of Section 8. to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION) 
Total area in Tract 1 North of fence 2.07-acres. 
A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SE% of Section 8, T40N, 
R5W BM and being more particularly described as follows: 
~eg inn ' i n~  at the northwest comer of SEX of Section 8; the~ce S 8S051'56" E, 
800.00 feet, along the north line of said SE% of Section 8, to the NW comer of 
Tract 2 and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Thence S 8g051'56" E, 101 1.61 feet. along the north line of said SE% of 
Section 8, to the NE corner of said Tract 2; 
Thence S 3O41'52" W, 160.00 feet, along the east line of said Tract 2, to a 
point of intersection with an east-west fence; 
Thence N 8g016'21" W, 988.95 feet, along said fence, to a point on the 
west line of said Tract 2; 
Thence, leaving said fence, N 4O45'00' W, 150.00 feet, along said west 
line, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION) 
Total area in Tract 2 North of fence = 3.55 acres. 
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Attorney at Law 
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COME NOW the plaintiffslcounterdefendants above-named by and through their 
attorney of record, Charles A. Brown, and hereby amend their Reply to the defendants' Amended 
Counterclaim as follows: 
1.  As to Paragraph 55 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants admit 
the same. 
2. As to Paragraph 56 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants deny 
the same. 
3. As to Paragraph 57 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants deny 
the same. 
4. As to Paragraph 58 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants admit 
they were repairing a fence during the summer of 2003 and deny the remaining allegations of said 
paragraph. 
5. As to paragraph 59 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants 
affirmatively allege that Idaho Code § 6-202 speaks for itself and deny the remaining allegations of 
said paragraph. 
6. As to paragraph 60 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants 
aff~rmatively allege that the boundary between counterplaintiffs' property and counterdefendants' 
property is as established by a fence and/or fenceline as alleged in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
and deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
7. As to paragraph 61 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants 
affirmatively allege that the Northeast comer of counterplaintiffs' property is as established by a 
fence andlor fenceline as alleged in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and deny the remaining 
allegations of said paragraph. 
8. As to paragraph 62 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants admit 
counterplaintiffs have appeared in this action and retained their attorneys and are without 
information as to the remaining allegations of said paragraph and therefore deny the same. 
9. As to paragraph 63 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants deny 
the same. 
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10. As to paragraph 64 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants deny 
the same. 
1 1. As to paragraph 65 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants deny 
the same. 
12. As to paragraph 66 of the Amended Counterclaim, counterdefendants deny 
the same. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
13. Counterdefendants allege affirmative defenses, as follows: waiver; estoppel; 
statute of limitations under Idaho Code sections 5-203, 204, 205, 206 andor 207; laches; and 
acquiescence. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. That the defendantslcounterplaintiffs herein should be equitably and legally 
estopped and prevented from setting forth any defense whatsoever to the above-stated causes of 
action due to the fact that the defendantslcounterplaintiffs have already received compensation from 
their predeceasor in title in regard to the value of the Dispute Property as set forth above. Thus, the 
defendants should be equitably and legally estopped from again alleging or claiming any interest to 
the Disputed Property due to the equitable estoppel concepts in common law or also due to the 
applicability of Idaho Code section 6-1606. In the alternative any amounts received by the 
defendantslcounterplaintiffs should be set off as against any amount allegedly due pursuant to their 
counterclaim. 
WHEMFORE, counterdefendants pray as follows: 
1. That counterplaintiffs take nothing by their Amended Counterclaim and that 
the same be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. That counterdefendants be awarded their reasonable attorney fees and costs 
in having to defend against counterplaintiffs' Amended Counterclaim as allowed by Idaho law. 
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3. That such other relief be granted as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED on this - day of June, 2005. 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for PlaintiffsICounterdefendants 
I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
mailed by regular first class mail, sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
sent by facsimile, mailed by ___ sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
N. 214 Main Street 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq 
Schwam Law Office 
514 South Polk Sheet # 6 
Moscow. ID 83843 
on this day of June, 2005. 
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MOTION IN LIMINE 
COME NOW the PlaintiffslCounterdefendanis above-named by and through their 
attorney of record, Charles A. Brown, and hereby moves this Court to issue an order in limine as to 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs concerning the following: 
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1) That at the hearing on the preliminary injunction in this matter, it was 
indicated by the DefendantsICounterplaintiffs that they are relying upon a defense that would be 
characterized as a bona fide purchaser. 
2) Said affirmative defense was not plead as an affirmative defense in the answer 
that was filed in this matter. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12 (b) requires that "Every defense, in law or fact, 
to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto . . ." and must be plead in an affirmative way in 
order to put all parties on notice as to what the issues are at trial so that the pleadings define the 
relevant issues that are going to be tried in this matter. 
THEREFORE, the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants do hereby move for an Order in this 
matter excluding any and all witnesses or evidentiary material of any nature that would go to support 
the bona fide purchaser defense that the DefendantsICounterplaintiffs in this matter made reference 
to at the preliminary injunction hearing. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED on thiz 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
(5L.JL3 krn ,  
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax) 
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I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
- mailed by regular first class mail, s e ~ ~ t  by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 -Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
sent by facsimile, mailed by - sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
___ hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
N. 2 14 Main Street 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwmn, Esq. 
Scl~watn Law Office 
514 South Polk Street # 6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
on this & day of June, 2005. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P 0. Box 12251324 Maio St. 
Lowislan, Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-716-5886 (fax 297 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (Tax) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cabloneone.net 
Attorney for PlaintiffslCounterdefei~dants. 
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1 AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. 
) LANDECK IN SUPPORT OF 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS - 1 
j PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS 
Cllaries A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Maill St. 
Lewiston. Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax) 
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
: SS. 
County of Latah 1 
RONALD J. LANDECK, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says: 
1. That your affiant is competent to testify in this matter, that I am over age of 
18, and that I make the statements herein of my own personal knowledge and belief. 
2. That your affiant is a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho and my 
practice is located at 414 South Jefferson, Moscow, Idaho. 
3. That your affiant was the attorney of record for the above-named plaintiffs in 
the above-entitled matter until May 3 1, 2005, wherein a substitution of counsel was entered into 
between myself and Charles A. Brown. 
4. That during the hearing on the preliminary injunction on April 15,2005, in 
this matter, I was first made aware that the defendants in this matter are attempting to rely upon a 
bona fide purchaser defense. 
5. That said bona fide purchaser defense has not been plead as an affirmative 
defense in this matter. 
6 .  That also during said hearing on the preliminw injunction, I became aware 
for the first time that the defendants in this matter had already received a settlement in excess of 
$40,000.00 in regard to monies received by them for the very acreage in dispute. This money was 
received by the defendants herein from their predecessor in title. 
7.  That your affiant has ordered a transcript of the preliminary injunction 
hearing, but as of this date, I have not received said transcript. 
8. That your affiant nor the attorneys for the defendants in this matter have sent 
or responded to any type of formal discovery inclusive of interrogatories, requests for production, 
andlor depositions. 
9. That your affiant has allowed the defendants until July 1,2005, to supply the 
plaintiffs with their lay witness list and their expert witness list. This extension was due in part to 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS - 2 
Chaiies A. Brown, Bq. 
PO. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lawiston, Idaho 83501 
108-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax 
Jun ,lo 2005 2:23PM 
neghtiations whichpl~ysically (lucctings) occwcd onMay 12,  and 17,2005, ;utd actually continued 
beyond said dates. 
DATED on this may of June, 2005. 
~phald J. Landeck 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t b Pefore me on this &aY of  Junee 
I, Charles A. Brow, hereby certifi that atrue and coaecl copy ofthe foregoing was: 
- mailed by regular first class mail, sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-B82-1908. Magym 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - S c h m  
X sent by facsimile, mailed by - sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class inail, and overnight delivery 
deposited'in the United States 
Post Office 
- hand delivered 
to: Robefl M. Magyar 
AEorney at Law 
N. 214 Main Street 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
/D on this -day of June. 2005. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD J. LANDECK 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAMTJFFS' MOTIONS - 3 
Andrew M. Schwan, Esq. 
Schwam taw Office 
514 Soutl~ I'ollc Strect db 6 
Moscow. 11) 83843 
Cbrrloa A. RIOW. E q .  
P.O. Do* lUS( l id  Msln St. 
L m 6 r r ~ n .  llklloBJS0l 
LOB-1ih9961110&74GS(I86 (fnO 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fax) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cabloneone.net 
Attorney for PlaintiffslCou~~terdefendants. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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) Case No. CV 2004-000080 
) 
1 MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
WITNESS LIST 
1 
COME NOW the plaintiffs/counterdefendants above-named by and through their 
attorney of record, Charles A. Brown, and hereby move this Court to allow them to supplement their 
witness list by allowing witnesses to be called as set forth on the witness list already provided by 
MOTION TO AMEND WITNESS LIST - 1 
Chzlcs A. Brown. Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
20s-746-99471208-746-2886 (fan) 
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Mr. Landeck dated May 27,2005, and to allow the witnesses on the list which is attached hereto on 
the following basis: 
1. For the reasons as set forth in the Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck filed herein. 
2. On the basis that the bona fide purchaser defense, if the defendants are 
allowed to rely upon that, has not been properly plead and the plaintiffs have only recently been 
made aware of it. 
3. That the defendants have already received payment of approximately 
- 
$40,000.00 for the Disputed Property which is now contested in this matter. 
4. That no formal. discovev has been initiated? and. the trial is not set unti! 
September 15,2005, and thus allowing the supplementation of the witness Iist is not harmful to the 
defendants in any manner. 
5. That the defendants witness list is not due, by stipulation, until July 1,2005. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED on this 13th day of June, 2005. . - 
f A l n . ~ L  
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for PlaintiffsICounterdefendants 
Charles A. Brown. Eso 
PO. Box 12251324&in St. 
MOTION TO AMEND WITNESS LIST - 2 Lawiston, Iddia 83501 208-746-9947008-746-5886 (fax) 
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SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS LIST 
Robert L. Brower, Attonley at Law, P.O. Box 854, Lewiston, Idaho 83501,208-746- 
0453, attonley for Rogers family and or INEZ ROGERS FAMILY TRUST during negotiations in 
regard to payment of approximately $40,000.00 to defendant Todd Green. 
Members of Rogers family involved with negotiations in regard to payment of 
approximately $40,000.00 to defendant Todd Green. We believe their names are Thomas Rogers 
and Sharon McCadam, both trustees of the .INEZ ROGERS FAMILY TRUST which trust, we 
believe, owned the Rogers property prior to transfer to defendant Todd Green. 
KC Albright and Carole Hughes, Nearing Addition resident and attendee of August 
2002 meeting with Green, of 1 148 Nearing Rd., Moscow, Idaho, 208-882-2209. They would testify 
concerning the Greens dismantling a fence that had been a long-time border between the 
RogersIGreen property and their property. 
Jerry and Harley Wright, husband and wife, Nearing Addition resident and attendee 
of August 2002 meeting with Green, of 11 17 Nearing Rd., Moscow, Idaho, 208-882-4166. They 
would testify that they were aware of the fence in dispute and Jerry would testify that he was not 
aware, based upon his observations, of any internal fencing on the RogersIGreen side of the disputed 
fence. He would testify to the road system north of the disputed fence, and also testify to traversing 
the Rogers property. 
Guy Nearing, of I0 t 9 Nearing Rd., Moscow, Idaho, 208-882-5390. Mr. Nearing was 
the developer of the Nearing Addition. Ile shared borders with Rogers. Ile has been in the area 
since 1940. 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fax) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cabioneone.net 
Attorney for ~1aintiffsICounterdefendants. 
CLERI( QF DiSi'RIC'T COURT 
Lb,TAi-i COUNTY 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 1 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife 1 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 . , .  
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1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. ) 
GREEN, husband and wife, 1 
STEVEN P. SHOOK a ~ d  PJI.A.RY F 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 




I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify the following: 
That on June 10,2005, the following documents were attempted to be served upon 
Robert M. Magyar, one of the attorneys for the defendants, by facsimile which attempt failed due 
Charlcs A Brown, Esq 
P 0 BOX 12251324 Main St 
Lew~sfon. Idaho 83501 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1 20~-7~~.99~7120~-74a-5~8~ (fax) 305 
to his office being closed and apparently the fax machine not being turned on. Also, facsimile 
service was attempted upon the other attorney for the defendants, Andrew M. Schwam, and the 
person answering the phone directed us to mail the items. Regardless, the following documents 
were confirmed as being physically received by Mr. Schwam's office on Monday, June 13,2005, 
due to the fact that all were mailed on June 10,2005, and a call to Mr. Magyar's office has not been 
returned: 
Motion in Limine 
Motion for Order to Examine Disputed Property 
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Reply to Amended Counterclaim 
Affidavit of Cl~arles A. Brown in Support of Motion to Examine Disputed Property 
Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions 
Various Notice of Hearings 
That on June 13,2005, plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Witness List and Notice or  
Hearing were hand delivered to the defendant's counsel Robert M. Magyar's office at 530 South 
Asbuv Street, Suite 5, Moscow, Idaho, and Mr. Schwarn's officeat 5 14 South Polk Street, Moscow, 
Idaho. 
Attorney for PlaintiffsICounterdefendants 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 2 
Charles A. Brawn, Erq. 
PO. Box 1225/324 Mail, St. 
Lewiston, Ida110 83501 
208-746-99471208.746-5886 (fa 
I, Charles A. Brown, liereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
b( mailed by i e g u h  first class mail, - - sent by facsimile oilly 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
sent by facsimile, mailed by - sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Office 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, ID 83843 
on this 14th day of June, 2005. 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 3 
Cliaries A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1225/324 Main St. 
Lewismn, Idaho 83501 
208-746-W47120&746-5886 
Charles A. Brown 
Allorncy at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fau) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cableone.net 
Attorney for PlaintiffsICounterdefendant~. 
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RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO 
AND MOTION TO STFUKE 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
WITNESS LIST 
C!,sr!er A. Bmwn, &*Q. 
1',0. @ox 122SR24 Mais3 $1. 
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CO- NOW t l~c  Pf aintiffs above-named by and through their atto~ney ~f record, 
CI~arles A. Brown, and hereby respond to Defendants' Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Witness List as follows: 
Defendants objcctedto the filing of the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Witness Ljst because 
it was not filed in a timely manner, permission of file Court wps not sought, and because Plaintiffs 
failed to designate if it was lay or expert witnesses that were being listed thereon. 
The failure to obtain the Court's permission is now rendered moot because the 
Plaintiffs' new counsel, Charles A. Brown, has made exactly rhat request, and a hearing on that 
motion is pending for June 27,2005. 
The failure to designate as lay witness or expert witness is an inappropriate argument 
in that Plaintiffs' previous counsel clearly designated that the wi tnes~e~ set fo ih  on the Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Witness List were to be lay witnesses. 
The timeliness issue of the filing of the Supplemental Witness List has been 
responded to in a variety of ways including Motion to Supplement Witness List, the Afiidavit of 
Ronald 5. Landeck, tile Motion for Leave to Amend ~ o m ~ l a i n i  a dReply to Counterclaim, and the 
argument set forth in the Motion in Liminc, and the Motion for Order to Examine Disputed Property 
and Affidavit of Charles A. Brown in Support thereof, all filed in this matter and all of wl~ich are 
scheduled to be heard on June 27,2005. 
In addition to the arguments set forth therein, there have been some startling 
disclosures that have recently occurred. Asnoted in d ~ e  Affidavit ofRonald J. Landeck, he indicated 
that the testimony obtained at the hearing on the Preliminary Injunction revealed a prior settlement 
concerning the Weitzs' claim had already occurred. 
When Charles A. Brown became counsel for the Plaintiffs in &is matter, he contacted 
Mr. Robert Brower, an attorney in Lewiston, Idaho, concerning the contents of said settlerne~ll. 
Mr. Brower was not able to respond because the Settlement Agreement and Rclease 
of Claims, dated the day of August, 2003, as between The Inez FI. Rogers Family Trust, the 
predecessor in title, and Mr. and Mrs Green, the Defendants herein, contained a conlidentiality 
provision. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
PLAINTIFFS' SUl'PLENLENTAL 
WITNESS LIST 
Chnrlcs A, Brown. Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Mnio St 
Lr~)lslo~l, ld~llo 83501 
108.766-99671258-746-5886 (I=) 
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Said Settlemcni Agreemcntrevealed that Mr. Green used the Weilzs' claim in order 
to obtain a reduction in the purchase price from the Rogers in the arnount of $46,247.16 (see 
attached) which the Greens owed the Inez H. Rogers Family Trust. The Settlement Ageenlent and 
Release of Claims reads in part: 
5. Weitz claim ownership of approximately 8.57 acres of the 
surveyed 160 acres deeded to Greens by Rogers (hereinafter the 
'"disputed property"). 
6. The disputed properiy lies north of what appears to be the 
remnants of an old barbed wire strand fence (hereintifter the "disputed 
fence"). . . . 
13. Greens will, accept the sum of $46,247.16 as a full, final and 
'complete settlement of all Greens claims against Rogers related to the 
disputed property. . . . 
14. ??lep&es will keep rile ternwand conditions of this Settlement 
Agreement confidential. . . . . 
Thus, to restate the time line in h i s  matter: 
1) The PlainWs in this matter, or their predecessors, or their family, and, tl~us 
predecessors in title, have beenin possession of theprope&y up tothe disputed fence line since 1929. 
2)  The Inez H. Rogers Trust sold the property to the Greens on July 26,2002, 
and said Wananty Deed and legal description is inclusive of the property described in the complaint 
as the disputed property. 
3) Greens had Ronald P. Munson perfori a survey of the property in question 
in the fall of 2002, resulting in a record of s w e y  dated January 22,2003. 
4) On February 28,2003, Greens sell to Castles using a Warranty Deed that 
includes the disputed property. 
5) OnMay 13,2003, Greens sell to Shooks using a Warranty Deed that includes 
the disputed property. 
6) On August 1,2003, Greens settled with The Inez H. Rogers Family Trust in 
the amount: of $46,247.16 which said Settlement Agreement doesnot include the Defendants, Castles 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO 
ANI) MOTION TO STRIKE 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
WITNESS LIST 208-7464907RO8-746-5886 (fox) 
or the Defendants Shooks as parties or signators, and said settlement is for a full and final senlement 
of all of Greens' claims against Rogers related to the disputed property, 
7) Attachedhereto is a copy ofthe Settleinent Agreement and Release of Claims 
dated August 1,2003, whiclt was supplied to Charles A. Brown on June 19,2005, (a Sunday) at 7:50 
p.m. Counsel for the Plaintiffs was informed that Mr. Brower had been contacted by counsel for the 
Defendants, Mr. Magyar and Mr. Schwam, and that Nlr. Brower obtained permission &om them to 
release said Settlement Agreement to me at that time. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, th is  Settlement Agreement changes the dynamics and issues of the 
above-entitled case, as do Defendants' indication that they are going to be relying upon a bona fide 
purchaser status type of theory in itsdefense. Thus, additional witness testimony as to those aspects 
of this matter will be necessitated by the Plaintiffs in order to adequately defend or address said 
claims. 
At this time, counsel for the Plaintiffs is not seelciag a continuance of the trial setting, 
but if counsels for the DDcndants feel that such is required by them to timeIy prepare, counsel for 
the PIaintfWs would, with the Cotrrt's permission, certainly accommodate. 
DATED on this 20th day of June, 2005. 
L h  L * J L  
Charles A. B r o k ~  
Attorney for PlaintiffstCounterdefendants 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
WITNESS LIST 
Clindcs A. Brown, Ew. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Mnin St. 
Lcwiston, Idshoe3501 
208-74G-9941~208-7~6-58S6 (isn) 
1, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
- mailed by regular first class mail, - sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
J sent by facsimile, mailed by -- 
regular first class mail, and 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
hand delivered - 
to: Robert M. Magyar - 208-882-1908 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, E s ~ .  - 208-882-4190 
Schwam Law Office 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, ID 83843 
on this 20th day of June, 2005. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTd 
WITNESS LIST 
- sent by Federal Express, 
ovei~~ight delivery 
SETTLEMENT AGREEICTE;Nl' 
AND WLEASE OF CLAIMS 
THIS SETXEMBNT AGREEhlENT AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS (hereinafter also 
L'A~cment") made this la day of August, 2003, is between and among The Inez H Rogers 
Family Trust (hereinafter "Rogers"), and Todd A. maen and Tonia L. Qrccn, husband and wife 
(hereinafter "Greens"). 
RECITALS: 
1. Crreens purchased from Rogers the follo--4ng described real propeny in La th  County. 
State of Idaho: 
The Southeast Quarter of Scction 8, Township 40 No* Pangs 5, West. 
containing 160 acres (hereinafkcr "Greens property"). 
2. oreens received a Wananty Deed for tho Greens property from Rogers, providing in 
part chat Rogers "will defindsaidlitle agoinst all other law@ clufms and demands. ' 
3. Greens have had Greens property surveyed by n licensed survwo;, 
4. Gerald md Consuelo Weitz (hereinafter "Weitz") own property bordering Greens 
property to the no& (hereinafter thc "Weitz property"). 
5. Weitz claim ownership of approximately 8.57 acres of the surveyed 160 acres deeded 
to Oreens by Rogers (hereinafter the "disputed property"), 
6. The disputed propeq lies noah of  what appears to be the remnants of an old barbcd 
wire strand fence (hereinafter the *disputed fence"). W ~ i t z  claims the disputed fence is the 
actual and lcgal boundary hetween ~e Greens pfopertY and Weitz propeny. 
7. Both Greens m d  Rogers deny that the disputed fmce i s  the accuid nnd lcgal boundary 
betwem the Grccns proporty and Weitz property. 
8. Weitz has indicated they will file a quiet title action to vcst titlc in the disputed 
property in Weitz. 
9. Greens heve informed Roge~s that Oreens will tender the defense of the quiet tirle 
action to Rogers, based upon the Wmanty Deed received from Rogers, the connaot documents 
and Idaho law. 
10. Greens owe Rogers the sum of  $169,600.00, includitig interest, on a promissory note 
(bexeinaifter "note") for the purchase of Greens property. 
11. Thc parties have negotiated this written Agreement by whicl-I a final ser~lernent will 
be made bemeen and among then senling, oornpmmising and resolving all claims, rights. 
SETTLEKENT AGREEMENT W D  P.EI,gASE OF CLASMS --I 
, , 
. . . . .: ..... ... :06E:rl, .,00/$00d,r,:.81;b,~ S5569hL80;: . . ?. ,.... . _ i..7::.n:i.i"nmC~:An~~ .. . (. ce:nr cm .-KT-om 
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obligations and liabilities of every kind between and among them arising from or in connection 
with the disputed property and the money due on the no*. 
NOW THEREFORE, in considem~icn of the mutual covenants and undertakings of thc 
patities and the promises to release each other as hwehafter set forth. the parti8s agree as 
follows: 
12. Rogers will accept the sum of $I23,352,84 as R full, final and complete payment of 
rhe note payable by Greens w Rogers. Rogers will reconvey dre Deed of Tmst that securcs 
payment by Greens of  said notc. 
13. areens wilt kcept the sum ofS46J47.16 as a fuli, final and cornplerc setrlemenr of 
all Greens claims against Rogas related to ~e disputed propem. Rogers, will have no further 
liability or responsibility to Greens relating ro the disputed property. 
14.The parries wilt keep the terms and conditions of this Settlement Apreemenr 
confidential. Unless ordered to diwlgc the ttctms of this hgrecrnext by a Coun,of competent 
jurisdiction, the parties, their aftorneys and representatives will keep the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement confidcntial. While the parties may divulge the tcms of this agreement to 
professionals hired and retained by than who need the information in their professional capacity. 
this confidentiality provision will also extend to those professionals. Provided, however. that 
Greens may divulge the Terms of this Agreement to the per chase;^ of parcels From Greens 
property, and their respective hired and retained professionals. 
15. The part.ies sllall execute such documents as may be necessary to carry out and 
effectuate the terms of this Apeement. 
16. Greens hereby relewc and relfnquish any and all claims, rights, causes of eclion and 
dnmagcs against Rogers concerning the disputed property, and agree to indsmnlfq. and hold 
Rogers harmless from any claim cf Weitz or their successors in interest cor!cerning d ~ c  disputed 
property. 
17. Except as eeprcssly provided in this Settlcm&t Agrccmcnt and Release of Claims 
and as a ffirther material inducement for Rogers to enter into this Agreement, Greens irrevocably 
and uncondjtiondl,: relea%, acquit and forever discharge Rogers from any and all charges, 
, . 
complaints, claims, liabilitizs, obligations, promises, agreements, controvcrsics, damages. 
actions, muses of action, suits, rights, Cen~ands, costs, losws, debts and expenses (including 
at~omcys' fees and costs actually incuned) of any naturc whtsocver, .known or unknown which 
Greens may now have, orvn Or hold or claim to have, own or hold or Which G:eens at any time 
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heretofore had, outned or held or claimed to have, owned or held, which relate to the disputed 
Pq- J rn .  
18. Except as expressly provided in th;s Senlemenr Agreement and Release of Claims 
and as a further material inducuncut. for Greens to enter into this Agreement. Rogers-incvocabiy 
and unconditionally relase, acquit and forever discharge &ens from any md all c h ~ e s ,  
complaints, claims, liabilities, obligations, promises, agpments,  controversies, damages, 
actions, causes of action, suits, rights, demands, costs, losses, debts ~ n d  expenpes (including 
attorneys' fees b1d c02f.s actually inourred) of any nature whatmerrer, known or unkno~n which 
Rogers may now have, own or hold or cldm ro have, own or ho13 or which Rogers at any time 
hcrdoforc had, owncd or held or claimed to have, owned or held, which relate to tne disputed 
property and/or the note payeble by Greens to Rogers. 
19. The parties hereto acknowledge that this Agrecmont shall riot, in any way, be 
construed ss an admission of liability, fault or impropriety on any bads whatsoever on the perf of 
any pany. 
20. This Agreement scts fo& the eatire agreement betwccn thc partics hereto and fully 
supersedes m y  and all prior agreements or understandings between the parties pertaining to tht 
$object matter covered herein. This Agreement map not he modified except in writ ing 
subscribed to by all parties. 
21. ALI times provided for in this Agreernenr, or in any other document executed 
hereunder, for the performance of an): act will be strictlyconstmcd, time being of the essence 
22. If any tenn or provision of tbjs Agreement shall, to any extent be determined by a 
corn of competenf jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, h e  remaixder of this Agreement 
shall not be afkcccd thcrcby, and each term aad provision of this Agreemrnt shall be: valid and 
be enforceable to the fdlest exfent permitted by law; and it is the intention of the parties hereto 
that if any provision of this Agreement is capable of ,f construcriona onc of which would 
render rhc provision void and the other of which \vould render die provision valid, the provision 
shall have the meaning which renders it valid, 
23. In the cvcnt .li.tigation is  nccesmy to enforce any of thc tcms, co~cnaas  or 
conditions of ?his Agreement on the pad: of rhe orher tc be performed, co construe :his 
Agreem?nt, or to recover damages for the breach thereof, the prevailing party in such suit shall 
be entitled to receive from the losing p a y  a remnabic amomt of altorney fees 10 be fixed by 
the coun hsving jurisdiction r.horeof and mxed &Q cosm in such suit. 
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24. All parties expressly agree that notwithstanding any statute or rule of law whether 
enacted or in force in Idsho or in any other State, this general release shall be given full force and 
effect according to each and all of its express rcnns aad pmviisions, including those relating to 
unknnwn and unsuspected claims, Icmands, and causes of action, if any. .Each pasty 
acknowledges and agrees that this waiver of rights i s  an essential and ma7eriaI tern of This 
Ameemcnt. Each party has been advised by legal counsel with rcspcct to such waivcr and 
underatand8 and acknowledges thc significance and consequences of this general release and 
express waiver of rights. 
25. Each party represents that this Agreement is a icgal, valid and binding obligation OF 
rhar party enforceable by the terms hereof. 
26. Th6 comidcrations stated herein are csuuactud and not mere rccitals, No promises, 
inducements or agreements not herein expressed have been made by an)* parry and this 
A~reement contains the entire agreenlenr among the parties. Each parry to this Agreement has 
executed and delivered the same after being fd ly  informed of irs rerms. cofienrs and effc~ts, and 
all parties have bein represented and advised by Legal counsel. 
27. Thii Agreement may be executed in courherpms, andtor hy facfacsimile signanirrs, each 
of which shall be deemed aii original, but all of which shall constitute the same instrumen:. 
2S.This Agreement shall be cor~strued and enforced under, in eccordance with and 
govuned by the laws of the Stare cf Idaho and proper vence or  any aclion hereunder shall lie in 
Larah County. Idaho. 
M WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Settlemen1 Agmeme.nt and 
Release of Claims effective this Is' day of August, 2003. 
Todd A, Green and Tonia L. Grccn 
Todd A. Grecn 
A L  
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STATEOF IDAHO 
) 6s. 
county o f  La~ah ) 
tf, On this day of August. 2003, before me, k c  undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said 
slate, gmonally appeared TODD A. GREEN and TONYi I, G-EN, husband and wife, known 10 me to 
be rht persons whose names are subscribed to the foregoing Agreement and acknowledged lo  me that 
IREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and notarial seal on the date lost above 
NOTARY PUBLIC for ltlrlh'6 
Residing at  Moscow. 
My commission cxpircs: 05-05-09 
STATE OF WhSIfMGroN 
1 5 s  
County of Ska&it ) 
On of August, 2003, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said 
Stnte, pergona[ly appearad SHARON McCADAM, known or identified ro me to be one of the persons 
vhoss nara\P;s we subscribed to the foregoi~lg instrument as Trustees OF THE INEZ H. ROGERS 
FAM[LY TRUST, and acknowledged to me that she executed cite same as Tnrstc:. 




RlmJ J. HAU- 
M Y W ~ ~  EM& MSY a 2W5 Rtsidrng 8 1 ! 2 2 / ~  
MY commiss~on expires: C- I -WS' 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of Ada 
=& On this day of August, 2003, ixlfore me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in arid for said 
Stm, personally appeared THOMAS L. ROGERS, known or identified to me tq he one of the persorls 
whose names are subsr ikd  to tha foregoing insnurnent QS Trustees of THE INEZ H. R0GEP.S 
FAMILY TRUST, and acknvwledgtd to me that he executed the samo as Trristcc. 
have hereunto net my halld and notarial seal 00 [Ire date last above 
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MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwanl #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantslCounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. SHOOK 
PlaintiffsICouilterdefendants, 1 RE: WEITZ' 
v. ) 
1 ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) MOTION TO 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SIIOOK, ) EXAMINE THE DISPUTED PROPERTY 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss: 
County of Latah 1 
STEVEN R. SHOOK, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the Defendants - Counterplaintiffs in this matter 
2. The information contained in this affidavit is based upon my own knowledge. 
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3. Before Plaintiffs (herein Weitz) ever fiIed a lawsuit in this matter, Consuelo Weitz, 
one of the Plaintiffs, told me that they (Weitz) had adversely possessed my land up to the "fence" 
they claimed existed. Therefore, the Weitz' adverse possession claim is not new. Weitz were aware 
of this theory at the time they filed their complaint, but decided not to pursue it. 
4. Since at least as far back as 1999, there was no fence enclosing the land claimed by 
Weitz. 
5. I was upon the property a number of times since 1999, and freely used the property, 
and never saw any fence enclosing the property, or any no trespassing signs erected by Weitz. 
6. With regard to Mr. Brown's request that he be permitted to go upon the disputed 
property, and that he be permitted to do so with his clients and others as he chooses with no control 
from the Court with regard to that use, I am very worried, and would object. 
7. The access requested by Mr. Brown would completely undermine the Preliminary 
Injunction, because it would allow the Plaintiffs and their agents free access to the disputed property 
at the sole discretion of their lawyer, without any independent person present to insure that there is 
no further alteration of evidence. Also I would be liable for the safety of these people. I thought 
that was the very thing that the preliminary injunction hearing and resulting Order was supposed to 
prevent. 
8. If the Court feels that Mr. Brown needs access, then I hope that it will permit such 
access only under tight controls that will presewe the site until the time of the Court's viewing. 
9. It is not necessary for Mr. Brown to see this land in order to act as the attorney for 
Weitz. Mr. Schwam has been acting as my attorney for an extended period, and has never seen the 
land. Mr. Schwam has stated to me that he will see the land when the Court sees it. 
10. Todd and Tonia Green are required to defend my title to t l~e  disputedproperty against 
the claims of Weitz by contract, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Todd A. Green. 
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11. I have always required Todd and Tonia Green to defend my title. 
12. My agreement with Todd and Tonia Green even requires that "Notwitl~sta~~ding 
anything to the contrary, the Greens shall, not later than three (3) years from date, by appropriate 
legal action, agreement or otherwise, proceed with Action to Quiet Title [Idaho Code Title 6,  
Chapter 41 to Tract 2 from any and all Weitz potential adverse possession claim[s]." 
13. I have demanded and still demand that Todd and Tonia Green fulfill their contractual 
duties, and defend my title against Weitz. 
DATED this 19"' day of June, 2005. 
S-lei=L~&&/ 
STEVEN R. SHOOK 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 19" day of June, 2005. 
m4+ 
Notary Public in and for & tate of Idaho, 
residing in Moscow, Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: 05-05-09 
OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2oth day of June, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Mh+ 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. SHOOK 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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CLERK OF DlST9iC1' COURT 
LATt\H COUNTY 
BY -.---..- &EPUV 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantsICounterplailltiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 
PlaintiffsiCounterdefei~dants, 1 AFFIDAVIT OF TODD A. GREEN 
v. ) 
1 IN RESPONSE TO THE AFFIDAVIT 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) OF RONALD J. LANDECK 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) AND MOTION W LIMINE 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss: 
County of Latall ) 
TODD A. GREEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the Defendants - Counterplaintiffs in this matter. 
2. The information contained in this affidavit is based upon my own knowledge. 
3. Paragraph 4 of Mr. Landeck's Affidavit is not correct. It is possible that my position 
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in this lawsuit was first understood by Mr. Landeck on April 15,2005, but it is not ttue that he was 
first made aware of it on that date. 
4. In my verified Answer to the Plaintiffs' (herein Weitz) Complaint, I state seventeen 
(17) separate times that the fence that they rely upon in their Complaint does not exist. Of course, 
when I purchased my land I was not aware of something (the fence) that did not exist. 
5. Further, in response to the Plaintiffs' assertion in paragraph 38 of their Complaint, 
that at the time that I purchased my parcel 1 had actual, constructive or inquiry notice that the 
disputed property did not belong to me, I answered with a denial. As became clear at the 
Preliminary Injunction hearing, my denial was truthful, and should not have takenthe Plaintiffs by 
surprise. 
6. My purchase of the disputed property from the Rogers on July 26,2002 has been a 
matter of public record prior to and during this entire lawsuit, and must have been known to Mr. 
Landeck because he sued me, and not the Rogers. 
7.. Mr. Landeck must have known before April 15,2005 that I was a purchaser of the 
disputed property, and that I did not have notice of a fence that I asserted Inany times does not exist. 
8. With regard to paragraph 6 of Mr. Landeck's Affidavit, Mr. Landeck is mistaken. I 
have never received nxonies "for the very acreage in dispute." Please see my Affidavit regarding the 
Rogers Agreement for a detailed explanation. 
9. With regard to paragraph 9 of Mr. Landeck's Affidavit, I was present at the 
discussions and meetings which preceded the Stipulation to extend my side's time to produce its lay 
and expert witness lists. The only reason this extension occurred was to allow my side to stop 
expending funds in preparation of this case because Weitz indicated they wanted to make an earnest 
effort to settle this case, and the more my side spent, the more difficult it would be to settle. My side 
would have had no trouble in complying with the Court's Order and provide its witness lists to the 
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Plaintiffs by June 1,2005, if we had not stopped all preparation at the request of Weitz to facilitate 
settlement. 
10. In fact, before the Stipulation was entered into, Weitz specifically promised that ifwe 
delayed preparation, they would get back to us quickly with a settlement proposal. We delayed 
preparation, but instead of a settlement proposal, we were informed that Mr. Landeck had been fired, 
and that a new attorney would be handling t11e case. 
11. Further, instead of a settlement proposal, we received proposed additions to their 
witness lists, and a variety of motions with regard to the case. 
12. The sole reason for the Stipulation to extend my side's time to subnlit its witness lists 
was as stated above, and was specifically included in the Stipulation itself, where it says, "...the 
likelihood of achieving a settlement will be firthered if defendants, while prepared to meet the 
court's June 1, 2005 deadline for disclosure of lay and expert witnesses, are relieved of the 
substantial costs associated with finalizing their lay and expert witness disclosures while meaningkl 
settlement discussions are occurring." Now, in a very short period of time, we must finalize our 
witness lists while responding to the various motions filed by Weitz' new lawyer. 
13. Mr. Landeck's Affidavit in paragraph 9 makes it sound like be allowed us an 
extension at our request, when in fact we halted all preparation at Weitz' request. Now we find 
ourselves kith a reduced time to prepare, while confronted with the Plaintiffs' efforts to change the 
vely nature of their case. 
14. When we offered the opinion in the Stipulation that the enlargement of time proposed 
in the Stipulation would not adversely affect our ability to be prepared for trial as previously 
scheduled, we had no idea that instead of receiving a settlement offer, the Plaintiffs would move to 
add new claims to their complaint, and file other motions that now require significant time for us to 
respond. 
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DATED this 20Ih day of June, 2005. 
T& A/ ~ r ,  
Todd A. Green 
TO before me this 20" day of June, 2005. 
/ W n A p  
~ o t a r y  Public in and &r the State of Idaho, 
residing in Moscow, Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: 05-05-09 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20" day of June, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
&""-;- 
Robert M. Magyar 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD A. GREEN 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(,$ Band Delivery 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephoile 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwain #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 1 AFFIDAVIT OF TODD A. GREEN 
1 
\ RE: AGREEMENT WITH ROGERS 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, j TRUST 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) RE: WEITZ EQUIThBLE ESTOPPEL 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) CLAIM 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
1 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
ss: 
County of Latah 1 
TODD A. GREEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the Defendants - Counterplaintifls in this matter. 
I 
2. The information contained in this affidavit is based upon my own knowledge. 
I 3. I entered into an agreement with The Inez H. Rogers Family Trust, (herein Rogers) 
AFFIDAVIT 
who was my predecessor in interest in the property that Plaintiffs (herein Weitz) claim, concerning 
Rogers' duty to defend my title to that property, the terms of which could not be revealed without 
court order. However, I have received permission from Rogers (from Thomas L. Rogers, Trustee), 
and from Rogers' attorney, to reveal this document to the Court and to Weitz. A copy of the 
agreement is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference 
4. As is evident froin the Rogers Agreement, Rogers was informed that I was going to 
require that Rogers honor its duty to defend my title against Weitz' claims 
5. When Rogers was informed that I was going to tender the defense of the Weitz claims 
to them, negotiations were held. 
6. The Rogers Agreement released Rogers from their duty to defend against the Weitz 
claims, and paid me a sum of money for relieving Rogers of that duty 
7. The Rogers Agreement did not pay me for any property, or for any property damage. 
I 
I have never received compensatioil from Rogers for the property that Weitz claims. I did not sell 
I 
land to Rogers, and Rogers did not buy land from me in that agreement. The agreeinent did not 
involve a payment to me for the loss of any land. 
8. The Rogers agreement was not a compensation for land, because at the time I entered 
into the agreement with Rogers on August 5, 2003 regarding Rogers' duty to defend my title, I 
already had acquired a contractual duty to defend the titles of Shoolts and Castles. The Shoolc and 
Castle agreements are similar regarding this issue. 
9. The Castle Agreement provides: 
"In accordance with the covenants of title the Castle's will receive with the warranty deed, 
the Greens shall continue to legally defend the title and surveyed amount of 48 acres (record 
of survey 472606) after the Castles take ownership. By this agreement, the Greens will take 
the following action regarding any potential adverse possession claim. Should Dr. & Mrs. 
Weitz proceed with an action that results in the loss of any portion of Tract 1 (sum total 
equaling 48 acres), the Greens will compensate the Castles in the amount of $4000 per acre 
for said losses within 7 days of final judgment." 
10. The Shook agreement provides: 
"In accordance with the covenants of the title that the Shooks will receive with the warranty 
deed, the Greens represent and warrant that they shall continue to legally defend the title and 
surveyed amount of the 31.08 acres (record 472606) after the Shooks take title ownership. 
By this agreement, the Greens will take the following action regarding the WEITZ's 
potential adverse possession claim. Should Dr. & Mrs. Weitz proceed with a legal action 
that results in the loss of any portion of Tract 2 (sum total equaling 3 1.08 acres), the Greens 
shall defend that legal action at their sole cost and expense and will further compensate the 
Shooks in the amount of $4,745.82 per acrf, in cash, for said losses within seven [7] business 
days of the final judgment. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the Greens shall, not 
later than three 131 years from date, by appropriate legal action, agreement, or otherwise, 
proceed with Action to Quiet Title [Idaho Code Title 6, Chapter 43 to Tract 2 from any and 
all Weitz potential adverse possession claim[s]." 
11. A copy of the Shook Agreement is attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
12. Shooks and Castles have never released me from my duty to defend their titles, and I 
have never wanted to part with the important part of my own land claimed by Weitz. That is why 
this case if being vigorously defended. 
13. The agreement I made with the Rogers was not in any way made for the benefit of 
Weitz. Weitz, who have created this lawsuit, and caused so much financial costs to so many, should 
not benefit in any way from my agreement with Rogers. 
14. The agreement with Rogers was not made for conceding this land to Weitz, because 
the Rogers and I have always denied that Weitz owned the disputed land (see especially paragraph 7. 
of the Rogers agreement). 
15. The hct  that the Rogers and I were able to amicably settle our dispute without taking 
the Court's time is irrelevant to, and should not become an issue in, the Weitz' claim to land in 
which they do not hold title, and for which they have never paid. 
16. With the benefit of hindsight, I would never have accepted as small a sum as I did in 
exchange for taking on the Rogers' duty to defend my title. I have learned that the cost of my duty 
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to defend will far exceed the sum I received from Rogers. 
17. The Rogers agreement makes clear that I have not received coinpensation for land, 
but instead have taken on the duty to defend title, which I am doing. 
18. I took on the duty to defend title against Weitz, in part, so that I could control tlie 
direction and insure the quality of the defense against the Weitz claims. 
DATED this 20" day of June, 2005. 
, 
Todd A. ~re'en 
dAf-UL-7 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 20" day of June, 2005. 
&AL 
Notary Public in addr the State of Idaho, 
residing ill Moscow, Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: 05-05-09 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20" day of June, 2005, I caused a m e  and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
&fi- 
Robert M. MagyarO v 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 




AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS (hereinafter also 
"Agreement") made this lSt day of August, 2003, is between and among The Inez H. Rogers 
Family Trust (hereinafter "Rogers"), and Todd A. Green and Tonia L. Green, husband and wife 
(hereinafter "Greens"). 
REXITAILS: 
1. Greens purchased from Rogers the followillg described real property in Latah County, 
State of Jdaho: 
The Southeast Quarter of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 ,  West, 
containing 160 acres (hereinafter "Greens prope~ty"). 
2. Greens received a Warranty Deed for the Greens property from Rogers, providing in 
part that Rogers "will defend said title against all other lawful claims and demands. " 
3. Greens have had Greens property surveyed by a liceiised surveyor. 
4. Gerald and Consuelo Weitz (hereinafter "Weitz") own property bordering Greens 
property to the north (hereinafter the "Weitz property"). 
5 .  Weitz claim ownership of approximately 8.57 acres of the surveyed 160 acres deeded 
to Greens by Rogers (hereinafter the "disputed property"). 
6. The disputed property lies north of what appears to be the remnants of an old barbed 
wire strand fence (hereinafter the "disputed fence"). Weitz claims the disputed fence is the 
actual and legal boundary between the Greens property and Weitz property. 
7. Both Greens and Rogers deny that the disputed fence is the actual and legal boundary 
between the Greens property and 'Weiiz property. 
8. Weitz has indicated they will file a quiet title action to vest title in the disputed 
property in Weitz. 
9. Greens have informed Rogers that Greens will tender the defense of the quiet title 
action to Rogers, based upon the Warranty Deed received from Rogers, the contract documents 
and Idaho law. 
10. Greens owe Rogers the sun? of $169,600.00, iilcludillg interest, on a promissory note 
(hereinafter "note") for the purchase of Greens property. 
11. The parties have negotiated this writtell Agreement by which a final settlement will 
be made between and among them settling, cordpromising and resolving all claims, rights, 
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obligations and liabilities of every kind between and among thein arising from or in connectiol~ 
with the disputed property and the money due on the note. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideratioll of the mutual covenants and undertakings of the 
parties and the promises to release each other as hereinafter set forth, the parties agree as 
follows: 
12. Rogers will accept the sum of $123,352.84 as a full, final and complete payment of 
the note payable by Greens to Rogers. Rogers will reconvey the Deed of Trust that secures 
payment by Greens of said note. 
13. dreells will accept the sum of $46,247.16 as a full, final and complete settlement of 
all Greens claims against Rogers related to the disputed property. Rogers will have no h b e r  
liability or responsibility to Greens relating to the disputed property. 
14. The parties will keep the terms and conditiolls of this Settlement Agreement 
confidential. Unless ordered to divulge the terms of this Agreement by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction, the parties, their attorneys and representatives will lceep the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement confidential. While the parties inay divulge the terins of this agreement to 
professionals hired and retained by them who need the iilformatioll in their professional capacity, 
this confidentiality provision will also extend to those professionals. Provided, however, that 
Greens may divulge the terins of this Agreement to the purchasers of parcels from Greens 
property, and their respective hired and retained professionals 
15. The parties sl~all execute such documents as inay he inecessary to carry out and 
effectuate the terms of this Agreement. 
16. Greens hereby release and relinquish any and all claims, rights, causes of action and 
damages against Rogers concerning the disputed property, and agree to inciemnify and hold 
Rogers harmless from any claim of Weitz or their successors in interest concerning the disp~~ted 
property. 
17. Except as expressly provided in this Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims 
and as a further material inducement for Rogers to enter into this Agreement, Greens irrevocably 
and unconditionally release, acquit and forever discharge Rogers from any and all charges, 
complaillts, claims, liabilities, obligations, promises, agreements, controversies, damages, 
actions, causes of action, suits, rights, demands, costs, losses, debts and expenses (including 
attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred) of any nature whatsoever, known or unlcnown which 
Greens may now have, own or hold or claim to have, owl1 or hold or which Greens at any time 
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heretofore had, owned or held or claimed to have, owlled or held, which relate to the disputed 
property. 
18. Except as expressly provided in this Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims 
and as a further material inducement for Greens to enter into this Agreement, Rogers irrevocably 
and unconditionally release, acquit and forever discharge Greens from any and all charges, 
complaints, claims, liabilities, obligatio~ls, promises, agreemei~ts, controversies, damages, 
actions, causes of action, suits, rights, demands, costs, losses, debts and expenses (including 
attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred) of any nature whatsoever, know11 or unlcnown which 
Rogers may now have, own or hold or claim to have, own or hold or which Rogers at any time 
heretofore had, owned or held or claimed to have, owlled or held, which reiate to tile disputed. 
property andlor the note payable by Greens to Rogers. 
19. The parties hereto acknowledge that this Agreement shall not, in any way, be 
construed as an adlnissio~l of liability, fault or impropriety on any basis whatsoever on the part of 
any party. 
20. This Agreement sets fort11 the entire agreement between the parties hereto and fully 
supersedes any and all prior agreements or understandings behveen the parties pertaining to the 
subject matter covered herein. This Agreement may not be modified except in writing 
subscribed to by all parties. 
21. All times provided for in this Agreement, or in any other document executed 
hereunder, for the performance of any act will be strictly construed, time being of the essence. 
22. If any term or provision of this Agreement shall, to any extent be determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement 
shall not be affected thereby, and each t e rn  and provision of this Agreement shall be valid and 
be enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law; and it is tile intention of the parties hereto 
that if any provision of this Agreement is capable of two constl~~ctions, one of which would 
render the provision void and the other of which would render tile provision valid, the provision 
shall have the meaning which renders it valid. 
23. In the event litigation is necessary to enforce any of the terms, covenants or 
collditions of this Agreement on the part of the otl~er to be performed, to construe this 
Agreement, or to recover damages for the breach thereof, the prevailing party in such suit shall 
be entitled to receive from the losiilg party a reasoilable amount of attorney fees to be fixed by 
the court having jurisdiction thereof and taxed as costs in such suit. 
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24. All parties expressly agree that notwithstanding any statute or rule of law whether 
enacted or in force in Idaho or in any other State, this general release shall be given full force and 
effect according to each and all of its express terms and provisions, including those relating to 
unlcnown and unsuspected claims, demands, ,and causes of action, if any. Each party 
acknowledges and agrees that this waiver of rights is an essential and material term of this 
Agreement. Each party has been advised by legal counsel with respect to such waiver and 
understands and acknowledges the significance and consequences of illis general release and 
express waiver of rights. 
25. Each party represents that this Agreement is a legal, valid and binding obligation of 
that party enforceable by the telins hcreof. 
26. The considerations stated herein are cont~:actual and not mere recitals. No promises, 
inducements or agreements not herein expressed have been made by any party and this 
Agreement contains the entire agreement among the parties. Each party to this Agreement has 
executed and delivered the same after being fully informed of its tenns, contents and effects, and 
all parties have been represented and advised by legal counsel. 
27. This Agreement may be executed in counterpa~ts, andlor by facsiinile signatures, each 
of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which shall constitute the saue instrument. 
28. This Agreement shall be construed and enforced under, in accordance with and 
governed by the laws of the State of Idaho and proper venue of any action hereunder shall lie in 
Latah County, Idaho. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Settlement Agreement and 
Release of Claims effective this I day or  August, 2003. 
The Inez H. Rogers Family Trust 
Todd A. Green and Tonia L. Green 
T A l  ; A - A  
Todd A. Green Tonia L. Greeii 
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
Couiity of Latah ) 
fd 
On this day of August, 2003, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said 
state, personally appeared TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, h~isbalid and wife, known to me to 
be the persons whose names are subscribed to the foregoing Agreement and acknowledged to lne that 
thev executed the same. 
have t set my hand and notarial seal on tile date last 
Residing at M ~ o o w .  
My commissioii expircs: 05-05-09 
above 
STATE OF WASI3JNGTON ) 
) ss 
County of Skagit ) 
0x1 this & day of August, 2003, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said 
State, personally appeared SHARON McCADAM, k~iown or ide~ltified to me to be one of tlie persons 
wliose names are subscribed to tlie foregoing instriuinenl as Trustees of THE NEZ F-I. ROGERS 
FAMILY TRUST, and acknowledged to me that slie executed tile same as Trustee 
M WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand aid  notarial seal on the date last above 
written. N~f&ry  Public 
0% We~hingfon 
8HIRLEY K. NYLANEg 
MY GQMMISSION EXPIRES / 
NOVEUBf R 1,2003& 
co~limissioil expires: 4 /,a 
! 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
t ss 
Coulity of Ada ) 
On this day of Augnst, 2003, before me, the iindersig~iecl, a Notary Public in aiid for said 
State, personally appeared THOMAS L. ROGERS, knowii or ideiitified to me to be oiie of the persons 
whose naines are subscribed to the foregoilig iiistruineiit as Trustees of THE N E Z  H ROGERS 
FAMlLY TRUST, and ack~iowledged to liie tliat he executed the satlie as Trustee. 
IN WlTNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my halid and liotarial seal on the date last above 
written 
y co~ii~ii iss~o~i expires: 
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ROAD AND BOUNDARY AGREEMENT 
.r 
This agreement is entered into on - /3 ,2003, by TODD GREEN and 
TONLA GREEN, husband and wife, on behalf of themselves and STEVEN R. SHOOK 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, owners of the real property described herein as 
Tract 2. 
RECITALS 
1. The Greens have acquired a tract of land consisting of 160 acres, more or less, in Latah 
County, Idaho, described as foilows: 
The Southwest Quarter of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian. 
They have divided it into four tracts, referred to herein as Tract 1 through Tract 4, whose 
specific legal descriptions are set forth in the record of survey under catalog number 
472606 (dated January 22,2003), records of Latah County, State of Idaho. 
2. Now, therefore, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
3. By this agreement the Greens wiU complete the construction of the private road 
servicing the Green Addition. To insure fiinds are available to complete paving, the 
Greens have secured a Money Market Certificate in the amount of the Poe Asphalt's bid 
(bid copy attached) with a maturation date of July 2004 (bank record attached), which 
Money Market Certificate shall be deemed irrevocable by the parties until such a time as 
the paving improvements and road work have been &Uy completed. All road 
construction and paving wiU be completed by September 1,2004. 
AGREEMENT IN THE EVENT OF A BOUNDAY DISPUTE 
4. In accordance with the covenants of the title that the Shooks will receive with the 
warranty deed, the Greens represent and warrant that they shall continue to legally defend 
the title and surveyed amount of the 3 1.08 acres (record 472606) after the Shooks take 
tiae ownership. By this agreement, the Greens will take the following action regarding 
the WEITZ's potential adverse possession claim. Should Dr. and Mrs. Weitz proceed 
with a legal action that results in the loss of any portion of Tract 2 (sum total equaling 
31.08 acres), the Greens shall defend that legal action at their sole cost and expense and 
will hrther compensate the Shooks in the amount of $4,745.82 per acre, in cash for said 
losses within seven 171 business days of the final judgment. Nothwithstanding anything to 
the contrary, the Greens shall, not later than three [3] years from date, by appropriate 
legal action, agreement, or otherwise, proceed with Action to Quiet Title pdaho Code 




5. Ifthe Greens or the Shooks institute a suit concerning this agreement, the prevailing 
party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. In the event of a trial, the 
amount of the attorneys' fees shall be fixed by the court. The venue of the suit shall be 
Latah County, Idaho. This agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Idaho 
Date: 3-- / 3 -03 
ToddGreen 
Date: Ff3 -03 
Tonia Green 
&=.-a %o& Date: 5-1 S-2003 
Steven R. Shook 
Date: 9- 1 9- 2 0 ~  
Mary f l~ ive rna le  Shook 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND NOTARY 
In the State of Idaho, County of Latah: 
This Road and Boundary Agreement was sworn to and subscribed before me this day, 
13 r / b Y  ,2003, by the above-named parties: Todd Green, Tonia Green, 
Date: 13 yu7W a443 
\\\\\\111'1111, 
Ro& E. KG, 6. k~lbke $*Q$ ..... P .?? -.$'% . [Printed Name] 3 .  2 '"~QTARY ..  - CI
STATEOF B&D , COUNTY OF ~akl? 
-,On this 15 day of p"l&v ,20 D 3  
before me, a notary public in and for the saidrs@te, personally appeared 
s+evea R sh~k ma m y  6 ,  S i ] v e v m J e  ~ h m k  
known or identified to me to be the persons whose names arc subscribed to the within instrument 
and acknowledged to me that executed the same. 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs: Greens, shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF TODD A. GREEN 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefei~dants, RE: WEITZ' 
v. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) MOTION TO 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) EXAMINE THE DISPUTED PROPERTY 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERTNE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 MOTION IN LIMME 
1 
DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss: 
County of Latah 
TODD A. GREEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the Defendants - Couilterplaintiffs in this matter. 
2. The information contained in this affidavit is based upon my own knowledge. 
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3 .  Before Plaiiitiffs (herein Weitz) ever filed a lawsuit in this matter, Consuelo Weitz, 
one of the Plaintiffs, told me that they (Weitz) had adversely possessed my land up to the "fence" 
they claimed existed. Therefore, the Weitz' adverse possession claim is not new. Weitz were aware 
of this theory at tlie time they filed their complaint, but decided not to pursue it. 
4. Since at least as far back as 1999, there was no fence enclosing the land claimed by 
Weitz. 
5. I was upon the property a number of times since 1999, and freely used the property 
without Weitz' permission, and never saw any fence enclosing the property. 
6 ,  I linow of at least six (6 )  other people that have freely used the property claimed by 
Weitz without Weitz' permission, including Mr. And Mrs. Wayne Fox, Willie Kardong, Steve 
Shook, and Mike and Laura Oneal. 
7. With regard to Mr. Brown's request that he be permitted to go upon the disputed 
property, and that he be permitted to do so with his clients and others as he chooses with no control 
from the Court with regard to that use, I am very worried, and would object. 
8. The access requested by Mr. Brown would completely undermine the Preliminary 
Inju~iction, because it would allow the Plaintiffs and tbeir agents free access to the disputed property 
at the sole discretion of their lawyer, without any independent person present to insure that there is 
no further alteration of evidence. Also I would be liable for the safety of these people. I thought 
that was the very thing that the preliminary injunction hearing and resulting Order was supposed to 
prevent. 
9. If the Court feels that Mr. Brown needs access, then I hope that it will permit such 
access only under tight controls that will preserve the site until the time of the Court's viewing. 
10. It is not necessary for Mr. Brown to see this land in order to act as the attorney for the 
Weitz'. Mr. Schwam bas been acting as my attorney for an extended period, and has never been up 
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to see the land. Mr. Schwam has stated to me that he will see the land when the Court sees it. 
DATED this 20" day of June, 2005. 
Td A /ac 
Todd A. Green 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 20" day of June, 2005. 
&A- 
Notary Public in and f& tge State of Idaho, 
residing in Moscow, Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: 05-05-09 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20" day of June, 2005, I caused a hue and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
4- 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
@ Hand Delivery 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD A. GREEN 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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CLEF?i( OF o/$TRICT COUA J 
LATAH COUNTY 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Pollc Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendanlsICou~~terplaintiffs: Greens, Shoolcs and Castles. 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
PlaintiffsICounterdefendants, RESPONSE TO MOTIONS: 
v. 1 
1 FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) TO EXAMINE PROPERTY 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) IN LIMINE 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs. 1 
Defendants - Counterplaintiffs (herein sometimes referred to as Green) hereby respond to the 
Motions filed by Plaintiffs - Counterdefendants (herein sometilnes referred to as Weitz), For Leave 
to Amend, To Examine Property, and In Limine, as follows. 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
RESPONSE TO MOTIONS - 1 
I. LEAVE TO AMEND - ADVERSE POSSESSION and EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
1. The adverse possession claim Weitz is attempting to assert is not a "new" claim or issue, 
and Weitz intentionally chose to not pursue this theory at the outset of this case because it has no 
merit, and Weitz cannot satisfy the requirements of an adverse possession claim. 
1.1 Before Weitz ever filed a lawsuit in this matter, Consuelo Weitz, one of the 
Plaintiffs, told Todd Green and Steven Shoolc on different and separate occasions that they 
(Weitz) had adversely possessed the Green land and the Shook land up to the "fence" they 
claimed existed. Therefore, the Weitz' adverse possession claim is not new - Weitz were 
aware of this theory at the time they filed their complaint, but decided not to pursue it. [See 
the Affidavits of Todd A. Green and Steven R. shook attached hereto.] 
1.2 The Weitz proposed amended pleadings to do not indicate there is any new 
information or new evidence to justify adding their new claims for adverse possession or 
equitable estoppel at this late date. 
2. To take the land which Green holds by clear title by the theory of adverse possession, 
Weitz must establish that they actually possessed the land openly, notoriously, exclusively and 
adversely to Green and Green's predecessors. 
2.1 Because Weitz is not claiining under a written claim of title, Weitz must satisfy 
the requirements of Idaho Code, Sections 5-205, 5-206,5-209 and 5-210, copies of which 
are attached hereto. Green asserts Weitz can not succeed in this regard. 
2.2 Idaho Code Section 5-206 presumes a person occupying the property of another 
who holds legal title is deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, 
unless the occupier satisfies the strict requirements of adverse possession. 
2.3 Idaho Code Section 5-210 allows an adverse possession claim on land only: 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERPLArNTIFFS 
RESPONSE TO MOTIONS - 2 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure; or, (2) Where it has been usually 
cultivated 01- itnproved. Weitz admit by paragraph 29 of their complaint and proposed 
amended complaint that they cannot prove that they or their predecessors in interest built the 
fence that is down and no longer exists. This is fatal to an adverse possession claim. For a 
full discussion of this see paragraphs 3 and 4 following, and the cases of Loomis and 
Standall quoted below and attached for the Court's conve~lience. The alleged fence has not 
been maintained and is down. This is fatal to their adverse possession claim. For a full 
discussion of this see paragraph 3 following, and Standall quoted below and attached. 
2.4 Idaho Code Section 5-210 also requires that the adverse claimant must have 
occupied and claimed the land for the period of five (5) years continuously, and paid all 
taxes levied and assessed upon the land. Weitz has not occupied and claimed the land in 
satisfactiotl of the statute and interpretive case law (continuous, notorious, exclusive and 
hostile) for the period of 5 years prior to filing this lawsuit, if ever. For exclusivity 
requirement, see Rice v. Hill City Stoclc Yards, Co., 121 Idaho 576, 826 P.2d 1288, copy 
attached. 
2.5 Weitz has not paid any taxes levied and assessed upon the land upon which they 
are asking to add this claim for adverse possession. In fact, during all times the Weitz now 
claim they occupied the land by adverse possession, they only paid taxes upon the specific 
acreages owned by them by deed in the NE %of Section 8. Green and Green's predecessor 
in interest, Rogers, paid all taxes on all acres (160) located in the SE % of Section 8, 
including the land claimed by Weitz by adverse possession. The failure by Weitz to pay taxes 
on the land they now claim by adverse possession is fatal to their claim, and it cannot prevail. 
The tax assessment notices for the Green property and the Weitz property for Latah County, 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERPLAINTITFS 
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Ida110 support this assertion, copies of some of which have been attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. See Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152,525 P.2d 347, copy attached. 
2.6 Green anticipates that Weitz will argue that the "lot number exception" 
established by the Idaho Supreme Court to the tax requirement will save them from their 
fatal Raw of never having paid taxes on the property they wish to claim by adverse 
possession. However, the Court has addressed this issue in Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 
16 P.3d 263. where it stated: 
"[S] Generally, ldaho Code sectio115-210 requires actual payment of the taxes that 




633 P.2d 592 (1981); Fry v. Smith, %Idaho 740, 430 P.2d 486 (1967); WAite v. 
Boydstun, %Idaho 615,428 P.2d 747 (1967); Larson v. Lindsay, a l d a h o  242,327 
P.2d 775 (1958); Balmer v. Pollak, Qldaho 494,186 P.2d 217 (1947). As was noted 
in Trappett, this Court has, on a number of occasions, "wrestled" with property 
disputes involving the payment of taxes. 102 ldaho at 530,633 P.2d at 595. This has 
resulted in a significant amouilt of what the Court termed "judicial gloss" whittling 
away at a literal application of the tax requirement.(fnl) Id. The tax rule focuses 011 
the actual payinent of taxes as demonstrated by the assessor's valuation. The Court, 
however, "has fashioned several exceptions to the general rule which, when applied, 
have the effect of satisfying the tax requirement." Id. at 530-3 I, 633 P.2d at 595-96. 
[6] The Baxters argue that the "lot number" exception to the tax requirement 
applies in this case. The lot number exception states that: 
(1)n the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, where one 
landowner can establish continuous open, ilotorious and hostile possession of an 
adjoining strip of his neighbor's land, and taxes are assessed by lot number or by 
government survey designation, rather than by metes and bounds description, 
payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is enclosed satisfies the 
tax payinent requirement of the . . . statute. 
Scott v. Gubler, &Idaho 441, 443-44, 51 1 P.2d 258, 260-61 (1973) (footnote 
omitted). The Baxters contend that the property in question is described by 
government survey designation and not by metes and bounds. Without a metes and 
bounds description, they argue, it is impossible to tell how much properly is being 
assessed with any precision. Thus, they claim the payment of the taxes assessed on 
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their property iilcludes all the property within the inclosure, i.e., on the east side of 
the fence located between the Craney and Baxter properties. 
This argument, however, ignores the rationale behind the lot number exception. 
As the Court stated in Flynn v. Allison, "[tlhe primary reason behind the lot number 
exception is as follows: when taxes are assessed according to some generic 
description, 'it (is) impossible to. determine from the tax assessment record the 
precise quantum of property being assessed.. . .' " Zldaho  618,621,549 P.2d 1065, 
1068 (1976) (citation omitted). Here, the Craneys submitted the affidavit ofthe Bear 
Lake County assessor, which clearly describes the disputed property and confinns 
that the Craneys and their predecessors in interest paid the taxes on the disputed 
parcel bounded by the range line. In contrast, the Baxters offered the affidavit of 
Tracy Baxter. This affidavit, however, which comprises the Baxters' sole piece of 
evidence, merely states that Baxter paid the taxes on his property. There is neither 
any indication as to the extent of the Baxters' property nor evidence as to what 
parcels of property Baxter paid taxes on. Therefore, the affidavit, even when viewed 
in a light most favorable to the Baxters, fails to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact on the required payment of taxes and is insufficient to overcome the Craneys' 
motion for summary judgment on this issue." See Baxter v. Craney, copy attached. 
2.7 In our case, not only do the Latah County, Idaho Tax Assessments for the 
Green and Weitz parcels clearly describe the property being taxed, they specifically 
indicate the number of acres being taxed. Green and his predecessor Rogers clearly 
paid all taxes on the 160 acres in the SE !h of Section 8, including the land Weitz 
wishes to claim by adverse possessioil. Even more damaging to Weitz and fatal to 
their case, their own tax assessineilts clearly show them paying taxes only on land in 
the NE !h of Section 8, and according to the specific number of acres they own in 
that section. Because Weitz did not pay any taxes on the land they claim, they 
cannot prevail in an adverse possession claim against that land. (See Latah County 
Idaho Tax Assessments.) 
3. In our case, the "fence" upon which Weitz wishes to rely is "down", and Weitz admitted 
in the preliminary injunction hearing that Weitz and their predecessors in interest had done no 
maintenance for at least 30 years. Only small remnants of the "fence" remain today. In Standall v. 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLArNTIFFS 
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the Court found that regarding the property, the adverse claimant 
"failed to establish that it was protected by any substantial enclosure. The trial court 
found that the barbed wire fence was down. The record fully sustains the trial 
court's determination that the barbed wire fence the Teaters contended bounded the 
area claimed by them was down and cattle could cross and recross the area.. .I.C. 5 5- 
210 requires that to constitute an adverse possession, the person claiming it must 
have protected it by a substantial enclosure. In this regard the Teaters failed in their 
proof concerning the claim of enclosure by a barbed wire fence." 
See Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152,525 P.2d 347, copy attached. 
4. 111 paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiffs have stated that 
"Said fence and fenceline were constructed in approximately 1929. On information 
and belief, there is no evidence as to the manner or circu~nstances of the original 
location of the fence and fenceline." 
The following discussion shows that Weitz, by making the assertion in paragraph 29, and 
having admitted not maintaining the fence in inore than 30 years, have defeated their own adverse 
possession claim, and there is no need to permit its addition to this case at this late date. 
The construction of a substantial enclosure to protect property claimed under adverse 
possession by those asserting possession, is an element of adverse possession which must be clearly 
and satisfactorily proven. See Loomis v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 97 Idaho 341,544 P.2d 299, 
(copy attached) where the court stated: 
"Appellants have failed to demonstrate that they substantially enclosed the disputed 
parcel of land. This is one of the requireme~lts et forth under I.C. 5 5-2 10 before an 
adverse possessioil claim can be perfected. As this Court noted most recently in 
Standall v. Teater:(fn5) 
"I.C. 5 5-210 requires that to constitute an adverse possession, the person 
claiming it must have protected it by a substantial enclosure." (Emphasis 
added by Court)(fn6) 
"[I ,2] One asserting an adverse possession claim must prove each and every element 
by clear and satisfactory evidence.(fn7) The record is devoid of evidence that 
appellants constructed or maintained ail enclosure to indicate the extent of their 
claim. On the contrary, the record discloses that one side of the enclosure which 
existed was built by respondent, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, and 
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maintained by it." 
In Cavvs v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614,790 P.2d 395, (copy attached) the Court found that 
". . .Capps never built or maintained any enclosure around the subject property. See 
LC. $9 5-208(2), 5-210(1). The court noted that the evidence showed ameandering 
barbed wire fence on the property built by employees of the defendants' predecessor, 
Burton, to separate livestock. It is well settled that persons claiming title by adverse 
possession must establish - as one of the elements of such claims - that they 
constructed or maintained an enclosure on the disputed parcel of land to indicate the 
extent of their claim." See Loomis. "A fence erected by a neighbor for the purpose 
of containing livestoclc or to restrain livestock from entering the neighbor's properly 
will not suffice to satisfy the enclosure requirement for adverse possession by a 
claimant adjacent to the neighbor's property." 
In Persyn v. Favreau, 119 Idaho 154,804 P.2d 327, (copy attached) the Court found that a 
fence did not constitute a substantial enclosure under subdivision (1) of this section where the fence 
had not been erected by plaintiff or plaintiffs grantors and where its purpose never was to enclose 
any part of plaintiff's property. 
We note that Weitz have found a witness, Homer Ferguson, who while he will not be able to 
testifL about his beliefs that he somehow held, he will be able to testify to the fact that he maintained 
the cattle fence as a lessee of Rogers to facilitate cattle pasturing. This shows that the fence was 
intended to restrain cattle, and was maintained by Rogers, not Weitz or their predecessors in interest. 
5. Weitz' proposed amended complaint will not withstand a demurrer because paragraph 29 
of both the original and proposed amended complaint states 
"Said fence and fenceline were constructed in approximately 1929. On information 
and belief, there is no evidence as to the manner or circumstances of the original 
location of the fence and fenceline." 
For Weitz to prevail on an adverse possession claim, they must show that they, and not 
someone else, put a substantial enclosure around the land they claim. See Loomis. 
6. Any use made by Weitz of the disputed property was not open, notorious, hostile and 
exclusive of others. Testimony in the preliminary injunction hearing and affidavits in support of our 
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Response show that many people used the disputed property without pernlission from Weitz. In 
Rice v. Hill Citv Stockyards, Co., 121 Idaho 576,826 P.2d 1288, copy attached, the Court found 
that exclusive use by the adverse claimant was a requirement, stating 
"If we treat the entire acreage as one parcel of property, there is no question that 
neither J.E. Fanner nor Rice ever used the entire parcel openly, notoriously, and 
exclusive of others, since the record indicates that many people used the southern 
parcel of the property contiiluously and without permission." 
7. Because the claim for adverse possession can not succeed, Green has concerns that Weitz 
may be attempting to amend their complaint as a ruse, in order to ask the Court for a trial by jury, 
which Weitz had first demanded, then waived by a filing with the Couit dated December 3, 2004. 
Green vigorously opposes any effort by Weitz to change the entire character of this lawsuit at this 
late date by seeking a new trier of fact, and specifically objects to the Motion to Amend if it is 
intended to permit a demand by Weitz for a trial by jury. The Court's ruling in the preliminary 
illjunction hearing would explain why Weitz would like a different trier of fact. Adding a jury at this 
time would completely change the character of trial required, including the witnesses needed and 
type of experts required, and there is not enough time to permit this. 
The Court has the discretion to reject the addition of a new cause of action when it has no 
chance of success and will only dramatically change the nature of the trial. If Weitz has no intention 
of requesting a jury trial at this time, they should say so immediately. 
8. Weitz' attempt to assert equitable estoppel as a new cause of action and as an affirmative 
defense borders on frivolous. Weitz assertion that "the defe~ldants/counterplai~lliffs have already 
received compensation from their predecessor in title in regard to the value of the Disputed 
Property.. ." is not true. 
As is evident from the Rogers Agreement, Rogers was informed that Todd Green was going 
to require that Rogers honor its duty to defend Green's title against Weitz' claims. When Rogers 
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was informed that Todd Green was going to tender the defense of the Weitz claims to them, 
negotiations were held. The Rogers Agreement released Rogers from their duty to defend against 
the Weitz claims, and paid Todd Green a sum of money for relieving Rogers of that duty. The 
Rogers agreement was not a compe~lsation for land, because at the time Todd Green entered into the 
agreement with Rogers on August 5,2003 regarding Rogers' duty to defend Green's title, Greens 
already had acquired a contractual duty to defend the titles of Shooks and Castles. Copies of the 
Rogers Agreement, and the Green - Shook agreement are attached to the Affidavit of Todd A. 
Green. Please see that Agreement and Affidavit for further explanation. 
9. Weitz claim that "the defendants should be equitably and legally estopped from again 
alleging or claiming any interest to the Disputed Property due to the equitable and legal estoppel 
concepts in common law or also due to the applicability of Idalio Code section 6-1606" is silly. 
Weitz should not be permitted to profit from an agreement relieving one party from the duty to 
defend against a questionable action brought against an innocent purchaser by Weitz themselves. 
Idaho Code Section 6-1606 applies to actions for personal injury or property damage. As is 
evident from the Affidavit of Todd A. Green, and the Rogers Agreement, Green did not receive 
"damages" from Rogers for either a "personal injury" or "property damage" claim. This statute is 
simply not applicable. 
It is interesting that the party attempting to take 8.5 acres without paying for them is 
attempting to rely upon a theory of equitable estoppel. The Rogers Agreement was never intended 
to benefit Weitz, the source of the problems that necessitated the Agree~iient in the first place, and 
Weitz should not now realize any benefit from that Agreement, or their actions that necessitated that 
Agreement. The Rogers Agreement concerns contractual rights between Rogers and Green, not 
payment for damages of any kind to anyone. 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
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10. Please see the Affidavits of Todd A. Green and Steven R. Shook in support of this 
Response to Motions. 
11. The Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck states as fact things that are simply not true. In 
paragraph 6 Landeck states "That also during said hearing on the preliminary injunction, I became 
aware for the first time that the defendants in this matter had already received a settlement in excess 
of $40,000.00 in regard to monies received by them for the very acreage in dispute." As is evident 
from the Rogers Agreement, and the Affidavits of Green and Shook, this statement is not true. 
12. Weitz has not properly pled the Motion to Amend Complaint. Weitz has not alleged or 
claiined that they satisfy any specific requirements of adverse possession or equitable estoppel. 
Instead, Weitz has made a conclusory pleading to which a coherent response is impossible. 
11. MOTION TO EXAMINE PROPERTY 
13. The access requested by Mr. Brown would completely undermine the Preliminary 
Injunction, because it would allow the Plaintiffs and their agents free access to the disputed property 
at the sole discretion of their lawyer, without any independent person present to insure that there is 
no further alteration of evidence. The prelimi~iary injunction hearing was a very long, involved and 
expensive process, and resulted in an Order that is supposed to prevent what Mr. Brown now seeks. 
It is unfortunate that Mr. Brown was not present for that hearing, but to grant his request would in 
essence negate that hearing. 
14. If the Court concludes Mr. Brown needs to see the disputed property, we request the 
Court set a specific time and date for Mr. Brown alone, to be accompanied by one of Green's 
attorneys, or an independent person selected by the Court. While we are not suspicious of anything 
Mr. Brown might do upon the property, it would not be possible for him to oversee and control other 
persons viewing the property with him. We will find ourselves ill additional evidentiary disputes as 
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to the appearance of the property when Mr. Green purchased. The Court is aware that the scene 
regarding the condition of the fence remnants and the path have already been changed. No risk of 
further change should be accepted at least until the Court sees the property. 
15. Any time people go upon the land owned by Defendants, the Defendants are put at risk 
for claims of injury or other harm that might befall these people. It is unfair to the defendants to 
give Mr. Brown the right to freely go about their property accompanied by others of his choosing 
while such a risk exists. Based upon the actions of Weitz that justified apreliininary injunction, and 
this risk, we object to Mr. Brown's Motion. 
16. It is not necessary for Mr. Brown to see this land in order to act as the attorney for Weitz. 
Mr. Schwam has been acting as attorney for Green for an extendedperiod, and has never been up to 
see the land. Mr. Schwam has stated that he will see the land when the Court sees it. Mr. Brown has 
access to all the knowledge of Mr. Landeck, who has seen the land in question, and can readily 
convey this to Mr. Brown. 
17. We suggest that it may now be time for the Court to view the property, perhaps prior to 
ruling on the pending motions, at which time all parties and counsel will have an opportunity to view 
the property with the Court. 
111. MOTION IN LIMINE. 
18. Weitz Motion in Limine is an effort to shift the burden of proof from Weitz, the party 
claiming by boundary by agreement, to Green. Every Idaho case concerning this theory of taking 
property of another place the burden of proof of each element upon the claimant. 
19. The position taken by Green that he is a purchaser is not ail affirmative defense. It is a 
fact known to the other side. A requirement of boundary by agreement if there is a purchaser 
involved, is that if the claimant intends to rely upon a fence, the fence must exist. The boundary by 
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agreement doctrine sets an objective standard, not a subjective one which would be known only to 
the purchaser, that the party relying upon the doctriile must meet with regard to the conditioii of a 
fence, if the claimant is attempting to use the doctrine against a purchaser. This objective standard is 
set out in many cases, and requires a standing fence substantial enough to give notice of contested 
ownership to a purchaser, or at least create in the purchaser a duty to inquire. 
20. In the case of Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 34 P.3d 1080, (copy attached) the 
Court on its own initiative, not by the raising of an affirmative defense, addressed the issue of fences 
that no longer existed at the time the purchaser purchased his property, saying 
"Furthermore, because the fences were no longer in existence when Stegelineier 
purchased his land, the plaintiffs cannot rely on the old fence lines to prove an 
agreement, but must meet their burden of proof with other evidence." 
The Court recognized that proving notice to a purchaser is a requirement of the doctrine of 
boundary by agreement. It is clearly not an affirmative defense that must be raised by the purchaser. 
Quite simply, if a claimant intends to rely upon a boundary by agreement concerning a purchaser of 
the claimed property, and wants to prove the agreement by a fence, the fence has to exist at the time 
of purchase, sufficient to put the purchaser on notice of the claim. The fact that no fence existed at 
the time Green purchased his property from Rogers can not place some burden upon Green, a21d 
relieve Weitz of their burden of proving each element of the boundary by agreement doctrine. 
21. In Paurlev v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P.2d 35 1, the Court gave an example of what 
would constitute notice (ail objective standard) to an intending purchaser. The Court stated 
"As indicated in Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, such an agreed boundary would also 
be binding upon a successor in interest of the seller, who purchased with notice of 
the agreement. The boundary, which defendants claim, was clearly marked by "a 
tight board fence", four or five feet in height, and the area on defendants' side of the 
fence was planted to lawn, shrubbery and bees. This would constitute notice to an 
intending purchaser, of defendants' possession." 
22. In paragraph 38 of the complaint, it was alleged 
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"At the time GREENS, CASTLES, and SHOOKS purchased their respectiveparcels, 
they had actual, constructive, or inquiry notice that the Disputed Property did not 
belong to them, regardless of their respective deed language. 
This was denied by paragraph 38 of our answer. Thus Weitz has been on notice since the 
initial pleadings in this case, that Mr. Green was both a purchaser, and that he had no actual notice of 
Weitz' claim of ownership. What seems to have surprised Weitz, is that under such circumstances, 
boundary by agreement carries with it the objective requirement that the fence be of such a nature 
that is would put a purchaser on notice of a conflicting ownership claim, or at least put the purchaser 
on notice to make inquiry of a conflicting ownership claim. The author of this Response is not 
aware of any requirement that the mswer must state the same thing twice in order for it to be 
available to the answering party. 
23. The affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck states in paragraph 4 "That during the hearing on the 
preliminary injunction on April 15,2005, in this matter, I was first made aware that the defendants 
in this matter are attempting to rely upon a bona fide purchaser defense." It is possible that Green's 
position in this lawsuit was first ullderstood by Mr. Landeck on April 15,2005, but it is not true that 
he was first made aware of it on that date. In the verified Answer to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, Todd 
Green states seventeen (1 7) separate tirrles that the fence that they rely upon in their Complaint does 
not exist. Of course, when Green purchased his land he was not aware of something (the fence) that 
did not exist. He was aware of the true quarter corner marker. Further, in response to the Plaintiffs' 
assertion in paragraph 38 of their Colilplaint, that at the time that Green purchased his parcel he had 
actual, constructive or inquiry notice that the disputed property didnot belong to him, he answered 
with a denial. As became clear at the Preliminary Injunction hearing, Green's denial was truthful, 
and should not have taken the Plaintiffs by surprise. Green's purchase of the disputedproperty from 
the Rogers on July 26,2002 has been a matter of public record prior to and during this entire lawsuit, 
and must have been known to Mr. Landeclc because he sued Green, and not the Rogers. Mr. 
Landeck must have known before April 15, 2005 that Green was a purchaser of the disputed 
property, and that Green did not have notice of a fence that Greeii asserted many times does not 
exist. Thus Plaintiffs were on notice from the outset that they would have to meet the requirements 
regarding an existing fence as set out in the case law. If this took Mr. Landeck by surprise, it was 
because he did not read the very cases upon which he was relying. 
24. Even if the Court determines that Mr. Green should have set out certain facts in his 
answer under the separate title of "affirmative defense", the Court can, and should, allow Green to 
amen in order to do so. (IRCP 15(a) and 15(b)). 
25. Even if the Court determines Green is relying upon the fact that he is a purchaser, it is too 
late for Weitz to object to that now. Testimony regarding Green being a purchaser without notice 
was provided by Green at the preliminary illjunction hearing, without objection from Weitz. Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) provides that 
"Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading 
are tried by express or implied conselit of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of ally party at any time, even after judgment; but 
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.'" 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65 (a)(2) provides that 
"Rule 65(a). Injunctions - Preliminary injunction. 
(2) Consolidation of hearing with trial on merits. Before or after 
the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary 
injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the 
merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the 
application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered, any 
evidence received upon an application for a preliminary injunction 
which would be admissible upon the trial on the merits becomes part 
ofthe record on the trial and need not be repeated upon the trial. 
This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to 
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save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury. 
As the issue of Green being a purchaser without notice was tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties at the preliminary injunction hearing, Weitz can not now object. Weitz 
Motion in Limine should be denied for all of the forgoing reasons. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Weitz Motion to Amend the Conlplaint to add a claim for adverse possession should be 
denied because Weitz can not prevail on this theory. If Weitz is seeking to demand a trial by jury, 
the Court should deny this request, as it would change the entire character of the trial. Weitz should 
not now be permitted to "forum shop" for a new trier of fact. 
Weitz Motion to Amend the Complaint to add an affirmative defense of equitable estoppel 
should be denied. The basis for Weitz request is a misstatement of the nature, terms and conditions 
of the "Rogers Agreement." Weitz, filing an action they find they can not now sustain, should not 
benefit hom an agreement that was required by their very actions. Weitz mischaracterization of the 
Rogers Agreement is not a basis to amend their complaint in this manner. 
Weitz Motion to Examine the property should either be denied, or granted with strict 
conditions that will assure compliance with the Court's Evidentiary Order and Preliminary 
Injunction, and provide a measure of protection and reassurance to Green. To grant the Motion as 
filed would nullify the Preliminary Injunction. Weitz still need to be restricted in their access to the 
property. Perhaps it is time for the Court, counsel and parties to view the property together, and 
prior to the Court ruling on the pending motions. This viewing will occur anyway, and would allow 
Mr. Brown and Weitz to view the property in a manner acceptable to Green, and we assume, the 
Court. 
Weitz Motion in Limine should be denied. It clearly is an effort to shift the burden ofproof 
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from Weitz, the party claiming by boundary by agreement, to Green. Every Idaho case concerning 
this theory of taking property of another place the burden of proof of each element upon ihe 
claimant. The position talcen by Green is not an affirmative defense because when a purchaser is 
involved the fence must meet an objective standard. 
From the outset of this case, Green has been a "purchaser", who has constantly maintained 
that the "fence" Weitz relies upon for notice of their boundary by agreement claim does not exist! 
While Green had no notice of any fence when he purchased his property, he did have notice of the 
true boundary as established by the 1988 IDL/BLM monument- the tall pink stake with the quarter 
corner sign attached. Should the Court determine Green's position is an affirmative defense, it 
should permit Green to amend its answer as permitted by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 20" day of June, 2005. 
/ ? & & 4 ~ ~  
Robert M. Mawar ", 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs (Green) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20"' day of June, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RESPONSE TO MOTIONS to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
/?M .z+ 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
@ Hand Delivery 
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5-205. Effect of entry. 
No entry upon real estate is deemed sufficient or valld as a 
claim unless an action be com~nenced thereupon within one (1) year 
after making such entry, and within five (5) years of the time when 
the right to make it descended or accrued. (1881) 
5-206. Constructive possession. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the 
possession thereof, a person establisl~ing a legal title to the 
property is presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time 
required by law, and the occupation of the property by a~iother 
person is deemed to have been under and in subordination to 'lie 
legal title, unless it appear that the property has been held and 
possessed adversely to such legal title, for five (5) years before 
the co~mnencement of the action. (1 88 1) 
5-207. Possession under written claim of title. 
When it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he 
claims, entered into the possession of the property under claim of 
title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim upon a written 
instrument, as being a conveyance of the property in question, or 
upon the decree or judgment of a conlpetent court, and that there 
has been a continued occupation and possession of the property 
included in such instxument, decree or judgment, or of some part of 
the property under such claim, for five (5) years, the property so 
included is deemed to have been held adversely except that when it 
consists of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is 
not deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract. (1881) 
5-208. Claim under written instruillent - Possession defined. 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, for 
the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person 
claiming a title founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment 
or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in 
the following cases: 
(a) Where it llas been usually cultivated or inlproved. 
(b) Where it has been protected by a substantial * 
enclosure. 
(c) Where, altliough not enclosed, it has been used for 
the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the purposes of 
husbandry, or for pasturage, or for the ordinary use of the 
occupai~t. 
(d) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly 
improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have been 
left not cleared, or not enclosed, according to the usual 
course and custom of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to 
have been occupied for the samr length of tine as the part 
imoroved and cultivated. 
(2j~otwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this 
section, adverse possession shall not be considered established 
under the provisions of any sections of this code if a written 
instrument has been recorded in the real estate records kept by the 
i \ 
county recorder of the county in which the property is located and 
such written instrument declares that it was not the intent of a 
parly to such instrument, by permitting possession or occupation of 
real property as set forth in subsection ( I )  of this section, to 
thereby define property boundaries or ownership. 
(3) For purposes of establishing adverse possessioll pursuant 
to this section, a person claiming adverse possessio~l must present 
clear and coilvincing evidence that the requirements ofsubsectioils 
(I) or (2) of this section have been met. (2001) 
5-209. Possession under oral claim of title. 
Where it appears that there has been an actual conlillued 
occupation of land, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other 
right, but not founded upon a written instlurnent, judgment or 
decree, thc land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to 
have been hcld adversely. (1881) 
5-210. Oral claim - Possession defined - Payment of taxes. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a 
person claiming title not founded upon a written instrunlent, 
judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and 
occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or ilnproved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established under the provisio~~s of any sections of this 
code u~lless it shall he shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for the period of five (5) years coiltinuously, and the 
party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all 
the taxes, state, county or mntmicipal, which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law. Provided fkther, that 
adverse possession shall not be considered established under the 
provisions of any sections of this code if a written instrument has 
been recorded in the real estate records kept by the county 
recorder of the county in which the property is located and such 
written instrument declares that it was not the intent of a party 
to such instrument, by permitting possessio~l or occupation of real 
property, to thereby define property boundaries or ownership. 
Provided further, that for purposes of establishing adverse 
possession pursuant to this section, a person claiming adverse 
possession must present clear and convincing evidence that the 
requirements of subsection (1) or (2) of this section have heen 
met. (2001) 
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Floyd LOOMIS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY and Oregon Short 
Line Railroad Company, Defendants-Respondents. 
[Cite as Loornis v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 97 Idaho 3411 
No. 11712. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
December 17, I975.(fn*) 
Action for quiet title was brought. The District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Valley County, Alfied C. Hagan, 
J., entered judgment denying plaintiffs' claim of title by adverse possession, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, McQuade, C. J., held that the enclosure requirement of adverse possession statute was not 
satisfied, that evidence showed that defendant had been in quiet possession of disputed property for well over 
one year, and that plaiiltiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. 
Affirmed. 
Shepard, J., filed a dissenting opinion' 
Ward E. Hower, Cascade, for plaiiitiffs-appellant. 
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E. C. Phoenix, Pocatello, for defendants-respondents. 
McQUADE, Chief Justice. 
This is a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land located in Valley County, Idaho, which borders, in 
part, on the Cascade Reservoir. The disputed parcel of land contains 1.081 acres, and measures approximately 
90 feet on the north end, extending south 675 feet with a southern boundary measuring 50 feet. Defendant- 
respondent Oregon Short Line Railroad(fn1) claims ownership of the parcel by virtue of a deed dated 
September 12, 1913. Plaintiffs-appellants Floyd and Viola Loomis (the senior Loomises) and Donald and Diana 
Loomis (the junior Loomises) base their claim for title over the disputed property on the theory of adverse 
possession. 
The facts of this case may be summarized as follows. In 1913, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company 
purchased and received a deed for 6.3 acres of land from Parker V. Lucas, Etta J. Lucas, A. B. Lucas and Ella 
M. Lucas. The land was purchased for right of way purposes, and the railroad laid its track through this property 
sometime in 1913. The trial court found that the disputed 1.081 acres of land was included within the confines 
of the land description in this particular deed, and that therefore title to the disputed tract was vested in the 
railroad at the time of the delivery of the deed. 
Appellant Floyd Loomis acquired title to Lot 3 of Section 3, Township 15 North, Range 3, East Boise 
Meridian (in which the disputed land is located) in 193 1. His deed however excepted "6.3 acres heretofore 
deeded to the O.S.L. Ry. for rightof-way purposes." When Loomis acquired the property, there existed a fence 
built by the railroad which ran north to south. The record discloses that this fence was not erected to mark a 
boundary, but was rather built by the railroad to restrain cattle. This fence 1i11e coiistitutes the eastern b o u 9 s  
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of the disputed tract. Appellants rely upon the existence of this fence for a part of their enclosure of the disputed 
parcel of land. 
Property in the vicinity of the disputed parcel, including part of the land acquired by appellant in 193 1, but 
excepting Oregon Short Line Railroad Company's land used for right of way purposes, was condemned in 1944 
by the United States govement for the Cascade Reservoir. A final order of condemnation was entered in the 
U. S. District Court, District of Idaho, on January 14, 1944, condemning in part: 
"(b) A tract of land contaiiling twentyone and 601100 (21.60) acres, more or less, being the north 
half (N 112) of Lot three (3) of Section three (3), Township fifteen (15) North, Range three (3) East, 
Boise Meridian, Valley County, Idaho, excepting therefrom the right, title, and interest of the 
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company and the Union Pacific Railroad Company in and to existing 
right of way for railroad;" . . . (Emphasis added.) 
In 1966, appellants procured a return lo them (by virtue of a quitclaim deed) of a portion of the land talcen 
by the United States through condemnation. The quitclaim deed transferred a portion of Lot 3, reserving 
"presently used rights of way for . . . railroads . . . created in favor of the public or public utilities." Thereafter, 
the senior Loomises platted land owned by them known as Mountain Shadows Subdivision, which consisted of 
twenty-one waterfront lots. The plat was duly filed with the Valley County recorder and recorded. Two of the 
subdivision lots are partly within the disputed parcel of land. By gift deed, the senior Loomises conveyed one of 
the subdivision lots to the junior Loomises. The other subdivision lot still stands of record in the senior Loomis' 
name. 
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In 1970, Union Pacific Railroad Company built a fence on the west line in the north half of Lot 3 as 
described in the 1913 deed. Subsequent to the construction of this fence, and within a year thereafter, appellants 
brought suit in the United States District Court to quiet title. The suit brought in federal court was later 
dismissed without prejudice. 
In 1973, appellants brought this action in the district court for Valley County alleging three causes of action. 
The first was for unlawful entry and forcible detainer of the disputed land, alleged malice, and demanded three 
times the amount of appellants' actual damages as fixed by a jury. The second pleaded a common law action in 
ejectment, asked for actual damages, and also demanded a trial by jury. The third action was a proceeding to 
quiet title. The district court acting pursuant to motions to dismiss tendered by respondents dismissed the first 
cause of action, but refused to dismiss the second cause of action. It ruled that the second cause of action would 
be hied by the court sitting without a jury. 
Appellants' theory at trial was that they had acquired title to the disputed parcel through the actual, open, 
notorious and hostile possession of the disputed property by the senior Loomises between 193 1 and 1944. 
Thereafter, they argued that the United States condemned their interest in the tract acquired through adverse 
possession, but that in 1966, ownership of the disputed property was returned to thein via a quit claim deed. 
The trial court afier a lengthy analysis of the essential elements required to establish adverse possession, 
rejected appellants' claim. It found that appellants had failed to cany their burden of proving they had been 
assessed or paid taxes on the disputed property during the period of their alleged occupation. Accordingly, the 
trial court found in favor of the respondents, and entered judgment, whereupon it ruled that: Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Company was at all times herein and is now the owner in fee simple, in possession and entitled to the 
possession of the tract of 1.081 acres at issue, and that the adverse claims of appellants were invalid and 
groundless. The court also denied the requests of respondents for a reformation of the quitclaim deed and of the 
subdivision plat of Mountain Shadows Subdivision filed with Valley County. It is from this judgment that 
appellants have brought this appeal. We affirm. 
3KCh 
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In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in coilcluding that the 
requirements set forth in I.C. S 5-210(h2) for the acquisition of title by adverse possession were not satisfied in 
this case, because they dld not pay the taxes on the land during the period of their purported use and occupancy. 
Citing both Scott v. Gubler,(fn3) and Standall v. Teater,(fn4) appellants maintain that in paying taxes on land 
which they owned, contiguous to and enclosing the disputed parcel of land, they were in effect paying taxes on 
the 1.081 acres of land which is the subject of this controversy. 
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We find it unnecessary to pass upoil this contention. Assuming arguendo appellants are correct in their 
assertion, they still cannot prevail on their adverse possession claim. Appellants have failed to demonstrate that 
they substantially enclosed the disputed parcel of land. This is one of the requirements set forth under I.C. $ 5- 
210 before an adverse possession claim can be perfected. As this Court noted most recently in Standall v. 
Teater:(fnS) 
"I.C. $ 5-210 requires that to constitute an adverse possession, theperson claiming it must have 
protected it by a substantial encIosure." (Emphasis added)(fn6) 
[I, 21 One asserting ail adverse possession claim must prove each and evely element by clear and 
satisfactory evidence.(fn7) The record is devoid of evidence that appellants constructed or mailltailled an 
enclosure to indicate the extent of their claim. On the contra~y, the record discloses that one side of the 
enclosure which existed was built by respondent, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, and maintained by it. 
The trial court found the existence of a substantial enclosure by virtue of the fence respondent railroad company 
erected in 1913. It concluded that this satisfied the enclosure requirement. This was an incorrect interpretation 
of the eiiclosure requirement and therefore an improper conclusion. Appellants' failure to protect the disputed 
parcel by a substantial enclosure must be held to defeat their adverse possession claim, and obviatcs a 
discussion of the merits of their payment of taxes argnment. 
In their second assignmei~t of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the first cause 
of action pleaded in their complaint. The basis for the trial court's action was threefold: First, the court reasoned 
that the fence which was built in 1970, and which appellants relied upon as constituting the uillawful entry 
required under the forcible detainer statute, had been in place for more than one year prior to the 
commencement of the present action. Therefore, the court ruled that this constituted a bar to the action pursuant 
to I.C. 6-3 14.(fn8) Secondly, the court ruled that appellants could not join in one action (as they had done) a 
claim for forcible detainer, with claims for ejectment and quiet title. Thirdly, the court ruled that pursuai~t o I.C. 
5 1-2208(fn9) and Fourth Judicial District Local Rule 3.4(a), (fn10) original jurisdiction to try forcible 
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detainer actions was with the Magistrates Division of the District Court. Appellants attack all three rulings, 
contending first, that the requirements of quiet possession for one year coupled with an interest in the property 
that had not been "ended or determined" as set forth in I.C. $ 6-3 14 were never estabIished; secondly, that 
disillissing for misjoinder was contrary to I. R.C.P. 18(a)(fnll) which encourages joinder; and thirdly, that 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(fn12) gave the district court jurisdiction to try the cause sounding in forcible detainer. 
[3,4] Contrary to appellants' assertions, the record discloses that respondent had been in quiet possession of 
the disputed property for well over one year, and in fact closer to three years prior to the commencement ofthis 
proceeding. Nor can we say that in bringing ail action in federal district court to quiet title prior to the 
commencement of the present action, respondents' interests in the disputed parcel had been "ended or 
determined." The federal court action was dismissed without prejudice. Therefore no adjudication of the 
contesting parties' rights to the disputed tract was ever made. 
We coilclude that the trial court was correct in dismissing appellants' first cause of action because 360 
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respondents had satisfied the necessary elements set forth in I.C. 5 6-314 to constitute a defense to an action for 
forcible detainer. We therefore find it unnecessary to review the alternative grounds set forth by the trial court 
supporting the granting of respondents' motion to dismiss appellants' first cause of action. 
111 their third and final assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in ordering the 
second cause of action in ejectment be tried without a jury, despite their request for a jury trial. We find no 
merit to this argument. 
We believe the case of Anderson v. Whipple,(fnl3) is controlling on this issue. In that case, plaintiff filed a 
complaint alleging in part: 
" . . . that the defendants are in possessioil of said premises and have been unlawfully withholding 
the possession from the plaintiff since the 1st day of January, 1946; that the value of the rents and 
profits of the land is $800.00 per year; that she has been deprived of the rents and profits and 
further damaged by the withholding of possession in the sum of $500.00; that defendants claim an 
interest in the property adverse to the plaintiff, which is without right; and that the defendants have 
not any estate, right, title or interest whatever in said lands. Plaintiffprays that defendants be 
required to set forth the nature of their claim; that all adverse claims be determined; that it be 
adjudged that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the 
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possession of the premises; that the defendants have no estate nor interest therein; that they be barred from 
asserting any claim; for restitution of the premises; for the reasonable rental value from January 1, 1946; for 
$500.00 damages; . . ."(fnl4) 
The defendants admitted that they held possession but argued that they were in possession pursuant to an 
agreement with plaintiff. Defendants filed a motion for a jury trial, on the grounds that the pleadings showed 
upon their face that an action at law and not a suit in equity was before the court. The motion was granted. 
[5,6] On appeal, plaintiff assigned as error the trial court's granting of a jury trial. The Court, after a careful 
analysis of the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, reversed, ruling that, 
"This question (of whether this was an action for possession under I.C. 5 10-105 or an action to 
quiet title under LC. 5 6-401) must be determined from a consideration of all of the pleadings in the 
case, and of the ultimate and entire relief sought." 
The Court further remarked: 
"Here the plaintiff has pleaded her cause in equity to quiet title. As to her good faith, it appears 
from the record that a dispute, dating back to 1937, has existed between these parties as to whether 
or not the contract alleged in defendants' answer was in fact made. As shown by the answer, 
defendants' claim adversely affects plaintiff's title. One action between them was dismissed 
inconclusively before this action was commenced. It therefie appears thatplaintiffis seeking not 
alone to oust defendants, but to quiet her title against their adverse claims. Further, the defendants' 
answer contains allegations which in effect tend to establish a right in them to the relief of specijic 
performance of an oral contract for a lease of the property for the life of the lessor, and title 
thereto in fee upon her death. It is true that the defendants do not pray for afirmative reliefto that 
effect and that their pleading is in form defensive only. However, the efect is the same. They 
appeal to equity to defeat theplaintiJ7 We adhere to the rule that 'Equity having obtained 
jurisdiction of subject matter of a dispute, will retain it for the settlement of all controversy between 
the palties with respect theretoV'(fnl5) (Emphasis added). 
36r  
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In this case, appellants sought not alone to oust respondents, but to quiet title against any claim respondents 
might have as to the disputed parcel of land. In essence, following the dismissal of appellants' claim relating to 
forcible entry and detainer, the trial was held to resolve the paramount issue of who held title to the disputed 
tract of land. In suits to quiet title to real property, no right to trial by jury exists.(fn16) Furthermore, in 
respondents' answer to the complaint, they sought equitable relief to defeat appellants' claim to the disputed 
parcel. Respondents sought refonnation of the quit claim deed issued to appellants in 1966 and of the Mountain 
Shadows Subdivision plat filed with Valley County, to the extent land described in those instruments impinged 
upon any real property owned by them. The action before the trial court was equitable in nature and appellants 
were not entitled to a jury trial. 
Costs to respondents. 
Judgment afjrmed. 
DONALDSON and BAIES, JJ., and SCOGGIN, D. J. (retired), concur. 
SHEPARD, Justice (dissenting). 
The trial court in this case found the existence of a substantial enclosure of the 
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property in issue and concluded that this satisfied the enclosure requirement of I.C. 5 5-210. The majority on 
appeal finds error in that conclusio~~. The trial court found against the plaintiffs in their assertion of adverse 
possession by its conclusion that the claimants had failed to prove their payment of taxes thereon. The majority 
does not discuss nor dispose of that finding and conclusion by the trial court nor appellants' assertion that Scott 
v. Gubler, supra, and Standall v. Teater, supra, support appellants' position. In effect then the majority affirms 
the judgment of the trial court on the basis that the trial court reached the correct result but for the wrong reason. 
Conversely, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold that the trial court was correct in its 
finding and conclusion regarding the substantial enclosure requirement of the statute but erred in its finding and 
conclusion regarding the tax payment requirement of the statute. 
In 1913, the railroad fenced its right-of-way and thereby excluded therefrom the 1.08 acres here in dispute. 
Using that fence erected by the railroad, the appellants enclosed that 1.08 acres with their remaining and 
abutting lands. There is no question but that the 1.08 acres along with the remainder of appellants' lands was 
protected by a substantial enclosure (fence) and that appellants thereafter and coi~tinuously for 57 years 
occupied, used and improved that land. Following condemnation of the property by the United States in 1941, 
they remained on the property as tenants of the government and at a later time secured a retnrn deed. The 
condemnation order excluded the then "existing right-of-way for railroad." Since the railroad had fenced out the 
1.08 acres from its right-of-way, I would hold that the 1.08 acre parcel was not part of its then "existing right-of- 
way for railroad" exempted from condemnation. At the time of the return deed the disputed tract was still 
fenced out of the railroad right-of-way and therefore I would hold that it was not reserved to the railroad as 
'Ipresently used right-of-way." They platted, subdivided and sold part of the tract disputed herein. It was not 
until 1970 when the creation of Cascade reservoir made the disputed property a lakeside lot and thereby greatly 
enhanced its value that the railroad asserted a claim to the property and erected a fence along what it claimed to 
be its western property line. Appellants promptly brought suit in U.S. District Court to resolve the dispute 
created by the 1970 erection of the fence and when said suit was later dismissed without prejudice, appellants 
promptly brought the instant action in state court. 
I point out that LC. 5 5-210 provides "for the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person 
claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been 
possessed and occupied in the following case only: 1. Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosu tie&? 
http:/lwww.lawriter.net/cgi-binltexis/weblidcaselaw/+k-el4aReqhbnme4AUBeqGgwwqFqHxw ... 6/20/2005 
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Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. * * * [the additional requirement that claimants have paid the 
taxes]." Here there is no question but appellants cultivated, improved, occupied, used and fanned the disputed 
property for the requisite time. There is likewise no question but that the property was protected by a substailtial 
enclosure. In my opinion the majority then expands the requirements gained from a literal meaning of the 
statute by adding the requirement that the subtantial enclosure be erected by the adverse claimant. The majority 
opinion does not discuss any policy reason nor rationale for broadening the statutory requirements. I see no 
policy to be served nor any rationale for such a decision. On the contrary, it would appear that the only way in 
which claimants herein could have satisfied the newly created requirement was to erect their own fence which 
would serve no purpose since it would necessarily have to duplicate and parallel a then existing fence. 
I would find error in the finding and conclusion of the trial court that appellants had failed to satisfy the 
taxpaying require- 
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ment of the statute. This Court has for many years and most recently in Scott v. Gubler, supra, and Standan v. 
Teater, supra, enunciated a liberal view with respect to the tax requirements for adverse possession in cases 
involvi~lg boundary disputes between contiguous landowners. See White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615,428 P.2d 
747 (1967); Beneficial L f e  v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,270 P.2d 830 (1954); Callcins v. Kousouros, 72 Idaho 
150,237 P.2d 1053 (1951); Bayhouse v. Uriquides, 17 Idaho 286,105 P.2d 1066 (1909). I do not perceive any 
evidence in the record that the railroad paid taxes on the disputed tract of land during the time it was occupied, 
utilized and improved by appellants. Railroad colnpanies, as public utilities, pay their taxes in an entirely 
different fashion than do ordinary landowners. See I.C. $ 5  63-704,63-705,63-707,63-711. Railroads are taxed 
011 their gross assets divided by iniles of railroad traclc and here the Valley County assessor taxed the railroad on 
the basis of dollar value per mile of track ill Valley County. There is no indication that any particular real 
property was taxed to the railroad or that the railroad paid any amouiit of taxes on any particular piece of real 
property. On the other hand, I believe the cases here and before cited and particularly White v. Boydstun, supva, 
point out that continuous adverse possession will extend a true boundary line beyond the occupier's expressed 
deed limits, so that payment of taxes assessed on the deeded property is deemed payment of taxes on the lands 
in the claimants' possession. 
I must further disagree with the majority wherein it affirms the trial court's dismissal of appellants' first 
cause of action under the forcible detainer statute. I.C. 5 6-314 dealing with forcible entry provides "the 
defendant inay show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, 
have been in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year together next before the 
commeilcement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is not then ended or determined; and such 
showing is a bar to theproceedings. "(Bmphasis supplied.) The majority states that the record discloses the 
respondent had been in quiet possession of the disputed property for well over a year, and in fact closer to three 
years prior to the commencement of this proceeding. I cannot agree that the record so demonstrates when during 
all that period of time the appellants here were vigorously litigating in federal or state court the ownership of the 
disputed tract and seeking to oust the railroad fi-om that land. See New Zion Baptist Church v. Strain, 39 So.2d 
185 (La. 1949). 
I would reverse and remand. 
Footnotes: 
* A previous opinion, filed October 15, 1975, as to which rehearing was denied December 12, 1975, is 
withdrawn and this opinion substituted therefor. 
I. Defendant-respondent Union Pacific Railroad Company is the lessee of Oregon Short Line Railroad 
Company. 363 
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2. I.C. 5 5-210 provides: "5-210. 01-a1 claim-Possession deJined-Payment of taxes.- For the purpose of 
constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment 
or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions 
of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period 
of five years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the taxes, 
state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law." 
3.95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 258 (1973). 
4.96 Idaho 152,525 P.2d 347 (1974). 
5. Supfa note 4. 
6. Id. at 351,525 P.2d at 351. See also Lisher v. Krasselt, 94 Idaho 513,492 P.2d 52 (1972); Hyde v. Lawson, 
94 Idaho 886,499 P.2d 1242 (1972); Smylie v. Pearsall, 93 Idaho 188,457 P.2d 427 (1969); White v. Boydstun, 
91 Idaho 615,428 P.2d 747 (1967); Eagan v. Colwell, 86 Idaho 525,388 P.2d 999 (1964). 
7. Swanson v. State, 83 Idaho 126,358 P.2d 387 (1960). 
8. I.C. $ 6-3 14. 'Sufficiency of evidence-Defenses.-On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or 
forcible detainer, the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or forcible detainer 
complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to 
the possession at the time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or his 
ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, have been in the quiet possession thereof for the 
space of one whole year together next before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein 
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings." 
9. LC. 5 1-2208 provides in pertinent part: "1-2208. Assignment of cases to magistrates. -Subject to rules 
promulgated by the Supreme Court, the administrative judge in each judicial district or any district judge in the 
district designated by him may assign to magistrates, severally, or by designation of office, or by class or 
category of cases, or in specific instances the following matters: 
(1) Civil proceedings as follows: 
(b) Proceedings in forcible entry, forcible detainer, and unlawful detainer; . ." 
10. "Rule 3. Jurisdiction and Assignment of Cases-Magistrates.-The Magistrates in the respective 
counties in this district shall have jurisdiction to handle cases and proceedings as provided in this 
rule. 
3.4(a) Valley County Lawyer Magistrate. (a) All cases and proceedings specified in Section 1-2208, Idaho 
Code; Chapter 3, Title 66, Idaho Code; and Uniform District Court Rule 25." 
11. As then applicable Rule 18(a) read: "Rule 18(a). Joinder of claims and remedies-Joinder of claims.-The 
plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting f 3-64 
http://www.lawriter.net/cgi-bin/texis/web/idcaselaw/+k-el4aReqhb1ie4AUBeqGgwvqEqHxw . 6/20/2005 
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counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many c l a h s  either legal or equitable or 
both as he may have against an opposing party. There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple 
parties if the requirements of rules 19,20 and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or 
third-party claims if the requirements of rules 13 and 14 respectively are satisfied." 
12. As then applicable Rule 8(a) read: "Rule 8(a). General rules ofpleading-Claims for reliej-A pleading 
which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, 
shall contain (1) if the court be of limited jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the 
cow's jurisdiction depends, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative 
or of several different types may be demanded." 
13.71 Idaho 112,227 P.2d 351 (1951). 
14. Id. at 117.227 P.2d at 353-54. 
15. Id. at 122, 227 P.2d at 357. 
16. Id. at 121,227 P.2d at 356. See also Shields v. Johnson, 10 Idaho 476,79 P. 391 (1904); Faiwiew 
Investment Co. v. Lamberson, 25 Idaho 72, 136 P. 606 (1913); Howa~d v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 
189,340 P.2d 103 (1959). 
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96 Idaho 152; Standall v. Teater; 525 P.2d 347 
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Norman S. STANDALL and Anita J. Standall, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Archie TEATER 
and Patricia Teater, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants. 
[Cite as Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 1521 
No. 11308. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
July 26, 1974. 
In an action to quiet title, plaintiffs prevailed in the District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Gooding County, 
Charles Scoggin, J., and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, McFadden, J., held that where defendants 
since 1955 had maintained a substantial enclosure around their land, and plaintiffs recognized such as an 
encroachment upon their lands acquired in 1962, and defendants were assessed only on land designated as "Tax 
6" and not on land described by metes and bounds, and paid all taxes on property assessed to them over the 
years, they met the statutoly requirement of payment of taxes before claim to land under adverse possession 
could be established. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. 
Samuel Kaufnlan, Jr., Anderson, Kaufman, Andersot~ & Ringert, Boise, for defendants-appellants. 
Severt Swenson, Jr., Becker, Swenson & Shaw, Gooding, for plaintiffs-respondents, 
McFADDEN, Justice, 
Norman S. Standal and Anita J. Standal, husband and wife (plaintiffs-appellants), instituted this action to 
quiet title to real 
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property owned by them, alleging in their complaint that Archie and Patricia Teater, husband and wife, claimed 
an interest in their property. The Teaters (defendants-appellants) answered and cou~lterclaimed alleging that 
they owned certain real property described in their counterclaim, basing their ownership of the property on 
adverse possession. The trial court, after hearing the case entered findings of fact, conclusioils of law and decree 
adverse to the Teaters, and judgment was entered quieting title in the Standals. The Teaters then perfected this 
appeal. We affirm the judgment in part, and reverse in part. 
The lands in question are located in the Hageman Valley in Gooding County. The Standal property is in 
Lot 1 of Section 28, Township 6 South, Range 13 East of the Boise Meridian. The Teater properly, as described 
in their deed is a part of Lot 3, Section 21, Township 6 South, Range 13 East of the Boise Meridian. In their 
counterclaim they also assert ownership of property located in Lot 1 of Section 28, claimed by the Standals. The 
following is a sketch of the property claimed by the respective parties, and while not drawn to scale, illustrates 
the claims of the parties. 
[Please see hardcopy for image] 
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In substance the trial court found:-(a) In 1951 the Teaters by deed obtained rltle to their property in Section 
21; (b) The Standals purchased their property in Section 28 in 1962; (c) 111 1953 the Teaters had an engineer 
survey and deteimine a new description of the land, following which they made a claim to land in Section 28 
located within a barbed wire fence, which "was down and cattle could cross and recross"; (d) 111 1970 the 
Teaters had another engineer survey the property "due to the fact that the Defendants [Teaters] were not 
m 1953 * * *. That at the time the Defendant, Mr. Teater, stated that the Section satisfied with the survey " " ' 
line was not in the area determined by Mr. Riedesel [the engineer who surveyed it in 19701 and directed that he 
survey a line showed to him by the Defendant, Mr. Teater, which moved the entire October, 1953 survey south 
into Section 28"; (e) A chain link fence was constructed by the Teaters, but they testified they never considered 
this fence as their boundary; (f) The Standals and their predecessors paid all taxes levied on their property in 
Section 28 and the Teaters paid taxes on lands in Section 21 and paid no taxes on lands in Section 28; (g) The 
Teaters made no open adverse claim to Tract B until 1970 when they constructed a fence along the boundaries 
of the laid they claimed, which fence was promptly dismantled by the Standals. 
On the basis of the findi~igs of fact, the trial court concluded that the Teaters failed to establish their claim to 
adverse possession under a written instrument (I.C. $8 5-207, 5-208), or under an oral claim of title (I.C. 5 5  5- 
209, 5-210), and entered judgment quieting title in favor of the Standals. 
The appellants have assigned as error various findings of fact and conclusions of law contending that the 
findings were not sustained by the evidence and that the trial court misapplied the law in its conclusions. In 
summary, the appellants contend the trial court erred in holding, 
(1) that the appellai~ts failed to prove their claim of adverse possession to the land under a claim of 
a written instrument of title; and 
(2) that the appellants failed to prove their claim of adverse possession of the lands by an oral claim 
and exclusive possession in excess of five years. 
The Teaters purchased their property from Mr. and Mrs. Farnsworth, receiving a deed in 1951. Previously, in 
1949, the Teaters and Stella Farnsworth had entered into a written memorandum whereby it was agreed the 
Farnsworths would sell the Teaters a tract of about one acre of land on a knoll. The purchase price was minimal 
and the Farnsworths were unwilling to have it surveyed. In January 1951, a deed was executed by the 
Fanisworths to the Teaters describing the property as 
"A part of Lot 3, Section 21, Township 6 South Range 13 E.B.M., laying west of U.S. Highway 
30 consisting of approximately 213 of an acre and described as: Commencing at a point where U.S. 
Highway 30 crosses the south line of Section 21, thence west 250 feet; thence approximately North 
134 feet, thence in a Northeasterly direction 108 feet to the west line of U.S. Highway 30, then 
following the west side of U.S. Highway 30 South to point of beginning." 
This propelty was along the old highway from Bliss to Hagerman, and lay west of the highway and east of a 
break or rather abrupt drop to the Snake River. 
The Teaters commenced construction of their home on this property. During the course of construction, 
building materials were being pilfered, and in 1955 they constructed a 6 foot chain link fence topped by barbed 
wire to protect their property as is shown on the sketch, supra, as Tract A. The property was protected on three 
sides by the fence and on the west side by the break or drop-off. 
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established the southeast comer of the~r property on the west boundary of the highway with a marked rock. This 
point, Point C on the sketch, supra, was 267.3 feet southerly from the point where the south line of the chain 
link fence intersected the west boundary of the highway. Teaters claim that from this Point C they own all the 
property westerly to the break or drop-off, some 72 feet as they claimed, and then northerly &om that line to the 
west end of the south line of their chain link fence (Tract B, sketch, supra). 
The Teaters testified that they had made improvements in the claimed area by planting trees and maintaining 
the land in its natural rustic state. They also testified that they maintained an existing fence surrounding that 
area (Tract B). 
Mr. Teater is a well-known artist, and he used the property south of the chain link fence in his work as the 
basis for painting, exemplifying the natural state of the area. 
In 1970 the Teaters constructed a fence along the west and south side of the property they claim (Tract B). 
Standal testified that after the fence was built be pulled and stacked all the fence posts and rolled up the wires. 
He testified that in the area claimed by the Teaters he had hauled gravel out of a pit and sold some 3,000 yards 
of gravel to another person. 
[1,2] First, considering Teaters' claim to the disputed property based on adverse possession under a written 
claim of title (I.C. S; 5-207, $5-208), the trial court did not err in denying this claim. Their deed called for 
property situate in Section 21. The evidence clearly established the section line crossed their property between 
their home and the chain link fence to the south. Nowhere in the record does there appear any "written 
instrument" setting out any foundation for the Teaters' claim to the property lying south of the section line. The 
description set out by the surveyor in 1953 did not fit within the claim urged by the Teaters, or within the 
description contained in their counterclaim. The subsequent 1970 survey could not be used for any basis of 
adverse possession under a written claim. I.C. S; 5-207. The Teaters, who claim the property by adverse 
possession, had the burden of proof to establish their claim. Hamilton v. Village of McCall, 90 Idaho 253,409 
P.2d 393 (1965). See, Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477,511 P.2d 294 (1973); White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615, 
428 P.2d 747 (1967). The appellants failed in this regard. 
As concerns appellants' claim as to Tract B under an oral claim of title, I.C. $8 5-209(fnl) and 5-210,(fn2) 
the trial court denied this claim, first because the Leaters failed to establish payment by them of any taxes 
assessed against property situate in Section 28, and secondly, they failed to establish that it was protected by 
any substantial enclosure. The trial court found that the barbed wire fence was down. The record klly sustains 
the trial court's determination that the barbed wire fence the Teaters contended bounded the area claimed by 
them was down and cattle could cross and recross 
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the area. This finding, supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed 
by this court. Hafer v. Horn, 95 Idaho 621,515 P.2d 1013 (1973); Enders v. Hubbard & Sons, Inc., 95 Idaho 
590, 513 P.2d 992 (1973). I.C. S; 5-210 requires that to constitute an adverse possession, the person claiming it 
must have protected it by a substantial enclosure. In this regard the Teaters failed in their proof concerning the 
claim of enclosure by a barbed wire fence. 
[3] However, it is the conclusion of this court that the trial court erred in not recognizing the Teaters' claim 
to that portion of Tract A between the section line, southerly to the chain link fence. The record discloses that 
the section line between Sections 21 and 28 was northerly of the chain link fence and that that area of Tract A 
enclosed by the chain link fence encroached upon ground the record title of which was in the Standals. Mr. 
Standal testified that at the time he purchased his property in 1962 he recognized that this chain link fence was 
encroaching upon land owned by him, but that he did not want to do anything about it at the time. 
This court in a number of cases held that a fence can delineate the boundary of property regardless $88 
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location of the actual boundary when the other elements of adverse possession are present. See, Bayhouse v. 
Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 P. 1066 (1909); Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463 (1950); Calkins v. 
Kousouros, 72 Idaho 150,237 P.2d 1053 (1951); Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 258 (1973). The 
record is without dispute that the chain link fence was first constructed in 1955 and remained intact thereafter, 
and that this fence was a substantial enclosure within the meaning of I. C. 5 5-210. 
The trial court held that notwithstanding such an ei~closure by the chain link fence, the Teaters failed to 
show that they had paid any taxes upon land situate in Section 28. The tax assessor testified that initially the 
Teaters were assessed for a portion of Lot 3 west of the highway in Section 21, and that in 1952 the closest he 
could determine the acreage was .28 acres. The assessor testified that in 1953 the property was designated as 
Tax Number 6, and that he determined it contained two-thirds of an acre, but that he rounded the acreage off at 
one acre for assessment purposes. The record does not show that the assessor ever described this property by a 
metes and bounds description, but only assessed it as "Tax 6, Sec. 21, T. 6 R. 13". 
In 1973, in Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 258, this court had before it an issue concerning the 
statutory requirement that taxes must be paid before a claiin to land under adverse possession can be 
established. In fairness to the district judge and counsel, it should be pointed out that at the time of the trial of 
the instant case, none of them had the benefit of the decision in Scott v. Gubler, supra. In the Scott case this 
court reviewed at length prior decisions ofthis court and approved holdings from the Supreme Court of Indiana, 
and stated: 
"[Iln the case of boundary disputes between contiguous lai~downers, where one landowner can 
establish continuous open, notorious and hostile possession of an adjoining strip of his neighbor's 
land, and taxes are assessed by lot number or by government survey designation, rather than by 
metes and bounds description, payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is 
enclosed satisfies the tax payment requirement of the Indiana statute. Nasser v. Stahl, 126 Ind. App. 
709, 134 N.E.2d 567 (1956); Echterling v. Kalvaitis, 235 Ind. 141, 126 N.E.2d 573 (1955). Several 
Idaho cases have expressed approval of a similar theory. See White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615, 
622,428 P.2d 747 (1967); Beneficial Life v. Wakanlatsu, 75 Idaho 232,242,270 P.2d 830 (1954); 
Calkins v. Kousouros, 72 Idaho 150, 156, 237 P.2d 1053 (1951); Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22, 
26,225 P.2d 463 (1950); Bayhouse v. 
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Urquides, 17 Idaho 286,297-298,105 P.2d 1066 (1909)." 95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 260-261 
The rule quoted above in the Scott case is applicable to the factual situation here. In this case, since 1955 the 
Teaters maintained a substa~ltial enclosure around their land. The Standals recognized this was an encroachment 
upon their land acquired in 1962. Over the years since acquiring their title the Teaters were assesesd only on the 
land designated as "Tax 6" and not 011 land described by metes and bou~~ds. It is our conclusion that the Teaters, 
who paid all taxes on the property assessed to them over the years, as a matter of law did pay taxes on the whole 
of land designated as Tract A. This conclusion is further buttressed by the case of White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 
615,428 P.2d 747 (1967), where this court stated: 
"* * * it should be noted that in the analogous situation concerning adverse occupation of land, next 
to the boundary line between the property of the adverse claimant and his opponent, continuous 
adverse occupation will extend a true boundary line beyond the occupier's express deed limits, so 
that payment of taxes assessed on the deeded property is deemed payment of taxes on the lands in 
the claimant's possession. [Citations omitted.]" 91 Idaho at 622,428 P.2d at 754. 
See, Scott v. Gubler, supra; Hyde v. Lawson, 94 Idaho 886,499 P.2d 1242 (1972); Beneficial Life v. 
Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,270 P.2d 830 (1954); Mulder v. Stands,' supra; Bayhouse v. Urquides, supra. 
369 
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It is thus our conclusion that the r eaters are entitled to a decree quieting title to all property within the 
boundaries of the chain linlc fence (Tract A), and that portion of the judginent must be reversed. 
141 A judginent defining rights to land must be precise in its description. Noaie v. Fleming, 62 Idaho 381, 
112 P.2d 482 (1941); Hedrick v. Lee, 39 Idaho 42,227 P. 27 (1924). The record here fails to contain any metes 
and bounds description of Tract A sufficient to properly describe the parties' respective tracts of land. Unless 
the parties can furnish an agreed upon and adequate description of Tract A, the trial court shall order a survey 
by a disinterested, qualified engineer in order to obtain the necessary data for a description of the property 
sufficient for the purposes of this case. The costs of such survey shall be fixed by the court and be borne equally 
by the parties. The parties shall be furnished the results of such survey and be given an opportunity to be heard 
thereon. See, Lisher v. Krasselt, 94 Idaho 513,492 P.2d 52 (1972). Thereafter, the trial court shall enter 
amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in conformity with the views expressed herein. 
That portion of the judgment quieting title in the plaintiffs to land other than Tract A is affirmed, but that 
portion of the judgment concen~i~zg Tract A is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. No 
costs allowed. 
SHEPARD, C. J., and DONALDSON, McQUADE and BAISES, JJ., concur. 
Footnotes: 
1. LC. 5 5-209. "Possession under oral claim of title.-Where it appears that there has been an actual continued 
occupation of land, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a written 
instrument, judginent or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to have been held 
adversely. 
2. I.C. 5 5-210. "Oral claim-Possession defined-Payment of Taxes.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrumellt, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
2. Where it has beell usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possessioil be considered established ur~der the provisions 
of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period 
of five years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the taxes, 
state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law." 
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121 Idaho 576; Rice v. Hill City Stock Yards Co.; 826 P.2d 1288 
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Gwim F. RICE and Lena Rice, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HILL CITY STOCK YARDS 
COMPANY, a defunct Idaho corporation; the unknown heirs and devisees of R.H. Bennett, Joe Urquidi, P.M. 
Gandiago, Joe Darrianaga and James Farmer, said named individuals being the last directors of Hill City Stock 
Yards Company and all of said individuals being deceased; E.R. Hanford, if living; the unknown heirs and 
devisees of E.R. Hanford, if deceased; A.C. Chipman and Rosa B. Chipman, if living; the unknown heirs and 
devisees of A.C. Chipman and Rosa £3. Chipman, if deceased; Camas Prairie Development Compal~y, a defunct 
Idaho corporation; the unknown last directors, if llving, and if deceased, the unknown heirs and devisees of said 
last directors of Camas Prairie Development Company, a defunct Idaho corporation; County of Camas, State of 
Idaho, a body politic corporate; all of the unknown owners and claimants of the following described real 
property situate in Camas County, State of Idaho, to wit:(fhl) Defendants, and Faulkner Land and Livestock, 
Inc.; Charles J. Olson; Robert F. Bennett; Hammet Livestock Company, a corporation; Dennis Strom; and 
Adeline M. Urquidi, Defendants-Respondents. 
[Cite as Rice v. Hill City Stock Yards Co., 121 Idaho 5761 
No. 18949. 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, March 1991 Tenn 
February 3,1992. 
Rehearing Denied March 27, 1992. 
Deed grantee filed quiet title action, claiming ownership of property purchased from a statutory trustee of a 
corporation that had previously forfeited its charter. The District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Camas County, 
James J. May, J., denied the grantee's claim. Appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, 121 Idaho 616, 826 P.2d 
1328, reversed and remanded. Petition for review was granted. The Supreme Court, Balces, C.J., held that: (1) 
the deed was void where it was not joined by all surviving directors of the corporation in their capacities as 
statutory trustees; (2) the evidence did not establish that the grantee and his predecessors had exclusive use of 
property claimed by adverse possession; (3) the grantee could not establish title to the property by merely 
challenging his opponents' ownership; (4) remand was necessary for further proceedings to resolve conflicting 
judgments, one of which granted a default judgment and stated that the corporation had no interest in the 
property, and the other one which stated that the corporation was the lawful owner of the property; and (5) an 
award of discretionary costs had to be based on express findings about why each item sliould or should not have 
been allowed. 
Decision of Court of Appeals vacated; judgments of district court affirmed ill part and vacated in part and 
cause remanded. 
Page 577 
Ling, Nielsen & Robinson, Rupert, for plaintiffs-appellants. Roger D. Ling, argued 
Rosholt, Roberts011 & Tucker, Twin Falls, for defendants-respondents. Gary D. Slette, argued. 
ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
BAKES, Chief Justice. 
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Plaintiffs Gwinn and Lena Rice brought this action against defendants Hill City Stock Yards, Faulkner Land 
& Livestock, Inc., and others, seeking to quiet title in ccrtain real property in Camas County, Idaho. The trial 
court denied plaintiffs' claim to the property. Plaintiffs appealed this decision, and the Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Upon denial of defendants' petition 
for rehearing, the Court of Appeals issued an addendum to its original decision, still holding in favor of 
plaintiffs. Defendants then filed a petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision, and this Court granted 
that petition. 
The Court of Appeals opinion set forth most of the pertinent facts: 
The real property was originally purchased and owned by the Hill City Stock Yards Company, a 
corporation. The corporation was formed by a group of sheepinen operating in Camas County. The 
real property was used by those shareholders, a day or two each year, as a staging area to prepare 
livestock for shipment by rail. During the 1950ts, shipping by rail was discouraged and the 
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stockmen began shipping by truck. Consequently, the real property ceased to be used to prepare livestoclc for 
shipment on the railroad. It remained in use only as an occasional stop-over point for livestock operators trailing 
either sheep or cattle to or from the summer range. 
The record title to the real property was vested in Hill City Stock Yards Company, which had been 
incorporated in Idaho on August 30, 1938. In its 1938 annual statement, the corporation listed R.H. 
Bennett, Joe Urquidi, P.M. Gandiago, Joe Bariilaga (listed as Joe "Darrianaga" ill the caption of this 
case), and James Farmer as directors. ... The district court found that these were the last known 
[directors] when the corporation forfeited its charter on November 30, 1939. I.C. 5 30-614 
(repealed effective July 1, 1981). The corporation was never reinstated and eventually was 
dissolved by operation of law on March 1, 1979. I.C. 5 30-614. 
On February 1, 1967, James Farmer gave his son, J.E. Farmer, a quitclaim deed to the corporation's 
real property. James Fariner died a few months later. The deed recited that James Farmer acted as 
the sole surviving trustee of Hill City Stock Yards Company in making the conveyance. J.E. 
Farmer did not record the deed until 1978, but in 1968 he began paying the taxes assessed against 
the real property. 
Gwinn Rice, a farmer residing at Hill City, used the real property since 1957 with the informal 
permission of both James and J.E. Farmer. In April, 1981, Rice entered into a formal written lease 
with J.E. Farmer for a five-year term. After the expiration of the lease, on June 6, 1986, Rice 
obtained a deed to the real property from J.E. Farmer and his wife. Rice then comnlenced this quiet 
title action, claiming title both by virtue of the deed obtained from J.E. Farmer and by adverse 
possession. After trial, the district court concluded that Rice had no claim to the real property either 
by deed or by adverse possession. This appeal followed. 
In addition to the foregoing facts, the record reflects that Faulkner Land & Livestock (Faulkner) purchased a 
sheep ranching business from Riley Smith and James and J.E. Farmer in 1945. Faulkner claims that this 
purchase of James Fanner's sheep ranching business also included James Farmer's interest in the property 
owned by Hill City Stock Yards, to which Rice is now attempting to quiet title. 
The trial court found that Rice had no valid claim to the property because the deed from James Farmer to his 
son, J.E., was a nullity and also because neither Rice nor the Farmers had inet the eleineilts of adverse 
possession. The trial court also found that Faulkner obtained a beneficial interest in the Hill City Stock Yards 
Co. when it purchased the sheep ranching business fiom the Farmers. The Court of Appeals agreed that the deed 
to Rice was a nullity, but reversed the trial court's conclusion that J.E. Farmer did not adversely possess ?+. 9 l 2  
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property, holding that Rice had adequately shown that J.E. Farmer had fulfilled the requirements of adverse 
possession. The Court of Appeals also ultimately found that Faulkner's claim to a beneficial interest in the 
property was invalid as it was based on hearsay testimony. 
The first issue on this appeal has two components: Did the trial court correctly coilclude that the plaintiffs 
had no valid claim to the property because, first, the quitclaim deed given to J.E. Farmer by James Farmer was a 
nullity, and second, there was no substantial and competent evidence to support Rice's claim to the property by 
adverse possession? Then we are required to determine if the trial court erroneously concluded that Faulkner 
Land and Livestock has a beneficial interest in the property. 
[I] When this Court reviews a decision of the Court of Appeals, we give consideration to the ruling of the 
Court of Appeals, but make an independent appellate review of the trial court's decision. Sato v. Schossberger, 
117 Idaho 771,792 P.2d 336 (1990); State ex rel. Evans v. Barnett, 116 Idaho 429,776 P.2d 438 (1989). The 
district court, as trier of fact, is in the best 
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position to judge the credibility of evidence. Therefore, if substantial and competent, though conflicting 
evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact, we will uphold those findings on appeal. I.R.C.P. 52(a); 
MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp., 108 Idaho 588,701 P.2d 208 (1985); Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74,644 
P.2d 1333 (1982). 
I21 We f i s t  consider the trial court's conclusion that J.E. Farmer did not receive a valid deed to the property 
from his father. The Court of Appeals explained its decision to uphold the trial court's holding as follows: 
The trial court found that the deed from James Farmer to J.E. Farmer was a nullity and conveyed no 
interest in the real property. We agree. The deed recited that J.E. Farmer, as grantor, was acting as 
the "sole surviving trustee of Hill City Stock Yards Company." The trial court found that J.E. 
Fanner was not, in fact, the sole surviving trustee of Hill City Stock Yards Company. Moreover, 
the law requires that those serving as statutory trustees, in winding up the affairs of a forfeited 
corporation, must act in concert, not unilaterally. Smith v. Steele Motor Company, 53 Idaho 238,22 
P.2d 1070 (1933). Thus, the deed from James Farmer to J.E. Farmer was defective and it did not 
pass title. 
The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court on this issue. There is evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's finding that Joe Barinaga, an original director of Hill City Stock Yards, who also 
became a trustee when the corporation forfeited its charter in 1939, was still alive when James Farmer deeded 
the property to J.E. Farmer in 1967. Since Joe Barinaga did not participate in the transfer of the property to J.E. 
Fanner, the deed conveying the property was a nullity, and the trial court did not err in so holding. See Smith v. 
Steele Motor Co., 53 Idaho 238,22 P.2d 1070 (1933). 
We next consider the trial court's finding that Rice failed to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that 
J.E. Farmer had adversely possessed the property against all others ikom and after 1967, when Farmer received 
the deed from his father. Rice received his quitclaim deed from J.E. Farmer for the property on June 6, 1986, 
and filed this action on August 20, 1986, barely two months later. Thus, Rice must rely upon the claimed 
adverse possession of the Farmers in order to establish the five years of adverse possession required by statute. 
The trial court made the specific finding of fact that "[nleither the Plaintiffs nor their predecessors-in- 
interest have ever maintained an open, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession of the Property." Based on 
this finding, the court then made the legal conclusion that "[pllaintiffs have not demonstrated by clear and 
satisfactory evidence that title to the Property should be quieted in them. The Plaintiffs have failed to meet the 
burden of proof required for a showing of a claim of adverse possession." 
Q'Y2 
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The Court of Appeals reversed the rrial court, holding that the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that 
J.E. Farmer did l lf i l l  the elements of adverse possession with regard to the northern fenced portion. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals held, under I.C. 3 5-208, "the adverse possessio~i of the fenced parcel would extend to the 
balance of the real property under I.C. 3 5-208(4)." Iiowever, from our review of the record, and giving 
appropriate deference to the trial court's opportunity to view the witnesses as they testified, particularly 
regarding the witnesses pointing to locations on maps and other exhibits, we concIude that there is substantial 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that neither the Farniers  or Rice maintained the "open, notorious, 
exclusive, and hostile possession of the property" necessary to establish adverse possession by clear and 
satisfacto~y evidence. 
[3] A party claiming title to property by adverse possession has the burden of proving all the elements by 
clear and satisfactoly evidence. Berg v. Faivman, 107 Idaho 441,690 P.2d 896 (1984); Pincockv. Pocatello 
Gold & CoppevMin. Co., 100 Idaho 325,597 P.2d 21 1 (1979); Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152, 525 P.2d 347 
(1974). In this case, Rice claimed ownership of the 
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property by adverse possession under color of title. I.C. $ 5-208, which covers claims to property under color of 
title, reads: 
5-208. Claim under written instrument-Possession defined.- For the purpose of constituting an 
adverse possession by a person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or 
decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved 
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the 
purposes of husbandry, or for pasturage, or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
4. Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the portion of such farm or lot that 
may have been left not cleared, or not inclosed, according to the usual course and custom of the 
adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 
I.C. 3 5-207 provides that a party must possess property under color of title for five years to claim title by 
adverse possession. 
[4] This Court has frequently held that in order to claim title to land by adverse possession, the possession 
must have been actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous, exclusive and hostile to the true owner's title and to 
the world at large for the whole period prescribed by the statute. Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789, 537 P.2d 
631 (1975); Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 511 P.2d 294 (1973); Hawe v. Hawe, 89 Idaho 367,406 P.2d 106 
(1965). Furthermore, in Pincock v. Pocatello Gold & Coppev Min. Co., 100 Idaho 325,33 1,597 P.2d 21 1 
(1979), this Court set forth the requirements necessary to establish a claim of adverse possession under color of 
title: 
(1) that they entered into possession, as that term is defined by LC. $5 5-208, of the disputed 
property; (2) under a claim of title, which claim in this case is founded upon a decree of a 
competent court; (3) exclusive of other right; (4) that there has been a continued occupation and 
possession of the disputed property described in the decree of distribution; (5) that they have so 
held the property for five years; and ( 6 )  that they have paid all taxes, state, county or municipal, 
which have been levied and assessed upon such land accordi~lg to law.(fn2) 3-24 
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[5] If we treat the entire acreage as one parcel of property, there is no question that neither J.E. Farmer nor 
Rice ever used the entire parcel openly, notoriously, and exclusive of others, since the record indicates that 
many people used the southern parcel of the property continuously and without permission. 
The evidence regardii-~g the northern parcel of the property is less conclusive. Much of the testimony 
supports Rice's claiill that J.E. Farmer fulfilled the required elements of adverse possession against the northern 
parcel. Rice testified that he (Rice) used the northern portion of the property from 1957 on with the permission 
of James and J.E. Farmer and that he (Rice) improved the property by putting up fencing and building winter 
headquarters, corrals, hay sheds, and a spring house. Furlhermore, he testified that: 
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Q. Did anyone hold themselves out as being the owner of the property to you? 
A. Nobody held themselves out as being the owner of the property except Jay Farmer. 
Q. Jay Farmer did, then? 
A. It was with his permission that 1 done all these things 
Q. When you say Jay Farmer, was that the son or the father? 
A. That's the son [J.E. Fanner], at this time. 
Furthermore, at one point in his testimony, John Faulkner testified that he primarily used the area south of 
the highway. He also testified that he knew the Bill City Stock Yards Company owned land on the northern side 
of the road, but he didn't exactly know where it was and didn't know if the property north of the highway was 
entirely fenced because he had "never beell on the baclc side to see." The record also indicates that J.E. Farmer 
began paying all taxes on the property in 1968 when he received the quitclaim deed from his father, but the 
taxes were assessed in the name of Hill City Stoclryards until 1983. 
On the other hand, some of the testimony indicates that Faulkner and others also used the northern parcel 
without permission, which would defeat Rice's claim. When aslced if he had seem Faulkner's men or sheep on 
that property, Rice responded, "Well, it's a cinch they've beel: on there." He also stated that two other ranchers 
in the area, Dennis Strom and Charles Olson, had used both the northern and southern parcels and answered 
another question by stating, "I told in my testimony that people used it [the property] without my permission." 
Charles Olson, who ran cattle in the area until 1974, confirmed in his testimony that he and his family had used 
the property on the north side of the highway. 
John Faulkner also testified that he and his family repeatedly used the property. 
Q. Are you familiar with the property described in the Complaint and referred to today as the 
disputed property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wow did you become familiar with it? 
A. With use. 
Q. How long has the Faulkner family used that property? 
- 
( -- 
A. I'm aware of since 1942. Conti~~uously 
Q. And is that on an annual basis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many times a year? 
A. One, two, five. Depends which year and where we're going. 
Q. Did you continue to use that property, then, from 1957, on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Until the present date? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does it continue to be a necessary part of your operation? 
A. Yes. 
When asked if he used the property with permission, he answered, "Not by permissioll of anybody, just used 
it." Finally, Faullrner testified that he was never aware that J.E. Farmer held himself out to be tile owner of the 
property: 
Q. Did the Farmers know that Faulkner Land & Livestock, Faulkner Land & Livestock and 
Faulkners, used the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did either of them say to you that you could not use the property? 
A. No. 
Q. Did either of them ever say to you that you had to pay to use the property? 
A. No. 
Q. Did either of them ever say you couldn't go on the properly? 
A. No. 
Q. Did either of them ever try to keep you off the property? 
A. No. 
From the record it is often unclear whether the witnesses were testifying as to the northern or southern 
portion of the property. The trial court was in the best position to weigh and evaluate the testimony of the 
witnesses, particularly as that 
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testimony relates to pointing out loc&tions on maps and other exhibits. Given the heightened burden of proof, 
i.e., clear and satisfactory evidence, which the plaintiffs were required to meet, we cannot conclude that the trial 
court's finding of fact that "neither the Plaintiffs nor their predecessors-in-interest have ever maintained an 
open, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession of the Property," is clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a), MacNeil, 
Rueth, supra. 
In addition to alleging that the trial court erred in finding no adverse possession, appellant Rice argues that 
the trial court erred in finding that Faulkner Land and Livestock obtained an interest in the Hill City Stock 
Yards Company when it purchased the sheep ranching business from Riley Smith and James Farmer. However, 
a party seeking to quiet title to real property must rely on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness 
of that of his adversary. Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 3 1,624 P.2d 413 (1 981); Pincock v. Pocatello Gold and 
Copper Min. Co., Inc., 100 Idaho 325,597 P.2d 211 (1979); Nelson v. Enders, 82 Idaho 285,353 P.2d 401 
(1960). Rice may not rely on the alleged weakness of Faullner's claim to the property to support his own quiet 
title action. Because Rice did not convince the trial court, by a showing of clear and convincing evidence, that 
he or his predecessors-in-interest had fulfilled the elements of adverse possession, his quiet title action fails. We 
have previously concluded that the trial court's finding was not "clearly erroneous." I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Rice, however, argues that the answering defendants had no standing to attack the validity of his claim to 
the property since, as he asserts, they themselves did not establish a valid claim to the property. Rice also 
asserts that Faulkner waived any right to claim title to the property and is thus estopped from attacking his claiin 
because they did not attempt to determine who owned the property, did not pay any taxes on the property, and 
did not object when James Fanner attempted to deed the property to J.E. Farmer. Finally, Rice argues that 1.C. $ 
30-1-105, which provides that any action brought by or against a dissolved corporation will remain valid for 
only two years after the date of statutory dissolution, bars the answering defendants from asserting a claim to 
the property because no such action was brougl~t within two years of the statutory dissolution. 
[6,7] As previously stated, a party seeking to quiet title to real property must rely on the strength of his own 
title aud not on an adversary's weakness. Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 3 1,624 P.2d 413 (1981); Pincoclc v. 
Pocatello Gold and Copper Min. Co., Inc., 100 Idaho 325,597 P.2d 21 1 (1979); Nelson v. Endeus, 82 Idaho 
285,353 P.2d 401 (1960). 111 each of the above arguments, Rice attempts to establish that his claim to the 
property must succeed because the answering defendant's claims are without merit. However, we have affirmed 
the trial court's finding that Rice failed to establish a valid claim to the property, either by deed or by adverse 
possession. His arguments that the answering defendants have no standing to attack his claiin or are somehow 
estopped from attacking his claim in no way make his claim to the property any stronger. 
As to the waiver and estoppel claims, the trial court specifically found that "[tlhere is no estoppel or waiver 
of rights by the Defendants." This was a question of fact for the trial court which it resolved against appellant 
Rice. We conclude that the trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous. 
[8] Rice further argues that I.C. 9 30-1-105 bars Faulkner from asserting any claim to the real property after 
March 1, 1981, two years after the date of the statutory dissolution of the Hill City Stock Yards Company 
resulting from an application of I.C. 3 30-614 (repealed effective July 1, 1981). Again, Rice's claim focuses on 
the weakness of Faulkner's claim to the real property, rather than the strength of his own claim to title, which 
the trial court resolved adversely to him. Accordingly, 
Page 583 
I.C. $30-1-105 does not support Rice's claim.(fn3) 
[9] Rice also assigns as error the trial court's Conclusion of Law No. 10, that "Title to the Property remains 
in the name of Hill City Stock Yards Company, or alternatively, its shareholders." The trial court's original 
judgment, filed on October 19,1988, incorporated Conclusion of Law No. 10, and "ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that title to the property described in Exhibit "A" remains in the name of Hill City Stoc 9 '7 7 
- Page 8 of 10 
i I 
Yards Company, or alternatively, its sfiareholders." The original judgment and the later amended judgment also 
decreed "that plaintiffs [Rices] have no right, title or interest whatsoever in and to the property," and that "title 
to the property . . . remains in the name of Hill City Stock Yards Company, or alternatively, its 
sharel~olders." (h4) However, the cow,  on December 13, 1988, also entered a "Default Judgment @uric Pro 
Tunc)" against Hill City Stock Yards and the other defendants who did not answer or appear at trial.(h5) The 
default judgment stated that "as to said defaulting defendants herein named, the plaintiffs [Rices] are the owners 
of the hereinafter described real property and are entitled to the possession thereof, and that none of the said 
defaulting defendants have any lawful estate or interest in or to said properly, or any portion thereof. . . ." 
Clearly, the December 13,1988, amended judgment and the December 13, 1988, default judgment are in 
conflict with each other.(fn6) In the December 13th amended judgment, the trial court concluded that title to the 
property "remains in the name of Hill City Stock Yards 
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Company, or alternatively, its shareholders." In the Oecember 13th default judgment, the trial court concluded 
that Hill City Stoclc Yards did not "have any lawful estate or interest in or to said property, or any portion 
thereof," and that the defaulting defendants, which iilcluded the Hill City Stock Yards Company, "are forever 
barred from asserting or claiming any interest or estate therein adverse to the plaintiffs [Rices] whatsoever as to 
said real property. . . ." The judgment and anlended judgment, which dismiss the Rices' claim and hold that the 
title to the property remains in the name of the Hill City Stock Yards Company, are in direct conflict with the 
default judgment which holds that the Hill City Stock Yards Compaily does not have any lawful interest or 
estate in the property and is forever barred from asserting or claiming any interest or estate therein adverse to 
the Rices. Because of the conflict between the judgments, we vacate all the judgments entered and remand this 
case to the trial court for further proceedings to resolve this conflict.(fn7) 
[1Qj Rice's final argument is that the trial court erred in failing to make express findings supporting its 
decision to grant the answering defendants discretionary costs. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) specifically requires that 
the district court "in ruling upon objections to . . . discretionary costs . . . shall make express findings as to why 
such specific item of discretionary costs should or should not be allowed." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D); Building 
Concepts Ltd. v. Piclceving, 114 Idaho 640, 759 P.2d 931 (Ct.App.1988) ("The rule requires 'express findings as 
to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed."'). By vacating the judgments 
entered in this case, we also vacate the award of costs, and therefore the question of the allowa~lce of costs must 
abide the entry of the ultimate final judgment on remand. Nevertheless, to award discretionary costs on remand 
the trial court must comply with I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 
We have reviewed the remaining issues raised by Rice and conclude that they are either mooted by our 
vacating the judgment in this matter, or that they are without merit. 
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court's conclusions that, (1) "Plaintiffs have not demonstrated by clear 
and satisfactory evidence that title to the Property should be quieted in them"; that (2), "The Plaintiffs have 
failed to meet the burden of proof required for a showing of a claim of adverse possession"; and that (3), "There 
is no estoppel or waiver of rights by the Defendants," are not clearly erroneous, and we uphold them. However, 
because the judgment and amended judgment which decreed the title to the property remains in the name of Hill 
City Stoclc Yards Company, or alternatively, its shareholders, are in direct conflict with the default judgment 
entered which decreed that, as to the defendant Hill City Stock Yards Company, 
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the plaintiffs Rices are the owners of the property, the October 17, 1988, judgment, the December 13, 1988, 
amended judgment, and the December 13, 1988, default judgment must be vacated and the matter remanded for 
further proceedings to resolve the conflict. 
The judgments entered by the district court are vacated and the cause remanded for hrther proceedin& 7 8 
- 
, 
consistent with this opinion. No costs or attorney fees allowed 
BISTLINE, JOHNSON, BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur. 
Footnotes: 
1. The lengthy legal descriptioil contained in the Notice of Appeal has been omitted from this title since it is not 
relevant to the disposition of this appeal. 
2. Neither I.C. $5 5-207 or 5-208, which are at issue ill this case, state that payment of taxes is required to gain 
title to property by adverse possession. I-lowever, in a footnote, the Pincock court pointed out that LC. 5 5-210, 
which covers adverse possession under an oral claim, states that adverse possession shall not be established 
"under the provisions of any sections of this code" u~~less  taxes are paid. I.C. $5 5-207 and 5-208 were adopted 
as part of the same code as I.C. 5 5-210 in 1881, and thus the requirement that taxes be paid to make a valid 
claim of adverse possession also applies to LC. 5s 5-207 and 5-208. One case, Stout v. Westover, 106 Idaho 
533,681 P.2d 1008 (1984), stated that "payment of taxes is not a requirement under either I.C. 5 5-207 or 5 5- 
208." However, in Stout, the trial court found and this court affirmed that the person claiming title by adverse 
possession had paid taxes on the property in question. Thus, the statement that taxes are not a requirement under 
§$ 5-207 and 5-208 was merely dicta in that case. 
3.111 fact, if LC. $30-1 -1 05 is applicable to this quiet title claim, the section would also appear to preclude 
Rice's action against the Hill City Stock Yards Company, the first named derendant in the action. I.C. 3 30-1- 
105 provides in part: "The dissolution of a corporation . . . shall not take away or impair any remedy available 
to ov against such corporation . . . for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such 
dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two (2) years after the date of such 
dissolution." 
4. The trial court entered its original judgment on October 19, 1988. On December 13, 1988, the trial court 
entered an amended judgment which included $268.25 as costs as a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) 
(C), and $346.10 as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l), for a total award of costs ill the amount of 
$614.35. Other than the insertion of the amount of costs awarded, the original judgment and the amended 
judgment were essentially identical. 
5. The December 13, 1988, "Default Judgment (Nunc Pro Tunc)," was in favor of the Rices, and against all of 
the defendants who had failed to appear, including the Hill City Stock Yards Company, a defu~ct Idaho 
corporation, the unknown heirs and devisees of the last known directors (none of whom appeared except Robert 
F. Bellnett), several other individuals and corporations, and "all of the other unknown owners and claimants 
who have or may have some claim in the below described real property." The default judgment ordered that "as 
to said defaulting defendants herein named, the plaintiffs [Rices] are the owners of the hereinafter described real 
property and are entitled to possession thereof, and that none of said defaulting defendants have any lawful 
estate or interest in or to said property, or any portion thereof, and that each and every one of the said defaulting 
defendants . . . are forever barred from asserting or claiming any interest or estate therein adverse to plaintiffs 
whatsoever, as to said real property described as follows [long description follows]." The default judgment 
"FURTHER ORDERED that this default judgment be entered as of August 19, 1987, nunc pro tunc," a date 
approximateIy sixteen months preceding the date the default judgment was actually signed and filed. 
6. The December 13, 1988, default judgment which decrees that "as to said defaulting defendants herein named, 
the plaintiffs [hces] are the owners of the hereinafter described real property and are entitled to possession 
thereof," conflicts with the trial court's earlier decision in its findings of fact and conclusions of law filed 
October 4, 1988, in which the trial court concluded that, "Plaintiffs [Rices] have not demonstrated by clear and 
satisfactory evidence that title to the property should be quieted in them." I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), which sets out the 
requirements for entry of default judgments, states in part: "If, in order to enable the court to enter [defaul 979 
C- Page 10 of 10 
I 
judgment or to cany it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may 
conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessaly and proper." Having conducted a trial, and 
having made findings holding that the Rices did not "have any lawfbl estate or interest in or to said property," 
the entry of the default judgment in favor of the Rices would appear to be contrary to I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). 
7. We hrther note that the answering defendants did not file a crossclaim or counterclaim to establish title to the 
property. The sole issue raised by pleadings in this case was whether or not Rice had proved title to the property 
either by the quitclaim deed he received from Farmer, or by adverse possession. Except for the defendants 
Faulkner's Land & Livestock, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Charles J. Olson, Robert F. Bennett, Han~met 
Livestock Company, an Idaho corporation, Dennis Shom, and Adeline M. Urquidi, all of the other defendants, 
including Hill City Stock Yards Company, failed to appear, and a default judgment was entered against them. 
That portion of the trial court's decision which concluded that title to the property remained in Hill City Stock 
Yards, appears to be beyond the scope of the issues raised by the pleadings. Conclusions of law, based upon 
issues not raised by the pleadings or not tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, cannot support a 
judgment. I.R.C.P. 15(b); Peters v. Bow, 45 Idaho 303,262 P. 149 (1927); Carson v. Thews, 2 Idaho 176,9 P. 
605 (1 886). Accordingly, the judgment and amended judgment which decreed that title to the property was 
deemed to remain in Hill City Stock Yards, may have been entered in error because it went beyond the issues 
raised by the pleadings. See Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266,280, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977) 
("Although a corporation which has forfeited its charter cannot have a judgment entered against it or be made a 
party to an action, Jolley v. Puregro Co., [94 Idaho 702,496 P.2d 939 (1972)], supra, the statutoiy trustees of 
such a corporation may properly be sued on any claim against the corporation and judgment may be entered 
against them in their capacity as trustees."). 
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Tracy BAXTER and Sharon Baxter, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. CRANEY and 
Darlene (Dollie) Craney, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents. 
[Cite as Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 1661 
No. 25549. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. Idaho Falls, September 2000 Term. 
December 15,2000. 
Claimants brought quiet title suit against adjoining landowners, claiming adverse possession of disputed tract 
and boundary by agreement or, in alternative, prescriptive easement over tract. The District Court, Bear Lake 
County, Don L. Harding, J., entered summary judgment against claimants on issues of adverse possession and 
boundary by agreement and entered judgment against claimants on prescriptive easement claim after bench 
trial. Claimants appealed. The Supreme Court, Walters, J., held that: (I) refusal to allow amendment of 
complaint to add federal agency as new party was not abuse of discretion; (2) claimant did not show requisite 
payment of taxes on disputed parcel to support adverse possession claim; (3) genuine fact issues precluded 
summary judgment on boundary by agreement claim; and (4) claimant did not show prescriptive easement to 
use land for cattle crossing. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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Myers, Thomsen & Larson, LLP, Pocatello, and Rigby, Thatcher, Andrus, Rigby, Kam & Moeller, Chtd., 
Rexburg, for appellants. A. Bruce Lars011 argued. 
Racine, Olsoii, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Pocatello, for respondents. Randall C. Budge argued. 
WALTERS, Justice 
This action was commenced by Tracy and Sharon Baxter against their neighbors, James and Darlene 
Craney, to quiet title to certain real property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Craneys upon the Baxters' theories of title by adverse possession and title through boundary by agreement. 
After a trial before the court without a jury, the district court also found in favor of the Craneys and against the 
Baxters on a claim of easement by prescription. The district court then entered an order awarding attorney fees 
and costs to the Craneys as the prevailing party. 
For reasons to follow, this Court affirms the order granting summary judgment on the adverse possession 
claim, but we vacate the order for judgment on the theory of boundary by agreement. We also affirm the 
judgment denying relief on the Baxters' claim to an easement by prescription. Finally, we vacate the award of 
attorney fees and costs in favor of the Craneys, and we remand the action for further proceedings. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Tracy and Sharon Baxter and James and Darlene Craney are ranchers who own adjacent parcels of real 
property in Bear Lake County. The Craneys and the Baxters share a common boundary of approximately one- 
quarter mile in length. The Craneys purchased their land in 1996 and subsequently removed a portion of a fence 
'?Q3 
located between the two properties. i'he Baxters contend that the fence marks the actual boundary between the 
two parcels. The Craneys, on the other hand, contend that the fence was put up for coilveniei~ce purposes and 
was only intended to keep cattle from wandering onto a portion of their land. They claim the range line to the 
east of the fence forms the boundary between the two properties as established by a number of surveys dating 
back to 1882. 
The Baxters filed this action against the Craneys in November of 1997, claiming ownership of the land east of 
the fence but west of the range line under the doctrine of boundary by agreement or by adverse possession. The 
Baxters alternatively claimed a prescriptive easement to cross the land lying to the east of the fence for the 
purpose of reaching a spring to water their livestock. Later, the Baxters attempted to amend their complaint to 
join the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) as a defendant in the action, asserting that the BLM was an 
integral party. The district court, however, refused to allow the Baxters to add the BLM. 
The district court granted suuxnary judgment in favor ofthe Craneys on the issues of boundary by 
agreement and adverse possession. The court concluded that the Baxters failed to present genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the existence of a boundary agreement between Tracy Baxter and Grant Esterholdt, the 
Craneys' predecessor in interest, or t l~e payment of taxes as is required for adverse possession. A trial was held 
on the issue of whether the Baxters acquired a 
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prescriptive easement to use the land east of the fence for stock watering. The district court found that ihe 
Baxters failed to prove the elements required for a prescriptive easement and awarded costs and attorney fees to 
the Craneys. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Baxters raise the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the District Court properly exercise its discretion in denying the Baxters' motion to amend their 
complaint to add the Bureau of Land Management as a party? 
2. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' adverse possession 
claim? 
3. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' claim of boundary by 
agreement? 
4. Was the District Court's denial of the Baxters' prescriptive easement claiin at trial based on substantial 
and competent evidence? 
5. Did the District Court properly award attorney fees and costs to the Craneys? 
ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Amend 
[I, 21 A trial court's decision to deny an amendment to pleadings is reviewed by this Court under an abuse 
of discretion standard. See Coolc v. State Dep't of Transp., 133 Idaho 288,296,985 P.2d 1150, 1158 (1999). In 
determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, this Court applies the three-factor test articulated 
in Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). The three 
factors are: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
382 
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court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. See 
id. at 94. 803 P.2d at 1000. 
Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely 
given when justice so requires." Id. See also Cook, 133 Idaho at 296,985 P.2d at 1157. This Court, on a number 
of occasions, however, has upheld trial court decisions to deny the plaintiffs amended complaint motion. See 
Daiv  Equip. Co. of Utah v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 301,304,442 P.2d 437,440 (1968) (holding no abuse of 
discretion when the amended complaint was filed five days prior to trial); Jones v.. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,610, 
570 P.2d 284,288 (1977) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to amend filed on the day of 
trial); Coo/z, 133 Idaho at 297, 985 P.2d at 1158 (holding no abuse of discretion for denial of an eighth amended 
complaint filed on the morning of trial). 
[3] The Baxters attempted to amend their complaint approximately five months after the original complaint 
had been filed and after the date for trial had been set. The district court concluded that given the amount of 
time and money the Craneys had expended in defending the action, "it would he unfairly prejudicial at this point 
to allow Plaintiffs the opporfmity to add a new party and change the dynamics of the action as it now stands." 
This illustrates that the district court recognized it had the discretion to allow or deny amendment of the 
complaint. Because Rule 15(a) requires the district court to allow amendments only when justice requires, the 
court's decision to deny the amendment was both within the bounds of its discretion and within applicable legal 
standards. In addition, the district court displayed sound reasoning for its conclusion. As the court noted, the 
issues the Baxters sought to resolve with the BLM were not directly related to their action against the Craneys. 
The BLM was neither a necessary party, nor were the Baxters unduly prejudiced by the district court's refusal to 
allow the Baxters to amend their complaint, as the Baxters are not precluded from bringing a separate action 
against the BLM. Moreover, the potei~tial ikelihood of removal to federal court upon the addition of the federal 
agency 
to the action would result in the Craneys expending more time and money so that issues unrelated to their case 
could be resolved. Accordingly, this Court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
refused to allow the Baxters to amend their complaint by adding the BLM as a party defendant. 
B. Summary Judgment Motion 
1. Standard of Review 
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the 
standard used by the district court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment. See McDonald v. Paine, 
119 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d 259 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes v. Akriddan Athletic Ass'n., Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 
670 P.2d 1294 (1983). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents 
on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of 
fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See I.R.C.P. 56(c); Badell v. Beeks, 
115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the 
moving party. See Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969). The adverse 
party, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this mle, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e); see also Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1986). In 
other words, the moving party is entitled to a judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial. See Badell, 115 Idaho at 102,765 P.2d at 127 (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 17, 
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). With this standard in mind, we turn to whether the district court erred 
in dismissing the Baxters' claims to title by adverse possession or by the doctrine of boundary by agree TEb 
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2. Adverse Possession 
[4] Idaho Code section 5-210 defines the elements of adverse possession under an oral claim of right. The 
statute provides as follows: 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not founded up011 
a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in 
the following cases only: 
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possessioll be considered established under the 
provisions of any sections ofthis code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for a period of five (5) years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and 
grantors, have paid all the taxes, state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed 
upon such land according to law. 
The burden of showing all of the essential elements of adverse possessioil is upon the party seeking title 
thereunder and every element of adverse possession must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence. See 
Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854,949 P.2d 1061 (1997); Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,690 P.2d 896 
(1984); Loomis v. Union Pacific Railroad, 97 Idaho 341, 544 P.2d 299 (1975). 
The Baxters argue that they presented a genuine issue of material fact supporting their claim of adverse 
possession concerning the property, including the payment of taxes on the disputed parcel. The Craneys, on the 
other hand, assert that the Baxters failed to hlfill the necessary requirements to establish an adverse use of the 
land, and in particular, that there is no evidence that they paid the taxes on the disputed property. 
[51 Generally, Idaho Code section 5-210 requires actual payment of the taxes that are assessed with regard 
to the disputed property. See Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 
633 P.2d 592 (1981); F v  v. Smith, 91 Idaho 740,430 P.2d 486 (1967); White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615,428 
P.2d 747 (1967); Larson v. Lindsay, 80 Idaho 242,327 P.2d 775 (1958); Balmer v. Pollak, 67 Idaho 494, 186 
P.2d 217 (1947). As was noted in Trappett, this Court has, on a number of occasions, "wrestled" with property 
disputes involving the payment of taxes. 102 Idaho at 530,633 P.2d at 595. This has resulted in a significant 
amount of what the Court termed 'Ijudicial gloss" whittling away at a literal application of the tax requirement. 
(fnl) Id. The tax rule focuses on the actual payment of taxes as demonstrated by the assessor's valuation. The 
Court, however, "has fashioned several exceptions to the general rule which, when applied, have the effect of 
satisfying the tax requirement." Id. at 530-31, 633 P.2d at 595-96. 
[6j The Baxters argue that the "lot number" exception to the tax requirement applies in this case. The lot 
number exception states that: 
(I)n the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, where one landowner can 
establish continuous open, notorious and hostile possession of an adjoining strip of his neighbor's 
land, and taxes are assessed by lot number or by government survey designation, rather than by 
metes and bounds description, payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is 
enclosed satisfies the tax payment requirement of the . . . statnte. 
Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,443-44,511 P.2d 258,260-61 (1973) (footnote omitted). The Baxters c o n s  4 
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that the property in question is descrioed by govenment survey designation and not by metes and bounds. 
Without a metes and bounds description, they argue, it is impossible to tell how much property is being 
assessed with any precision. Thus, they claiin the payment of the taxes assessed on their property includes all 
the property within the inclosure, i.e., on the east side of the fence located between the Craney and Baxter 
properties. 
This argument, however, ignores the rationale behind the lot number exception. As the Court stated in FIynn 
v. Allison, "[tlbe primary reason behind the lot number exception is as follows: when taxes are assessed 
according to some generic description, 'it (is) impossible to determine from the tax assessment record the 
precise quantum of property being assessed. . . .' " 97 Idaho 618,621, 549 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1976) (citation 
omitted). Here, the Craneys submitted the affidavit of the Bear Lake County assessor, which clearly describes 
the disputed property and confirms that the Craileys and their predecessors in interest paid the taxes on the 
disputed parcel bounded by the range line. In contrast, the Baxters offered the affidavit of Tracy Baxter. This 
affidavit, however, which comprises the Baxters' sole piece of evidence, merely states that Baxter paid the taxes 
on his property. There is neither any indication as to the extent of the Baxters' property nor evidence as to what 
parcels of property Baxter paid taxes on. Therefore, the affidavit, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Baxters, fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the required payment of taxes and is 
insufficient to overcome the Craneys' motion for summary judgment on this issue. 
3. Boundary by Agreement 
[7,8] The doctrine of boundary by agreement bas long been established in Idaho law. To have a boundary 
by agreement, the location of the true boundary line must be uncertain or disputed and there must be a 
subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. See Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,901,950 P.2d 1237,1240 
(1997); Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,41,794 P.2d 626,630 (1990). The agreement need not be express, 
but may be implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. See Neal, I30 Idaho at 901, 
950 P.2d at 1240; Williamson, 118 Idaho at 41,794 P.2d at 630. The Craneys assert that the Baxters cannot 
show that the boundary line between their respective properties is uncertain or has been disputed in the past, or 
that there has been any sort of agreement fixing the boundary. In 
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support of their position, the Craneys presented an affidavit by Ivan Kunz who said that his father had 
homesteaded the Craney property in the early 1900's; that he and his brother had helped his father install the 
fence prior to 1940 for the purpose of keeping cattle from wandering on to their meadow; and that the fence was 
not intended or agreed to establish a boundary line. The Baxters, on the other hand, represent that Tracy Baxter 
and Grant Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in interest, had an agreement as to the location of the boundary 
between their adjoining properties. The Baxters contend that the actual location of the boundary line was 
uncertain for a considerable amount of time and that Baxter and Esterholdt orally agreed that the fence 
constituted the boundary between their properties. 
In support of their argument, the Baxters rely in part on Tracy Baxter's affidavit. In the affidavit, Baxter 
relates two separate conversations with Esterholdt-one in 1991 and another in 1992-where Esterholdt 
purportedly acknowledged that the fence line constituted the boundary between their properties. When 
examining Baxter's affidavit, however, the district court noted that it was "uncomfortable giving serious 
credibility to portions of Mr. Baxter's affidavit given their hearsay nature." 
The Baxters also offered the affidavits of Marcia Singleton, who is Esterholdt's daughter, and Henry and 
Lee Rigby, whose father owned the Craneys' land at one time. Each of these affidavits to some degree supports 
the Baxters' contention that the fence line constituted tlle boundary between the two parcels. Singleton states 
that her father considered the fence to be the boundary. She also states that she assumed that the fence line was 
the boundary. The Rigbys, oil the other hand, both state that the fence was not constructed for convenience 
purposes, but was instead treated as a boundary between the k o  properties. The district court, however 3w 
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commented on the affidavits, stating that it could not "in good conscience give ithem] a great deal of 
credibility." 
[9,10] We conclude that the district court erred by considering the credibility of the affidavits. Although 
affidavits must set forth facts that would be admissible as evidence, see I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e), it is not proper for 
the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant at the summary judgment stage when credibility can be 
tested in court before the trier of fact. See Hines v. ITines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20,26 (1997); Sohn I J .  
Foley 125 Idaho 168, 171,868 P.2d 496,499 (Ct.App.1994). Because the affidavits are sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the presence of a boundary by agreement, we reverse the district court's 
order granting suminw judgment to the Craneys and remand the case for further proceedings on that issue. 
C. Prescriptive Easement Claim at  Trial 
1. Standard of Review 
111-141 Appellate review of the lower court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. See Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,269,985 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1999); Alumet v. Bear Lalce Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 
812 P.2d 253 (1991). A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor 
of the judgment entered, in view ofthe trial court's role as trier of fact. See Lindgven v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 
857, 949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997); Sun Valley ShamrockResources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 
116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). It is the province of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge thc credibility of the witnesses. See Abbott v. Nampa School 
Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544,808 P.2d 1289 (1991); I.R.C.P. 52(a). Findings of fact that are based on 
substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, will not be overturned on appeal. See Hunter v. Shields, 
131 Idaho 148,953 P.2d 588 (1998). Mowever, we exercise free review over the lower court's conclusions of 
law to determine whether the trial court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether'the legal conclusions 
are sustained by the facts found. See Whittlesey, 133 Idaho at 269,985 P.2d at 113 1; Burns v. Alderman, 122 
Idaho 
2. Prescriptive Easement 
[15,16] 111 order to establish a private prescriptive easement, a claimant must present reasonably clear and 
convincing proof of open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use under a claim of right and with the 
knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement for the prescriptive period of five years. See LC. 3 5-203; West 
v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,511 P.2d 1326 (1973). The purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and 
notorious is to give the owner of the servient tenement knowledge and opportunity to assert his rights. The open 
and notorious use must rise to the level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use to a servient 
landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of supervision over his premises. See Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110 
Idaho 337, 340, 715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App.1986) (citations omitted). 
[17j The Baxters argue that Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in interest, had actual knowledge that the 
Baxters' cattle used trails on land east of the fence to reach the spring for water. The district court, however, 
noting that there was conflicting testimony that the trails were also used by deer and elk wandering off the BLM 
lands, concluded that the Baxters failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the trails were sufficient 
to put Esterholdt on notice of their use as a means for the Baxters' cattle to get to the spring. We agree. An 
examination of the record establishes that the district court's characterization of the land is accurate. The land in 
question is essentially a knoll or hill. There are a number of bails present on the hillside, all of which could 
either be used by the Baxters' cattle or by wild game. The Baxters argue that their testimony at trial del 9vv 
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the main trails used by their cattle to reach the spring. The record, however, illdlcates that Esterholdt was ill and 
was only able to visit the property two or three times per year. Because a landowner need only maintain 
reasonable supervision over his property, see Kaupp, 110 Idaho at 340, 715 P.2d at 1010, we agree with the 
district court that the presel~ce of the trails on Esterholdt's land, without more, was insufficient to place 
Esterholdt on notice of their use by the Baxters' cattle. 
[IS, 191 In addition, the multiple paths do not show any established right of way on a specific trail. As the 
Court of Appeals noted in Roberts v. Swim, an easement by prescription "requires a showing by the claimant of 
a line of travel without material change or variation." 117 Idaho 9, 15,784 P.2d 339,345 (Ct.App.1989). Travel 
over a tract of land in various directions and courses for the prescriptive period is thus illsufficient to establish a 
right of way over any particular path. See id. Although the Baxters argue that their testimony at trial illustrated 
the particular trails their cattle were using to reach the spring, their testimo~ly also indicates that the lay of the 
land malces it difficult, if not impossible, for their cattle to reach the spring without followiilg one of the 
numerous trails that zigzag the slope leading to the water. As Mr. Baxter himself noted, his cattle were more apt 
to meander up and down the various trails than to travel in a linear fashion up or down the hillside. It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that the Baxters' cattle were not traveling by means of any particular route. 
The Baxters alternatively argue that there is no evidence demonstrating how the fence line that separates the 
two parcels was altered to allow their cattle to reach the spring. They assert that the lack of evidence as to how 
the use of the disputed property began raises the presumptioll of open, notorious, and continued use for the 
statutory period in their favor under I.C. 5 5-203, and contend that the burden then shifts to the Craileys, as 
owners of the property, to show that the use was permissive. See West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,557,511 P.2d 
1326, 1333 (1973). 
[20,21] Although it appears reasonable to assume that Baxter himself altered the fence to allow his cattle to 
reach the spring, it is true that the record does not indicate how or when the fence was moved. There are, 
however, facts suggesting that even if Esterholdt was aware that the Baxters' cattle 
Page 174 
were crossing his land to water at the spring, their use of his property was permissive. The property in question 
is essentially useless for grazing because of its steep terrain and lack of vegetation. Additionally, Esterholdt did 
not lose access to the spring when the fence was moved. It is therefore logical to assume that even if Esterholdt 
was on notice that the Baxters' cattle were crossing his land to reach the spring, he was simply being neighborly 
by allowing the fence to be moved and giving the Baxters' cattle access to water. Because a prescriptive right 
cannot be established where the use was permissive, see Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151,953 P.2d 588, 
591 (1998), we reject the Baxters' assertion. 
[22] The Baxters also contend that the Craneys took possession of the land with knowledge of the easement. 
As evidence of their knowledge, the Baxters point to testimony that the Craneys inspected the land prior to their 
purchase and observed the trails. An examination of the relevant testimony in the record, however, merely 
establishes that the Craneys were aware ofthe trails at the time of purchase. The Craneys' mere appreciation of 
the abundant trails, without more, is insufficient to establish that the Craneys were put on notice of a 
prescriptive easement across their land. Accordingly, because the district court's decision is supported by 
substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb its conclusion. SeeHunter, 
131 Idaho 148,953 P.2d 588 (1998). 
D. Attorney Fees 
Finally, we turn to whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to the Craneys as 
claimed by the Baxters in this appeal. Because we remand the case for further proceedings on the question of 
boundary by agreement, we vacate the award and direct the district court to redetermine the issue of the award 
of fees and costs upon completion of the proceedings on remand. Nonetheless, we deem it appropriate to 3 $7 
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address an apparent misperception kiculated by the district court with respebt to its initial attorney fee 
determination. 
The Craneys requested, and the district court approved, attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 5 12-120 together with 
other costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court noted that 
both the Baxters and the Craneys are engaged in the businesses of ranching and farming, characterizing each 
party as being involved in a commercial endeavor. The district court, however, also summarily concluded that 
the relationship between the two parties was of a commercial natnre. This simply is not the case. Idaho Code 
section 12-120(3) provides that attorney fees may be recovered by the prevailing party in a civil action to 
recover on "any commercial transaction." Id. The term "commercial transaction," as defined in LC. 5 12-120(3), 
includes all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. See id. This Court has 
previously recognized that "[alttorney fees are not appropriate under I.C. 5 12-120(3) unless the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." 
Brower v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345,349 (1990). 
1231 The present case is analogous to others decided by this Court and the Court of Appeals involving the 
determination of property rights. See Jeyv J: Joseph C.L. U: Ins. Assoc. v. Yaught, 117 Idaho 555,789 P.2d 
1146 (Ct.App.1990) (denying attorney fees under I.C. 5 12-120(3) in an action where property owner sought a 
judgment cornpelling adjoining property owners to reimburse it for irrigation assessments, to record an 
instrument establishing an access easement, and to remove a fence hindering its use of the easement and where 
after settlement, adjoining property owners breached the settlement agreement); Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 
1006,1012,829 P.2d 1355,1361 (Ct. App.), opinion on review, 121 Idaho 1000,829 P.2d 1349 (1992) 
(determining that a quiet title action involving dispute over the existence of a prescriptive easement was not a 
commercial transactioil under LC. 5 12- 120(3)); Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70,785 P.2d 634 (1990) 
(holding that an action in which landowners sought adjudication of water rights and a permanent re- 
straining order prohibiting the defendant from interfering with their diversion and use of water determined was 
not based on a co~nmercial transaction as defined in LC. 5 12-120(3)); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. 
Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,962 P.2d 1041 (1998) (concludi~lg that an action to determine ownership and easement 
rights did not fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction under I.C. 12-120(3) and therefore attorney 
fees were properly denied). Like the above cases, this action is primarily a dispute over property ownership and 
easement rights and as such does not fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction as defined in I.C. 3 
12-120(3) and as applied by the courts. 
E. Conclusion 
Tile order of the district court dismissing the Baxters' claims to title by adverse possession is affirmed, as is 
the judgment of the district court denying the Baxters' claim to an easement by prescription. We vacate the 
district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' boundary by agreement claim and remand 
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
We also vacate the order awarding attorney fees and costs to the Craneys, and direct the district court to 
redetermine the question of the award of attorney fees and costs upon resolution of the claim of boundary by 
agreement. 
No attorney fees or costs are awarded on appeal 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER and IUDWELL concur. 
Footnotes: 388 
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1. The Trappett Court notes that "a good deal of the judicial gloss has evolveb mechanically and without benefit 
of supporting rationale, a criticism which might well be leveled at the tax payment requirement itself." Id. at 
530,633 P.2d at 595. 
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136 Idaho 397; Griffel v. Reynolds; 34 P.3d 1080 
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Lloyd GRIFFEL, Harshbarger Farms, Inc., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. David REYNOLDS and Gogie 0. 
Reynolds, husband and wife, Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs, and Roy Stegelmeier and Trudy Stegelmeier, 
husband and wife, Defendai~ts Third-Party Defendants, Appellants. 
[Cite as Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 3971 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Idaho Falls, May 2001 Term. 
No. 261 15. 
Oct. 24, 2001. 
Neighbors brought action against landowners regarding boundary dispute to property landowners had purchased 
from former owners and surveyed, and landowners brought third party complaint against former owners for 
misrepresentation and other claims. Following summary judgment granted to landowners in action against 
former owners, the District Court, Fremont County, Brent J. Moss, J., entered judgment for neighbors. Former 
owners, who had agreed to defend all claims against landowners, appealed. The Supreme Court, Walters, J., 
held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to support finding that farming lines had not changed over past 20 years; 
(2) evidence was insufficient to support finding that disputed parcel of land contained 5.62 acres; (3) evidence 
was sufficient to support finding of agreement between neighbors and former owners creating boundary by 
acquiescence; and (4) landowners did not show coinpensable loss in misrepresentation action, as neighbors had 
not quieted title to land. 
Boundary by acquiescence affirmed; summary judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part 
Smith & EIancock, Rexburg, for appellants. Jesse D. Hancock argued. McGrath Meacham Smith & Seamons, 
Idaho Falls, for respondents. Bryan D. Smith argued. 
WALTERS, Justice. 
This case involves a boundary dispute, which arose when defendants David and Gogie 
Reynolds' (Reynolds) prepurchase survey demonstrated that plaintiffs' fanning lines encroached on the parcel 
that Reynolds had purchased from Roy and Trudy Stegelmeier. The district court determined the location of the 
boundary by applying the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACICGROUND 
In 1976, Stegelmeier entered into an agreement of sale with W.L. and Virginia Hargis to purchase several 
tracts of land in Fremont County, Idaho, including a parcel described as the N112 of the SE114, Section 24, 
Township 8 North, Range 44 E.B.M. The following year, Stegelmeier cleared the land of trees and began 
farming, which he continued until sometime in 1991 when he placed the Iand in CRP (Crop Rotation Program). 
In 1995, Stegelmeier sold approximately forty acres of said parcel to Reynolds. 
Prior to completing the purchase, Reynolds had the property surveyed. The description derived from the 
survey was noted on the deed from Stegelmeier to Reynolds as the NWll4 of the SWll4, Section 24, Township 
8 North, Range East, Boise Meridian, Fremont County, Idaho. The surveyed parcel was bounded on the west by 
property owned by Ilarshbarger Farms, Inc. (Harshbarger), that had been farmed by Clifford and Alyce 
Ilarshbarger since 1943, and on the north by property which was owned and being farmed by Lloyd Griffel, 
who had purchased his land from Robert R. Litton. Reynolds began to set fence posts in 1996 along the 
boundaries identified in the survey. 
394 
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Harshbarger disputed the location of the fence as the boundary and tore out rhe fence posts to access land it 
had been farming for some time. I-iarshbarger brought suit against Reynolds, claiming a right to the land up to 
and including the farming lines which extended beyond Reynolds' proposed fenceline. Griffel, who also 
disputed his common boundary with Reynolds as shown by the survey, joined as a plaintiff in the suit to 
adjudicate the northern and westerly boundaries of the Stegelmeier/Reynolds parcel. 
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the boundaries between their properties and Reynolds' property 
had been established for more than twenty years by both farming lines and fencing lines, and that these lines 
claimed by the plaintiffs were visible and obvious, although they had never been surveyed. The plaintiffs 
asserted title to the disputed premises defined by the farming lines as they existed in 1999 under theories of 
adverse possession and boundary by agreement andlor acquiescence. The plaintiffs obtained a temporary 
restraining order enjoining Reynolds from erecting the fence on the disputed boundary that would impede the 
plaintiffs from conducting their usual fall field farming work. 
Reynolds filed a third-party complaint against Stegelmeier, alleging breach of the parties' real estate 
agreement and warranty deed and misrepresentation. Subsequent to Reynolds' summary judgment motion, 
which the district court granted, (fnl) Stegelmeier agreed to defend all of the remaining claims against 
Reynolds in the action. By the time the matter went to hial, the plaintiffs had abandoned their adverse 
possession claims and proceeded oilly on their claims of boundary by agreement or acquiescence. 
The district court, in its meinorandum decision, found that the adjoining owners did not know the exact 
location of the common boundary lines prior to the survey but that all parties had acquiesced in the farming 
lines as boundaries for many years. Relying on the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, the district court found 
that the farming lines had not substantially changed for at least twenty years, thus providing a sufficient basis to 
establish an agreed boundary with certainty. The district court, however, allowed compensation for a deviation 
of seven feet in the fanning lines, pursuant to the expert's testimony. The district court entered judgment 
establishing the houildary lines applicable only to the property actually farmed and not modifying "any 
boundary otherwise described by deed that is currently located within existing patches of trees referred to 
above." The district court fixed the boundaries as follows: 
(I) between the GriffelReynolds parcel at a point seven feet 
north of and parallel to the farming line existing during the 
1999 farming year, and extending from the eastern boundary of 
the Reynolds parcel to the farming line against the trees on 
the west, and (2) between the HarshbargerlReynolds parcel at a point seven feet west of and parallel to the 
farming line as it existed during the 1999 farming year; that boundary extends north and south to the farming 
lines against the patches of trees located on the north and south end thereof as reflected in Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
1,2, and 3. 
Stegelmeier, the third-party defendant, filed a *80 timely appeal from the judgment and from the dishict 
court's order denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. On appeal, he argues that the district court's 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence, that the boundaries fixed by the district court are arbitrary, 
ambiguous, and not substantiated by the evidence, and that the plaintiffs' failed to sustain their burden of proof 
of acquiescence in the farming lines as the boundaries because the location of the farming lines from 1978 to 
1999 was not shown with certainty. DISCUSSION 
In Idaho, the phrase "boundary by acquiescence" is often used interchangeably with "boundary by 
agreement," although the latter more accurately describes the doctrine. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 950 
P.2d 1237 (1997), (citing Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,40,794 P.2d 626,629 (1990)). To prove 395 
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boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and a subsequent agreement fixing the 
boundary. The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the surroundiiig circunlstances and 
coilduct of the parties. Id. at 41,794 P.2d at 630; Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006 (1953). 
There is no dispute that the true boundaries between the plaintiffs' and the defendant's property were 
unknown. The parties' deeds, which were admitted as exhibits, describe the boundaries in terms of the section 
lines of Section 24 of the government survey, but none of the adjoining owners knew the true position of the 
lines on the ground. Stegelmeier testified that he had never had any discussions as to the location of the 
boundaries with the adjoining landowners, and until he could afford a survey, he farmed his property up to the 
existing farming lines. Further testimony of the parties established that there was no express agreement 
regarding the plaintiffs' common boundaries with Stegelmeier. Only when Reynolds set the fence posts along 
the boundaries that he had surveyed in 1995 did the parties learn the location of the true boundaries and the 
plaintiffs' encroachment onto the ReynoldslStegelmeier property. 
On the element of agreement, Cliff Harshbarger testified that from as far back as 1943, he had farmed up to 
a fence line, which he contended marked the boundary that he continued to obey. Lloyd Griffel also testified to 
the existence of a fence line, which he asserted divided his property from Stegelmeier's property, and up to 
which he had farmed even after the fence got caught in the disk and was removed. However, the plaintiffs 
offered no evidence as to when the fences were erected, by whom, and for what purpose. They also presented 
no evidence that Stegelmeier's predecesssor had agreed to treat either fence line as the boundary. Furthermore, 
because the fences were no longer in existence when Stcgelmeier purchased his land, the plaintiffs cannot rely 
on the old fence lines to prove an agreement but must meet their burden of proof with other evidence. 
Where no express agreement is shown, the agreed upon boundary "must therefore be determined from the 
conduct of the parties, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances." O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137, 
140,266 P. 797,798 (1928). A long period of acquiescence by one party to another party's use of the disputed 
property provides a factual basis from which an agreement can be inferred. Wells, 118 Idaho at 41,794 P.2d at 
630. Acquiescence is merely regarded as competent evidence of the agreement. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 
117,268 P.2d 351 (1954). 
The record discloses that Stegelmeier never confronted Harshbarger and Griffel with objections as to the 
location of their farming lines. No dispute existed until just prior to the conmencement of this action in which 
the plaintiffs sought to claim rights to the property defined by the farming lines. From this evidence, the district 
court concluded that the parties had acquiesced in treating the farming lines as their boundary over many years, 
based upon a finding that the farming lilies had remained substantially unchanged since 1978. Stegelmeier 
challenges this finding and that the disputed parcel contains 5.62 acres, claiming that the findings are not 
supported by the evidence. 
The plaintiffs' expert, Val Schultz, a cadastral surveyor, testified as to his interpretation of aerial photos of 
the disputed area taken in 1978, 1987, and 1992, which he compared to the actual locatioil of the farming lines 
and identifiable features that he was able to observe on the ground in 1999 just before trial. He identified a berm 
and an area marked by a three-foot difference in elevation, which showed the lines that the adjoining 
landowners adhered to during the years that they farmed the property. His expert opinion was that the farming 
lines of I-Iarshbarger and Griffel had not substantially changed for more than twenty years, and that opinion was 
admitted without contest. Accordingly, we uphold the district court's finding as to the certainty and permanence 
of the farming lines in this case. We conclude that there was substantial, competent evidence to support the 
finding that the farming lines had remained substantially unchanged since 1978. 
Schultz, however, did not measure the farming lines in relation to the surveyed boundary lines, nor did the 
1995 survey admitted into evidence on the stipulation of the parties precisely locate the farming lines. The 
description provided by the district court defining the boundary by acquiescence was not derived from a survey 
illustrating the location of the farming lines. Unlike the metes and bounds description in Lindgren v. Martin, 
130 Idaho 854,949 P.2d 1061 (1997), which was held to be supported by the record and deemed admitte 496 
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because it was not denied in the responsive pleading, the description constructed by the district court in this case 
is without a sufficient basis in the evidence. Therefore, we cannot sustain the district court's finding that the 
disputed parcel is 5.62 acres. 
Next, Stegelmeier argues that the disbict court erred as a matter *80 of law in establishing boundary by 
acquiescence, arguing that there was a failure of proof of an agreement. As earlier noted in this opinion, an 
agreement fixing the boundary line, whether express or implied, is essential to a claim of boundary by 
acquiescence. See Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho at 365,262 P.2d at 1010. An agreement can be "[ilmplied by 
the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties, including erection of a fence or other demarcation, 
possession of the property up to the fence, and a period of acquiescence." Morrissey v. Haley, 124 Idaho 870, 
865 P.2d 961 (1993); accord Edgeller, 74 Idaho at 365,262 P.2d at 1010 (such an agreement may be presumed 
to arise between adjoining landowners where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence or 
other monument on the line followed by such adjoining landowners treating it as fixing the boundary for such 
length of time that neither should be allowed to deny the correctness of its location). We are satisfied here that 
the adjoining landowners tacitly accepted the farming lines as visible evidence of their dividing lines for a long 
period of time. From the mutual recognition of the farming lines and the occupation and cultivation by each 
party up to the lines, the district court properly found acquiescence from which it implied an agreement between 
the parties. There are ample facts, therefore, to sustain the action of the district court holding the farming lines 
to be the boundary by acquiescence. 
We affirm the district court's order granting the plaintiffs boundary by acquiescence. Our decision, however, 
does not avail the plaintiffs of quiet title that they also sought in their complaint but only revises the parties' 
common boundary by operation of law. See Morrissey, 124 Idaho at 873,865 P.2d at 964 (oral agreement 
fixing boundary line between co-terminous owners where true boundary is unknown, uncertain or in dispute is 
not regarded as a conveyance but merely the location of the respective existing estates and the common 
boundary of each of the parties); Edgeller, 74 Idaho at 366,262 P.2d at I010 (holding that a finding, supported 
by substantial competent evidence, of an agreed boundary line has the effect of extending or diminishing the 
limits of the respective deeds to include and exclude the parcel of land in dispute). 
Our decision does put into question the district court's order on Reynolds' summary judgment holding that 
Stegelmeier shall reimburse Reynolds for the reasonable value of any property lost in the event the plaintiffs 
prevail in their claims. Stegelmeier malces the argument on appeal that he . should not be held to have conveyed 
to Reynolds less than the property described in the warranty deed, making him liable for breach of the warranty 
of title; and he asserts that boundary by acquiescence undermines the integrity of legal descriptions in all deeds. 
Until such time as the plaintiffs successfully obtain quiet title in the disputed area that is bounded in part by the 
newly-established boundary by acquiescence but as yet undefined, we are unable to measure the amount of 
property that Reynolds has been deprived of and the extent of any liability for said loss that Stegelmeier is 
responsible for. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the summary judgment ordering Stegelmeier to 
reimburse Reynolds because it has not been shown that Reynolds has suffered a compensable loss. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court granting boundary by acquiescence to the plaintiffs is hereby affirmed. 
FIowever, we vacate the order on summary judgment in favor of Reynolds requiring Stegelmeier to reimburse 
Reynolds for a loss of property, which has not been clearly proven. We do not award fees in that we cannot say 
that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Minich v. 
Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 91 1,918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). Costs are awarded to the 
respondents Harshbarger and Griffel. 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SCHROEDER, KIDWELL and EISMANN concur. 
Footnotes 1. On summary judgment, the district court held that Stegelmeier must 
reimburse Reynolds for the reasonable value of property lost in the event the plaintiffs prevail on their claims. 
The district court also held Stegelmeier liable to Reynolds for reasonable attorney fees and costs incurre i 
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defending against the plaintiffs' claims. 
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117 Idaho 614; Capps v. Wood; 790 P.2d 395 
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Alonzo V. CAPPS and Nona Lee Capps, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert D. WOOD and 
William J. Smith, duly appointed and acting personal representatives of Thomas B. Burton, deceased, and Frank 
C. Shirts, Jr., a single man, and Robert A. Shirts, a single man, Defendants-Respondents. 
[Cite as Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 6141 
No. 17257. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
April 11, 1990. 
In action to quiet title, on remand from appeal on issues of adverse possession and 
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exclusion of evidence, 110 Idaho 778,718 P.2d 1216, the District Court, Third Judicial District, Washingion 
County, Dennis E. Goff, J., adopted judgment entered after initial trial court proceedings dismissing plaintiffs' 
cause of action, granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' claim of prior settlement agreement with 
defendants, and denied plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Walters, C.J., held that: (1) plaintiffs were barred from urging the alleged prior settlement agreement with 
defendant as claiin for relief on remand under the doctrine of "law of the case"; (2) trial court had discretion to 
determine whether the existing record was sufficient, or should be supplemented by new trial, in order to make 
the required findings of fact and conclusions of law on remand; (3) plaintiffs' quitclaim deed was outside the 
chain of title to the property in dispute where plainiiffs could not establish that person conveying quitclaim deed 
owned the disputed parcel at time the property was conveyed; (4) case was one of adverse possession where the 
complaint pled adverse possession in the alternative to fee ownership and the claim of fee ownership failed; and 
(5) plaintiffs failed to prove adverse possession. 
Affirmed. 
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Massingill & Felton, Weiser, for plaintiffs-appellants. R. Brad Massingill argued. 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, Boise, for defendants-respondents Wood and Smith. Teny C. Copple 
argued. 
Burton & Kroll, Weiser, for defendants-respondents Shirts. Ira T. Burton argued. 
WALTERS, Chief Judge. 
This is an appeal by Alonzo and Nona Capps from a judgment entered on remand following a previous 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Capps v. Wood, 110 Idaho 778,718 P.2d I2 16 (1986) (Capps I), in a quiet 
title action. The district court held that the Capps had failed to prove they were entitled to the property in 
question. The issues on the present appeal are whether the district court erred in ruling that the Capps were 
precluded, on res judicata grounds, from seeking specific performance of an oral agreement to acquire title to 
the land; whether the trial court should have held a trial de novo on the remand; and whether the Capps were 
required to prove a theory of adverse possession in order to prevail on their quiet title claim. We affirm. 3 CJ 9 
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The case comes to us with the following background. In 1978, the Capps brought this action to quiet title in 
their name to a parcel of land in Washington County and to recover damages for alleged trespass and slander of 
title. Nained as defendants in the action were the personal representatives of the estate of Thomas Burton, 
deceased; Frank and Robert Shirts, purchasers of the disputed parcel froin the Burton estate; and Frank Davison, 
attorney for the estate. Prior to trial, Mr. Davison was dismissed from the action. After trial, judgment was 
entered in favor of the remaining defendants. The Capps appealed (Capps I), asserting that the trial courl erred 
in concluding that the Capps had failed to establish title to the disputed property on an adverse possession 
theory; that the court erred in excluding testimony undcr I.C. § 9-202(3), the dead man's statute; and that the 
court erred in striking the testimony of a boolckeeper (an employee of Burton's certified public accountant) who 
had testified concerning a rental payment made by Burton to the Capps in 1973. 
In Capps 1; the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of testimony under LC. § 9-202(3) concerning an oral 
arrangement between the Capps and Burton for the sale and purchase of the disputed property prior to Burton's 
death. However, with respect to the testimony of the bookkeeper, the Court held that this evidence should not 
have been disregarded by the trial court. The record in Capps I shows that, after the booMceeper had testified, 
the trial court became persuaded that the bookkeeper's testimony was a privileged or confidei~tial 
communication under I.C. 3 9-203A and would have to be excluded from consideration. The Supreme Court 
disagreed. It ruled that LC. 3 9-203A did not apply to testimony by the bookkeeper as to an entry made in the 
ordinary course of business, reflecting the purported rental payment by Burton to Capps. Noting that the Capps' 
claim to title to the property was predicated upon adverse possession for a five-year period (see I.C. 5 5-206), 
and observiilg that the Capps asserted they were Burton's landlord (Capps 1, 110 Idaho at 780, n. 1,718 P.2d at 
1218, n. I), the Court concluded that the bookkeeper'stestimony about a rental payment made by Burton to the 
Capps in 1973 "could have established the 
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five-year possession." 110 Idaho at 782,718 P.2d at 1220. Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case 
to the district court with directions to reconsider its findings in light of the admissibility of the bookkeeper's 
testimony. 
Upon remand, district judge Doolittle, who had presided over the trial, granted a motion by the Capps to 
disqualify himself from proceeding Wther with the action. The case was reassigned to district judge Goff. The 
Capps then filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that a settlement agreement had been reached by the 
parties in 1977, prior to filing the complaint in this action, in which the defendants had agreed to convey the 
disputed property to the Capps. The Capps requested judginent for specific performance of the alleged 
agreement. In response, the defendants maintained that no such agreement was ever made, that in 1977 the 
property had already been sold by the estate to the Shirts, that no claim for specific performance of any 
purported settlement agreement had been alleged in the Capps' complaint in this case and that such a claim was 
precluded by res judicata because it was never raised until after the appellate proceeding in Capps I was final. 
By cross-motion, the defendants requested suinmary judgment in their favor on the settlement-agreement issue. 
At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the Court invited further briefing from the parties on the 
question whether a new trial was necessary as a result of the remand from the Supreme Court. Eventually, Judge 
Goff granted a summary judgment to the defendants on the settlement-agree~neilt issue, determining that the 
issue was barred by res judicata because it had not been raised in the proceedings resulting in Capps I. He also 
decided that a new trial was not necessary. He issued an order ~nodifying the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law previously entered by Judge Doolittle following the trial. In this order Judge Goff made findings with 
respect to the bookkeeper's testimony theretofore excluded by Judge Doolittle, and he reached the conclusion 
that although the bookkeeper's testimony corroborated testimony that Burton may have been a tenant of the 
Capps, the Capps still had not proven they had been in possession of the property for a five-year period, as 
required by LC. S; 5-206, before their action was fiIed in 1978. Judge Goff then adopted the judgment 
previously entered by Judge Doolittle in favor of the defendants, without further modification or amendment. A 
motion by the Capps to reconsider these rulings was denied and this appeal followed. 400 
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We turn first to the issue concerning the alleged settlement agreement. In their complaint to quiet title and to 
recover damages for trespass and slander of title, the Capps alleged that, on or about November 9, 1977, they 
met with the parties who eventually were named as defendants in the action. The complaint recites that those 
parties agreed to coilduct a survey of a fenceline located on the property and, upon completion of the survey, to 
give to the Capps a quitclaim deed to the disputed parcel. The complaiilt d ~ d  not pray for specific performance 
of the alleged agreement. During trial, the Capps presented testimony concerning the settlement averred in their 
complaint. The defendants also presented testimony to refute the Capps' evidence. One of the defendants, 
Robert Wood, testified that although the parties had attempted to negotiate a settlement in order to avoid 
litigation, the attempt was unsuccessful. He stated that the estate had never agreed to give the Capps any deed to 
the property in question. In his findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Doolittle determined that the 
Capps had not proven any right to the disputed parcel of land. His decision did not explicitly refer to the 
settlement agreement. 
[I] When the Capps pursued their appeal in Capps I, no issue was raised with respect to the settlemeilt 
agreeinent. As noted by Judge Goff, the enforcement of that agreement was urged for the first 
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time after the case had been remanded to the district court. Judge Goff determined that res judicata, resulting 
from the failure of the Capps to assert enforcement of the agreement ill their appeal in Capps I, precluded 
consideration of that question on remand. We believe that Judge Goff erred by applying the doctrine of res 
judicata. Instead, we conclude that the Capps were barred from urging the settlement agreement as a claim for 
relief on remand, under the similar but related doctrine of "law of the case." Therefore, because the judgment in 
favor of the defexdants can be upheld upon another, correct theory, the result reached by Judge Goff will be 
sustained. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355 (1984). 
[2-51 Res judicata precludes the relitigation of a matter previously adjudicated. Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 
254,668 P.2d 130 (Ct.App. 1983) (review denied). It is premised upon the entry of a valid and final judgineilt. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 13 (1982). Here, the judgment entered by Judge Doolittle 
was specifically reversed by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded to the district court. 110 Idaho at 
782, 718 P.2d at 1220. As a result, there simply was no final "judgment" that would stand as a bar under res 
judicata to the assertion of new claims or theories by the Capps on the remand. However, under the "law of the 
case" principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not consider errors which arose prior 
to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal.(fnl) See 5 AM.JUR.2d 
Appeal and Error 4 752 (1962). This approach discourages piecemeal appeals and is consistent with the broad 
scope of claim preclusion under the analogous doctrine of res judicata. We hold that the alleged settlement 
agreement is not a viable issue ill the present appeal because it was embraced by the judgment from which the 
first appeal was taken yet was not raised in that appeal. 
[6] We turn next to the Capps' contention that the district court erred in not conducting a new trial in this 
action. As noted earlier, Judge Goff on remand simply modified the findings made by Judge Doolittle, aftcr 
taking into account the trial testimony ofthe bookkeeper contained in the transcript prepared for the appeal in 
Capps I. A new trial was not mandated by the Supreme Court in its reinand order, and Judge Goffs decision to 
proceed without conducting a de novo trial was compatible with that order. We previously have held that it is 
within a trial court's discretion to determine whether an existing record is sufficient, or should be supplemented, 
in order to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law on remand. Sherry v. Sherq, 11 1 Idaho 
185, 722 P.2d 494 (Ct.App.1986). We find no abuse of that discretion in this case. 
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Finally, the Capps argue that thedistrict court erred by finding that they had not proved their claim of title to 
the disputed property on a theory of adverse possession. The Capps contend that they in fact held a quitclaim 
deed to the property and that the burden to show a claim by adverse possession should have rested with the 
defendants and not with the Capps. We are not persuaded by their argument. 
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171 As to the Capps' deed, the trial judge rnled that it was "outside the chain of title" to the property in 
question. The court's determination is supported by the following evidence presented at the trial. The property 
in dispute consists of 11.42 acres of land located adjacent to and southeast of the Weiser River. At one time this 
acreage lay northwest of the Weiser River. In 1958, the river was rechanneled some distance to the west by 
Burton. As a result of the rechannelling of the river, the 1 1.42 acres here in question became situated on the 
southeast side of the river. In 1968, ten years after the river had been moved, Capps acquired a parcel of land on 
the northwest side of the river, with its described boundary at the centerline of the river. The Capps conveyed 
that property to a Mr. Scott in 1970. Subsequently, in 1971, the Capps obtained a quitclaim deed from Scott to 
the 11.42 acres lying east of the river. Scott testified that, although he signed the quitclaim deed at Capps' 
request, he believed he did not own any property on the east side of the river. 
[8] Clearly, unless Capps could establish Scott's ownership of the disputed parcel at the time the property 
was conveyed by quitclaim deed from Scott to the Capps, then that conveyance would be extri~~sic to the chain 
of title to the property. Scott's source of title came from the Capps. Their 1971 deed to Scott, and the earlier 
1968 deed to the Capps, "used the center line of the Weiser River as a starting point and conveyed property 
situated 'northwesterly of the Weiser River."' Capps I, 110 Idaho at 779,718 P.2d at 1216. The Capps asserted 
no claim to the disputed parcel eiiher by way of a theory of accretion or of avulsion.(fn2) Consequeiltly, we 
agree with the trial court's determination that the deed from Scott to Capps was outside the chain of title to the 
property in question. 
[9] Nor was the trial judge incorrect in deciding this case on a theory of claim by adverse possession. In the 
Capps' complaint, adverse possession was pleaded in the alternative to fee ownership. The claim of fee 
ownership failed and no issue concerning it is viable in the present appeal. The case was thus narrowed to one 
of adverse possession, as observed by our Supreme Court in Capps I. The Capps, as plaintiffs, had the burden of 
proof on this claim with evidence showing the strength of their own title, rather than merely attacking the 
defendants' title. It has long been settled that a party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the 
strength of his own title and inay not merely rely on the weakness of his adversary. See e.g., Pincoclc v. 
Pocatello Gold & Copper Mining Co., 100 Idaho 325, 597 P.2d 21 1 (1979). 
[lo, 111 One of the findings made by the district court, which was not challenged on the appeal in Capps I, 
was that the Capps never built or maintailled any enclosure around the subject property. See I.C. $ 5  5-208(2), 5- 
210(1). The court noted that the evidence showed a meandering barbed wire fence on the property, built by 
employees of the defendants' predecessor, Burton, to separate livestock. It is well settled that persons claiming 
title by adverse possession must establish-as one of the ele~nents of such claims-that they constructed or 
maintained an enclosure on the disputed parcel of land to indicate the extent of their claim. Loomis v. Union 
PaciJc Railroad Co., 97 Idaho 341,544 P.2d 299 (1975); Christle v. Scott, 110 Idaho 829,718 P.2d 1267 
(Ct.App.1986). A fence erected by a neighbor for the purpose of containing livestock or to restrain livestock 
froin entering the neighbor's property will not suffice to satisfy the enclosure requirement for adverse 
possession by a claimant adjacent to the neighbor's property. Here 
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it is undisputed that Capps did not enclose the property in question. The district court's finding is supported by 
substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). Consequently, we uphold the district court's 
coiiclusion that Capps failed to prove their claim of adverse possession.(fn3) 
Finding no error in the proceedings below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Costs to 
respondents; no attorney fees awarded. 
BURNETT, J., and SMITH, J., Pro Tem., concur. 
1. In Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338,421 P.2d 133 (1966), our Supreme Court mixed this rule with the rule 
prohibiting consideration of issues on appeal that were not first presented to the trial court. The Court said: 
In their secoiid assignment of error the Shriveses contend rescission should have been denied 
because of laches on the part of Talbots. This issue was not raised in the trial court, either in the 
first trial or in the second trial, nor was it raised 0x1 the first appeal [Shrives v. Talbot, 88 Idaho 209, 
398 P.2d 448 (1965)l or in the petition for a rehearing from the decision of the first appeal. It will 
not now be considered by this court, having been raised for the first time on the second appeal. 
91 Idaho at 346,421 P.2d at 141. 
2. See generally, Aldape v. Akins, supra, 105 Idaho at 256, n. 1,668 P.2d at 132, n. 1; Nesbitt v. WolJkiel, 100 
Idaho 396,598 P.2d 1046 (1979). Although the movement of the river in 1958 would not have affected property 
boundaries the11 existing, under the doctrine of avulsion, this would not necessarily imply that subsequent 
conveyances referring to the "Weiser River" would be deemed to mi to an old, previously existing river 
channel. Neither has Capps presented any authority in support of sucl~ an implication. 
3. The judgment dismissed the quiet title action brought by the Capps. The district court was not asked to 
determine-nor did it detennine-the rights of the defendants or of any other possible parties to all or any part of 
the property in question. 
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119 Idaho 154; Persyn v. Favreau; 804 P.2d 327 
Page 154 
Margaret J. PERSYN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eugene J. FAVREAU and Ellen M. Favreau, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
[Cite as Persyn v. Favreau, 119 Idaho 1541 
No. 18097. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
November 1, 1990. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 26, 1990. 
Petition for Review Denied Feb. 6,  1991. 
Property owner brought quiet title action based on a claim of adverse possession. The District Court of the First 
Judicial District, Bonner County, James R. Michaud, J., entered judgnient dismissing action, and plaintiff 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Swanstrom, J., held that: (1) adverse claim to disputed area was not "founded 
upon a written instrument" within meaning of statute governing adverse possession claims based on written 
instruments; (2) fence did not constitute a "substantial enclosure" under statute governing oral claims of adverse 
possession; and (3) actions of plaintiffs predecessor in clearing brush from fence area and maintaining fence, 




Cooke, Lamanna, Smith & Cogswell, Priest River, for pIaintiff-appellant. Thomas E. Cooke argued. 
Philip Henry Robinson, Sandpoint, for defendants-respondents. 
SWANSTROM, Judge. 
This appeal followed the dismissal of Margaret Persyn's quiet title action by the district court. The court 
held that the elements of adverse possession had not been proven and concluded that a fence line, which was 
alleged to be the easterly boundary of Persyn's property, did not establish the true boundary of Persyn's 
property. We affirm. 
Persyn contends that the district court applied the wrong statute, I.C. (1 5-210, in analyzing the requirements 
for adverse possession. Therefore, we must determine whether Persyn's claim of adverse possession properly is 
under an oral claim or if it is a claim under a written instrument which is governed by I.C. (1 5-208.(fnl) 
Asserting that I.C. (1 5-208 is the applicable statute in this case, Persyn raises three subsidiary questions. First, 
are the elements of I.C. (1 5-208 to be read in the disjunctive so that proof of one elenient is sufficient to prove 
possession? Second, has possession by Persyn under LC. (1 5-208 been proven? Third, did the Favreaus have 
notice of an adverse claim and, therefore have a duty to inquire into the nature of the claim when they 
purchased the adjoining property? We conclude that the district court's choice of I.C. (1 5-210 was correct. Our 
reasons are as follows. 404 
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The parties own adjacent parcels of real estate located in Bonner County, Idaho. The Persyn property lies to 
the west of the Favreau property. For approximately twenty-four years, a fence existed on what Persyn claims is 
the east boundary of her property. The disputed property, a ship varying in width between five and twenty-two 
feet on the west side of the fence line, is the subject of Persyn's quiet title action. 
The Persyns purchased their property in 1979 from Wilbur and Carolee Merritt, who had acquired the 
property from Willie Hoop. The adjacent property was owned by Bonner County until 1980, when the County 
conveyed the property to Connolly, who sold to the Favreaus in 1983. When Persyn's husband attempted to 
replace some ofthe fenceposts in 1984, he was told by the Favreaus that he was on their property. Mrs. Persyn- 
who succeeded to her husband's interest-filed suit shortly after this incident, claiming title to the property up to 
the fence line. 
[I] Persyin argued that she took title to the disputed property pursuant to a written instrument, calling I.C. $ 
5-208 into play. She cites Gage v. Davis, 104 Idaho 48, 655 P.2d 942 (Ct.App. 1982), in support of her 
argument. In Gage, the adverse claimant's deed contained a description of the disputed ship, as did the deed of 
the other party who opposed the claim. Unlike Gage, here, ihere is no overlap of the descriptions of the two 
deeds. Persyn's deed describes a parcel in the Southwest Quarter of the Norlhwest Quarter of section 34. The 
Favreaus' property is described as being in the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of section 34. As 
described in the deeds, the two parcels share a common boundary: a segment of the line between the Southwest 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter. A recorded survey, over 
which there is no dispute, establishes the location of this line. Thus, the Favreaus' deed description includes the 
disputed strip but Persyn's deed description does not. The record reflects only that Persyn was told by her 
predecessor in title (Merritt) that her property extended east to the fence. Merritt too had been told, when he 
acquired the property from Willie Eoop, that he was getting the property up to the fence. Upon these facts the 
district court concluded that Persyn's claim of title by adverse possession must meet the requirements of I.C. $ 
5-210. We agree. 
A party claiming title by adverse possession may rely upon a written instrument as being "a conveyance of 
the properly in question." I.C. 5 5-207; I.C. $5-208. "[Hlowever inadequate [such a conveyance may he] to 
cany the true title to such property, and however incompetent might have been the power of the grantor in such 
conveyance to pass a title to the subject thereof, yet a claim asserted under the provisions of such a deed is 
strictly a claim under color of title." Wright v. Mattison, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 50, 54, 15 L.Ed. 280 (1856). In 
reviewing the evidence before the court below, there is no assertion that Persyn's deed purports to convey the 
disputed triangular piece of property. Neverlheless, Persyn's counsel contends that simply because Persyn held a 
deed for property adjacent to-hut not including-the disputed parcel, the analysis under I.C. $ 5-208 was 
appropriate. We disagree. 
A comparison of the two statutes which define the distinct claims of title for adverse possession may be 
helpful at this point. Idaho Code 5 5-208, a claim under a written instrument, and I.C. $ 5-210, possession under 
an oral claim, have remained virtually intact since their adoption into the 1881 Idaho Code of Civil Procedure. 
The precursor and source of these statutes was the 1872 California Code of Civil Procedure, 3 323 and 3 325 
respectively. 
The Supreme Court of California in Kimball v. Lohmas, 31 Cal. 154 (1866) distinguished between adverse 
possession founded upon a "color of title" and that founded upon a "claim of title." 
Adverse possession is of different kinds: First, where the possession is taken by bow and spear 
without color of title, but with the intent to claim the fee exclusive of any other right and to hold it 
against all comers ...; second, where the possession is taken under a claim of title 
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founded upon a written instrument, as a conveyance, or upon the decree of ju&ment o fa  Court of competent 
jurisdiction. The first is sufficient to put the Statute of Limitations in motion, and, at the expiration of five years, 
vest in the usurper a right, under the statute which is equivalent to title; but until the statute has run he is as to 
the true owner a mere intruder, without right. It cannot be said in any just sense that as between him and the true 
owner a case of conflicting titles is presented until the statute has run; or that until then there can be, as between 
them, any substantial contest as to the title. But as to the other, or second kind of adverse possession, the case is 
otherwise. There the possession is accompanied by at least a colorable title, and an actual and substantial 
contest as to the title must arise whenever the party out of possession undertakes to assert his rights in any kind 
of action, for they occupy the position of conflicting claimants as to the true title, and not as to the possession 
0111y. 
Id. at 159. 
We conclude that Persyn's claim to the disputed triangular area west of the fence is not "founded upon a 
written instrument" within fie meaning of LC. 5 5-208, because no written instrument purports to give her 
actual title to or color of title to the disputed strip. Although the district court made no silch specific finding, it 
implied the same by proceeding to examine the elements of adverse possession under I.C. 5 5-210. 
[2] We now turn to the question whether the elements of adverse possession under 5 5-210 were proven by 
Persyn. The slatutory requirements of adverse possession must be established by clear and satisfactory 
evidence. Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,690 P.2d 896 (1984). In reviewing the district court's findings, then, 
our standard of review is one of clear error, absent which we will not disturb the findings. Gage v. Davis, supra. 
[3] The district judge held that the fence did not constitute a substantial enclosure under I.C. 5 5-210(1). He 
was persuaded that the fence had not been erected by Persyn or Persyn's grantors and that its purpose never was 
to enclose any part of Persyn's property. See Loomis v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 97 Idaho 341,544 
P.2d 299 (1975); Schutten v. Beck, 757 P.2d 1139 (Colo.App. 1988). When the County owned the property now 
belonging to the Favreaus, the County pern~itted an employee to erect the fence to contain the employee's 
horses within the property owned by the County. At no time was the fence regarded as the boundary between 
the two parcels. 
141 The district judge also ruled that the actions of Persyn's predecessor in clearing brush fiom the fence 
area and maintaining the fence up until 1979, and any actions by Persyn thereafter, were insufficient to be 
considered "improvement" as required by I.C. 5 5-210(2). Finally, the district judge concluded that neither 
Persyn nor her predecessors "in any way indicated an open and notorious hostile intent which brought home to 
the [Favreaus] or their predecessors in title that [Persyn] was claiming title to the real estate in dispute." 
[S, 61 We hold that the decision of the district court was well reasoned and founded upon sufficient 
evidence. The burden of showing all of the essential elements of adverse possession is upon the party seeking 
title thereunder. Berg, supra at 443, 690 P.2d at 899. Further, under I.C. 5 5-210, the claimant must either 
substantially enclose the property or cultivate or improve the properly to meet the requirements of adverse 
possession. Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 3 1,624 P.2d 413 (1981). We agree that Persyn failed in her proof of 
adverse possession of the disputed area, satisfying neither the enclosure element nor the improvement element. 
The last issue raised by Persyn was essentially one of notice. Persyn contended that the existence of the 
fence fine imparted notice of an adverse claim, such that when the Favreaus bought the property in 1983, they 
I had a duty to inquire as to the extent of such claim because the fence line 
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I was not on the survey line. The district court made a finding that after 1979, the fence fell into disrepair, with 
much of the barbed wire and many of the posts down at the time Favreaus bought the adjacent property. Thenl, 
in its conclusions of law, the district court rejected Persyn's argument and authority as unfounded. It has 4V8 
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been held in Idaho that "the party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strength ol' his own 
title, and not on the weakness of that of his adversary." Pincock v. Pocatello Gold & Copper Mining Co., 100 
Idaho 325,33 1,597 P.2d 21 1,217 (1979) (citations omitted). Persyn cannot resort to proving her adverse 
possession claim by transferring the burden of proof to the party against whom the claim is being made. 
The decree of the district court in favor of the Favreaus and against Persyn is affirmed. Costs to respondents 
Favreau. No attorney fees awarded on appeal. 
WALTERS, C.J., and WINMILL, J., Pro Tem., concur. 
Footnotes: 
1.5-208. Claim under written Instrument-Possession defined.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession by a person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the 
purposes of husbandry, or for pasturage, or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
4. Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the portion of such fann or lot that may have 
been lefi not cleared, or not inclosed, according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, shall 
be deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated. 
5-210. Oral Claim-Possession defined-Payment of taxes.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions 
of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period 
of five (5) years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the taxes, 
state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
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PAURLEY et ux. v. HARRIS et ux. 
[Cite as Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 1121 
No. 7927. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
March 16, 1954. 
Action in ejectment arising out of a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners. The District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, Ada County, Charles E. Winstead, J., entered judgment of ejectment for plaintiffs, and 
defendants appealed, claiming error in action of court in striking certain affirmative allegations from answer and 
in rejecting certain offered proof. The Supreme Court, Taylor, J., held that defendants' pleading of fraud or 
mistake was sufficient to permit admission of offered evidence to effect that the parties' vendor, and 
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her agent, at time sale to defendants was proposed, pointed out division line as contended for by defendants, and 
that stakes were driven to mark the line. 
Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
Keeton, J., and Beckwith, District Judge, dissented. 
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Fairchild & Fairchild, Boise, for appellants. 
Par01 evidence may be resorted to, not to vary the words of the grant, but to show from the situation and 
condition of the subject-matter what meaning the parties attached to the words used, especially in matters of 
subsequent made description and declaration of the grantor. Devlin on Real Estate Third edition, Vol. 2, Sect. 
1015 A, Page 1937. 
A boundary line may he established by adjoining landowners, when they so agree upon a boundary line, 
enter into possession, and improve the lands according to the line thus accepted, and they will not thereafter be 
permitted to claim the line agreed upon is not the true line, although the statute of limitations has not attached. 
Devlin on Real Estate, Third edition, Vol. 2, Sect. 1086. McNamara v. Seaton, 82 Ill. 498; Cutler v. Callison, 72 
Ill. 113; Ebert v. Wood, 1 Bin., Pa., 216,2 Am.Dec. 436; Houston v. Sneed, 15 Tex. 307,308; Sneed v. Osborn, 
25 Cal. 619; Sawyer v. Fellows, 6 N.H. 107,25 Am.Dec. 452. 
Where a boundary is established by agreement, followed by acquiescence and possession, and particularly 
possession for the full statutory period for establishing title by prescription, the line thus established determines 
the location of the estate and establishes the true line of division. Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463. 
Where a boundary line is pointed out, staled, or marked out by monuments plainly visible, the purchaser is 
entitled to take as so indicated to him. Taylor v. Reising, 13 Idaho 226,243, 89 P. 943. 
If a purchaser of real property has notice of defendants' claim to the property and his equity therein, su@Q 8 
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purchaser cannot be considered to bk an innocent purchaser for a valuable cohsideration. Froman v. Madden, 13 
Idaho 138,88 P. 894. 
Maurice H. Greeile and Raymond D. Givens, Boise, for respondents. 
Mutual mistake between one party and the agent of another does not show mutual mistake in the absence of 
a showing of the authority of the agent to make the stipulation claimed to be omitted. 45 Am. Jur., Reformation, 
Sec. 56; Mills v. Schulba, 1950, 95 Cal.App.2d 559,213 P.2d 408. 
The motion to shike is the proper method of reaching matter in an answer setting 
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up no defense to an action or containing recitations and negotiations prior to the execution of a written 
agreement in absence of pleading of ambiguity. Brown v. Jones, 49 Idaho 797,292 P. 235; Cowen v. 
Harrington, 5 Idaho 329,48 P. 1059; Fralick v. Mercer, 27 Idaho 360, 148 P. 906. 
Par01 evidence may not be admitted to vary the terms of a written agreement in tile absence of allegation of 
fraud or mistake. Udelavitz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029; Milner v. Earl Fruit Co., 40 Idaho 339,232 
P. 581. 
TAYLOR, Justice. 
Lots 1,2 and 3 in Block 2 of Lover's Lane addition to Boise City constitute a parallelogram, the lines of 
which do not m true north and south or true east and west. The side lines on the east and west run some few 
degrees to the east of true north and to the west of true south. The lots were owned by one Lillian Ferrell. On 
June 30, 1947, she entered into a contract with the defendants for the sale to them of the north one-half of the 
property, described in the contract as the "North One Half of lots 1,2, and 3 * * *." March 10, 1950, she 
contracted to sell to the plaintiffs the remainder, described as the "South Half of Lots 1,2, and 3 * * *." About a 
month afrer entering into possession. some time in July or August, 1947, the defendants erected a board fence 
on what they claim to be the dividing line between the property purchased by them and that retained by the 
seller. This fence is somewl~at o the south of a line, drawl parallel to the north and south end lines ofthe 
parallelogram, which would divide the property in equal parts. 
Plaintiffs, claiming to this center line, brought this action in ejectment to obtain possession of the area lying 
between the fence and the center line. After certain denials and admissions, the defendants in their answer 
allege their contract, a description of the property claimed by them thereunder, then follows lengthy allegations 
concerning prior occupancy of the respective tracts, and negotiations between defendants and the former owner 
leading up to the sale. They further allege that prior to their contract there was no division line, mark or 
monument separating the two portions of the property; that the owner FerreI1, acting through an agent, 
represented to them that the dividing line was located as now claimed by them; and that the agent pointed out 
and indicated the course of the division line; that they believed, and relied on, these representations in 
contracting to buy; that almost immediately after taking possession they built the fence referred to, leveled the 
ground, planted lawn, trees and shrubbery thereon and have since continuously occupied same; that at the time 
plaintiffs contracted to purchase the south onehalf of the property they knew that defendants occupied and 
claimed the property enclosed by the fence; that defendants' contract of purchase was drawn by the 
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owner Ferrell; that the description of the property therein contracted for is enoileous and does not properly 
describe the property sold to them; that the mistake went unnoticed by defendants; that they believe the mistake 
was mutual and, if not, then, in that event, the seller perpetrated a fraud upon them. 409  
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On plaintiffs' motion the court struck from the answer paragraphs four through eighteen, containing the 
foregoing and other affirmative allegations, on the ground that the same are immaterial, sham and frivolous. On 
the trial, defendants offered evidence to the effect that Mrs. Ferrell, accompanied by a real estate agent, came to 
their house and proposed the sale; that she and her agent pointed out the division line to be established, and that 
stakes were driven to mark the line. The court sustained the objection that this offered evidence was 
incompetent; involved matters merged in the contract; and that the contract could not be varied by such proof. 
[I, 21 The striking of the affirmative allegations from the answer and the rejection of this offered proof 
presents the controlling issue on this appeal. The general rules applicable are not in question. Oral stipulations, 
agreements and negotiations, preliminary to a written contract, are presumed merged therein, and will not be 
admitted to contradict or vary its plain terms. Hurt v. Monumental Mercury Mining Co., 35 Idaho 295,206 P. 
184; Milner v. Ear1 Fruit Co., 40 Idaho 339,232 P. 581; Larsen v. Buys, 49 Idaho 615,292 P. 239; Fidelity 
Trust Co. v. State, 72 Idaho 137,237 P.2d 1058. Fraud or mistake may be shown, in any case, to void or reform 
a contract. Udelavitz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029; Gould v. Frazier, 48 Idaho 798,285 P. 673; 
Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160,4 P.2d 657; Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 56 
Idaho 529, 56 P.2d 762; Utilities Engineering Institute v. Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981. 
[3,4] Although burdened and commingled with much that is sham and redundant, we think defendants' 
imperfect pleading of fraud or mistake was sufficient for the admission of the evidence offered, and should not 
have been stricken. 
"The particular rule applicable here is that where the seller and the buyer go upon the land and 
there agree upon and mark the boundary between the part to be conveyed and the part to be retained 
by the seller, the line thus fixed controls the courses and distances set out in the deed executed to 
effectuate the division agreed upon." Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, at page 89,245 P.2d 
1052, at page 1057. 
[Sj Applying that rule here, and assuming that defendants' proof would establish the facts, if the former 
owner and the defendants went upon the property prior to the execution of the contract, and there agreed 
I 
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upon a dividing line which was marked upon the ground, and the defendants thereafter contracted to buy, 
relying upon the agreed boundary, took possession, and occupied and enclosed the property up to the line 
agreed upon, a id  such possession was known to the seller, who acquiesced therein for a considerable period of 
time, such a state of facts would support the conclusion that the seller is boui~d by the dividing line agreed upon, 
even though it varies from the description written in the contract. Atwell v. Olson, 30 Wash.2d 179, 190 P.2d 
783; Arnold v. Hanson, 91 Cal.App.2d 15,204 P.2d 97; Angel1 v. Hadley, 33 Wash.2d 837,207 P.2d 191; 
Lake, for Use and Benefit of Benton v. Crosser, 202 Okl. 582,216 P.2d 583; Nebel v. Guyer, 99 Cal.App.2d 30, 
221 P.2d 337; Frericks v. Sorensen, 113 Cal. App.2d 759,248 P.2d 949; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Minnette, 
115 Cal.App.2d 642,252 P.2d 642; Appeal of Moore, 173 Kan. 820, 252 P.2d 875; Millikin v. Sessoms, 173 
N.C. 723,92 S.E. 359; 170 A.L.R. Annotation 1144. Cf. Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463; Edgeller 
v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006. 
What is here said of acquiescence by the seller is not to be construed as a holding that such acquiescence 
alone for the period here involved would be sufficient to establish title by "acquiescence". See Lewis v. Smith, 
187 Okl. 404, 103 P.2d 512. Draper v. Griffin, 61 Cal.App.2d 281, 142 P.2d 772; Willie v. Local Realty Co., 
110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718; Needhanl v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App.2d 609,211 P.2d 308; Dragos v. Russell, Utah, 
237 P.2d 831; Martin v. Lopes, Cal.App., 164 P.2d 321; Id., 28 Cal. 2d 618, 170 P.2d 881. Here the seller's 
acquiescence is merely regarded as competeilt evidence of the agreement and of the fraud or mistake by reason 
of which the contract, subsequently drawn by the seller, did not conform to the agreement. Edgeller v. Johnston, 
74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006; Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal.2d 456,224 P.2d 691; Crook v. Leinenweaver, 100 
Cal.App. 2d 790, 224 P.2d 891; Rahlves Rahlves, Inc., v. Ambort, 118 Cal.App.2d 465, 258 P.2d 18. 410 
, , 
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[6-81 As indicated in Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, such an agreed boundary would also be binding upon a 
successor in interest of the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement.;Tbe boundary, which defendants 
claim, was clearly marked by "a tight board fence", four or five feet in height, and the area on defendants' side 
of the fence was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees. This would constitute notice to an intending purchaser, of 
defendants' possession. One buying property in the possession of a third party is put on notice of any claim of 
title or right of possession by such third party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal. Nampa & 
Meridian In. Dist. v. Briggs, 27 Idaho 84, 147 P. 75; Nelms v. Miller, 56 N.M. 132,241 P,2d 333; Waltrip v. 
Cathcart, 207 Okl. 404,250 P.2d 43; 1. R. Garrett Co. v. States, 3 Cal.2d 379,44 P.2d 538; Marlenee 
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v. Brown, Cal.App., 128 P.2d 137; Three Sixty Five Club v. Shostak, 104 Cal.App.2d 735,232 P.2d 546; 55 
Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, 9 712; 66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser, 9 1012. Moreover, plaintiff Paurley 
testified in effect that he saw the fence and knew of defendants' occupancy of the disputed area before he 
contracted to buy the south half. If such facts are sufficiently established, the plaintiffs would not be innocent 
purchasers, and their rights would be subject to the same defense available against their grantor. 
We find no merit in other assignments made. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Costs to appellants. 
PORTER, C. J., and THOMAS, J., concur. 
IEETON, Justice (dissenting). 
Tne fact that the plaintiff Paurley saw the fence now claimed by defendants to be the boundary line dividing 
the land would not in m y  opinion put the plaintiffs on inquiry as to the agreement, if there were one, between 
the common grantors and defendants as to what the true boundary line should be. In other words the boundary 
fence claimed by defendants to be the boundary would not in itself be sufficieiit to establish lcnowledge of 
plaintiffs that an agreement as to the boundary line existed, if it did. The fence alone would not establish the 
true line dividing conterminous properties. 
In Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052, the boundary line in dispute was not only uncertain, 
but it could not be, and was not, determined with certainty. Hence, this court held that the agreed boundary 
controlled. Such is not true here. The true line in dispute in the present situation could be, and was, established. 
Hence, I think the judgment should be affirmed. 
BECKWITH, District Judge (dissenting). 
Reluctantly, but most earnestly, do I dissent. The facts contained in the majority opinion are sufficient for 
this dissent, with this additional notation. The agreement between Mrs. Fenell and the defendants was made 
June 30,1947. Harris built the fence about August of 1947. The complaint was filed December 4, 1950 (three 
years, six months). 
For sixty-three years this court has consistently maintained and supported the rule that a boundary line 
established by agreement by coiiterminous owners, followed by acquiescence aid possession for the full 
statutory period of time required to acquire title by prescription, operates to establish the true line of the 
respective estates. Idaho Land Co. v. Parsons, 3 Idaho, Hasb., 
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450,31 P. 791; Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 P. 1066; O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137,266 P. 797; 
Kesler v. Ellis, 47 Idaho 740,278 P. 366; Woll v. Costella, 59 Idaho 569, 85 P.2d 679; Mulder v. Stands, 71 
Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463; Edgeller, v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006. 
Conversely, that such ail agreement existing for only two years and four days, does not make the line so 
established binding or conclusive upon owners of laud abutting thereon. Woodland v. Hodson, 28 Idaho 45, 152 
P. 205, cited with approval in Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052. 
While Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, decided in 1952, and upon which a majority opinion rests, announced a 
new rule, that where a buyer and seller agree and mark the boundary, the line thus fixed controls the courses and 
distances set out in the deed subsequently executed to effectuate the division agreed upon. While the rule as 
aimounced does not require any lapse of time by acquiescence therein by the parties, the court in this case 
leaves no doubt that there must be, in addition to the agreement, an acquiescence by the parties for in explaining 
the rule the court says there must be both an agreement to fix the boundary, and that the seller must acquiesce 
therein for a considerableperiod of time to be estopped, and what has been said of acquiescence by the seller is 
not to be construed as a holding that such acquiescence alone for the period involved would be sufficient to 
establish title by "acquiescence", but that the seller's acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence of the 
agreement. All of the authorities cited in the majority opinion to support the above rules of law were cases 
involving a period of acquiescence for more than five years, our statutory period of time required to establish a 
prescriptive right, $5 5-207 and 5-210, I.C., except the case of Draper v. Griffin, 61 Cal.App.2d 281, 142 P. 2d 
772, in which the line was established four years, and Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App.2d 609,211 P.2d 308, 
where the line was established for a like period of four years, which cases were decided on the rule that where 
the property is improved to such an extent that a substantial loss would result if the position of the line was 
changed, both parties would be estopped to have the line changed, which are not the facts in this suit. Appeal of 
Moore, 173 Kan. 820,252 P.2d 875, where the line had been established for seven years, the court in citing 
Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607,75 P. 1019, a case where the line had been established for fourteen years, 
did announce the rule that where the parties agreed and acquiesced in an established line, even though the 
period of acquiescence falls short of the time fixed by the statute for gaining title by adverse possession, it 
becomes an established line. A11 of the authorities cited by the majority opinion on these rules support this 
dissent rather than the majority opinion. 
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The court has by the language used in the opinion in announcing the above iules, namely, where seller 
acquiesced therein for a considerableperiod of time, and that "seller's acquiescence is merely regarded as 
competent evidence of the agreement", has for all effects overruled all of the cases of this court for the past 
sixty-three years, which required agreement followed by acquiescence for at least five years to estop either 
party, including Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006, decided November 3, 1953, which 
corrected the error in Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052, by re-establishing the former 
precedent. In effect the court announces that henceforth three years, six months of acquiescence is a 
considerableperiod of time, sufficient to estop one of the parties from ejecting the other. 
The only reason to incorporate such a phrase in the opinion as "who acquiesced therein for a considerable 
period of time" (emphasis added), was to leave the law so flexible that it would take care of any future 
conditions and it most certaiilly will, because it destroys all security of real property titles in Idaho, and makes 
chaos, uncertain6 and confusion, concerning real property interests, the law in Idaho. Such a phrase is relative 
only and indefinite in itself, because to the very young time passes very slowly, while to those who have 
reached that stage in life where the mental and physical faculties begin to slow down, time passes with ever 
increasing rapidity, hence what may constitute a considerableperiod of time, depends entirely upon the outlook 
of the individuals involved, unless it is established by this court that a considerable period of time must 
logically mean five years, as set forth in our statutes of limitations, to establish title by prescriptive rights, which 
rule was so definitely established in Kesler v. Ellis, 47 Idaho 740,278 P. 366, wherein the court said: 
412 
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"* * * it is but logical to say that such acquiescence must continue tor a period of not less than 
five years, thus conforming to the period established by the statute of limitations ill cases of adverse 
possession." At page 744 of 47 Idaho, at page 367 of 278 P. 
The opinion sets forth no guidance for the trial courts, and no indication of what this court will hold to be a 
considerableperiod of time necessary to establish estoppel by acquiescence in future litigation of this nature. It 
has always been, and I venture to say still is, the prerogative of a trial judge to exclude all incompetent evidence 
from a case. The trial court was correct in excluding from evidence any and all offered testimony regarding the 
oral contract and acquiescence of the parties, first, for the reason that the contract being oral and made prior to 
the execution of the contract to purchase by defendants, is merged in that instrument, and hence, any 
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such evidence is incompetent, as held by the court. Fidelity Tmust Co, v. State, 72 Idaho 137,237 P.2d 1058, 
and authorities cited in the majority opinion on this point. Secondly, such an agreement would constitute an 
attempt to convey land by an oral agreement in violation of our statute of frauds, and would in itself be void. 
K d l e  v. Clinkingbeard, 66 Idaho 493, 162 P.2d 892, based on the long established precedent of this court that 
in order to effect an estoppel, the agreement coupled to the acquiescence, must have existed for five full years. 
Because the trial court did not base the exclusion of this evidence on the last-mentioned ground, is in itself no 
reason for reversing the judgment, because this court in arriving at a correct solution of the case, which agrees 
with the erroneous conclusion reached by the trial court, will affirm such judgment. Glander v. Glander, 72 
Idaho 195,239 P.2d 254. What has been said of the evidence in this case is likewise applicable to the pleadings 
and the motion to strilce portions ofthe answer. The entire answer, including those portions excluded, does not 
plead any defense, by estoppel, or othelwise, to this action, under the long-established rule of law above set 
forth. Therefore, the matters excluded in the answer are not sufficient as a defense, neither would any evidence 
of acquiescence during the pericd involved be competent evidence to prove estoppel against the p!aintiffs. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
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IN TIiE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIhL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 





) Case No. CV 2004-000080 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 1 
GREEN, husband and wife, 1 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MAR\' E. ) 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT DUE TO . . 
1 TWOGRAPI-IICAL ERROR 
Counterplaintiffs. ) 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT DUE TO 
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
1 
Lewiston,Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fa 4 1 4  
COME NOW the plaintiffs above-named by and through their attorney of record, 
Charles A. Brown, and move the Court for leave to amend their Complaint in this matter due to a 
Typographical error. 
This motion is based upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) and the court file 
herein. 
Upon reviewing the Complaint filed herein, the plaintiffs have noticed a 
Typographical error in paragraph 12 of said Complaint. Said paragraph reads as follows: 
12. WEITZES claim ownership of the property lying 
between said quarter-section line and said fence and fenceline 
adjacent to the _W 112 NE 114, and WEITZ CQ SONS, LLC, clsims 
ownership of the property lying between said qu&t&r-section line and 
said fence and fenceline adjacent to the E 112 NE 114. According to 
the Monson survey, the property claimed by plaintiffs collectively 
totals approximately 8.57 acres (collectiveiy the "Disputed 
Property"). 
The Typographical error is that the designations of West (W) and East (E) in the paragraph have 
been reversed and should read: WEITZES claim ownership of the property lying between said 
quarter-section liue and said fence and fenceline adjacent to theEli2 NE 114, and WEITZ & SONS, 
LLC, claims ownership of the property lying between said quarter-section line and said fence and 
fenceline adjacent to the W 112 NE 114. 
The Complaint references this allegatioddescription correctly in various other places 
of the pleading, and in this paragraph 12 the East and West designation were inadvertently switched. 
Thus, the plaintiffs request that they be granted leave to amend the Complaint 
accordingly. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED on this 22nd day of June, 2005. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT DUE TO 
TYPOGRAPI-IICAL ERROR 
Charles A. Brow1 
Attorney for PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants 
Charles A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certie that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
mailed by regular first class mail, sent by facsimile oilly 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
sent by facsimile, mailed by __ sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Ofice 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, ID 83843 
on this 22nd dav of June. 2005. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
I AMEND COMPLAINT DUE TO 
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR 
Cllwleler A. Brow, Esq 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (~ELX) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cableone.net 
Attorney for PlaintiffsICounterdefendants. 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife 1 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 






TODD A. GREEN and TONIA I,. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 










1 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE 
1 BY ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 
1 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE 
BY ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 1 
Charles A. Brawn, Esq. 
PO. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewirton, Idaho 83501 
208-746-99471208-746-5R86 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
: SS. 
County of Nez Perce 1 
I, ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ., a resident of the State of Idaho, do hereby 
acknowledge receipt of a copy of the Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Robert L. 
Brower, Esq., a copy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum to Robert L. Brower, Esq., a id  a witness fee 
check in the amount of $21.50, all in regard to the above-entitled action and issued by the above- 
named plaintiffs in the above-entitled Court, which copy of said papers I acknowledge as having 
received on the .;I day of June, 2005, and herewith accept service of process on said date at 
Lewistoii, Idaho, in my capacity as an individual, with the same force and effect as though the same 
had been personally served upon me in the State of Idaho. 
DATED on this a d a y  of June, 2005. 
, / -- 
~ a e r t  L. Brower, Esq. 
SUBSCRIBED AND 
, g,!\\!l 1 Ill///,,,, 
9 P7 ROS&.~+, .&~~\\\ i~~w,,,~~ + 
w.$ %@ ,, 
3os G9. *=_ (SEAL) ,- NOTARY = .a f: 
ACIWOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE 
BY ROBERT L. BROWR, ESQ. 
P.O. Box 12251324 ~ a i n  St.
Lewirton, Idaho 83501 
zo8.746.g947no8.746-m (f X) 418 
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1 SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO 
1 ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 
1 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC 
1304 Idaho Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before an authorized court reporter 
of the above-entitled Court at the Conference Center of Charles A. Brown, 312 Main Street, 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO 
ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 1 419 
Lewiston, Idaho, on Friday, the 1st day of July, 2005, at the hour of 10:OO a.m. for the taking of your 
deposition in the above-entitled action. 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following items and 
documents: your entire file in regard to your client The Inez H. Rogers Trust aMa The Inez Rogers 
Family Trust andlor Sharon McCadam and/or Thomas L. Rogers concerning Todd A. Green and 
Tonia L. Green, and/or Steven R. Shook and Mary E. Silvernale Shook, and/or Danial T. Castle and 
Catherine C. Castle which is inclusive of any and all correspondence, notes, e-mails, documents, 
pleadings, memorandums, settleinent documents, andlor releases. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you fail to appear at the place and time 
specified above, that you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover 
from you the sum of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to attend said 
deposition. 
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2005. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT. 
Attorney at Law 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO 
ROBERT L. BROWR, ESQ. 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fax) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cableone.net 
Attorney for PIaintiffs/Counterdefendants. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIiE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 




TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband anc! wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOIC, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants1 
Counterplaintiffs. 
Case No. CV 2004-000080 
NOTICE OF TAIUNG DEPOSITION 
DUCES TECUM OF ROBERT L. 
BROWER, ESQ. 
TO: ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ., Deponent, and 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE a ~ d  CATHERINE C. CASTLE, 
DefendantslCounterplaintiffs, and their Attorneys of Record, ROBERT M. 
MAGYAR and ANDREW M. SCHWAM 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. - 1 
Cllaries A. Brow!,, Esq. 
PO. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewision, Idaho 83501 
~ o s - 7 ~ ~ - 9 9 ~ 7 n o s - 7 ~ ~ - m  (fax) 4 2 jI 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at 10:OO a.m. on Friday, the 1st day of 
July, 2005, at the conference center of Charles A. Brown, 312 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, the 
plaintiffs in the above-entitled action will take the testimony on oral deposition of ROBERT L. 
B R O m R ,  ESQ., pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, before a duly authorized court 
reporter. If the deposition is not completed on that day, the taking of the same will be continued 
thereafter from day to day and from time to time until said examination is completed. 
Said deponent is comnlanded to have available at said deposition for inspection 
andlor copying the following: his entire file in regard to his client The Inez H. Rogers Trust a1Ma 
The Inez Rogers Family Trust andlor Sharon McCadam and/or Thomas L. Rogers concerning 
Todd A. Green and Tonia L. Green, andlor Steven R. Shook and Mary E. Silvernale Shook, and/or 
Danial T. Castle and Catherine C. Castle which is inclusive of any and all correspondence, notes, 
e-mails, documents, pleadings, memorandums, settlement documents, and/or releases. 
DATED on this 22nd day of June, 2005. 
Attorney for PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. - 2 
Cliailes A. Brown, Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewirton. Idaho 83501 
208-746-994712G-746-5886 (fa 
422 
I, Charles A. Brown, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
1 mailed by regular first class mail, sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-882-1908 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
sent by facsimile, mailed by - sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the Ufiited States 
Post Office 
hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Office 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Cleanvater Reporting 
P.O. Box 696 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
on this 22nd day of June, 2005. 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. - 3 
cirw1es A. B r m .  Esq. 
PO. Box 12251324 Main St. 
Lewismn, Idaiio 83501 
208-746-9947nO8-746-5886 (fax) 423  
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
CLERK OF Di$ml~.r COURT 
LAiii1-i COul\j~,y w-.--.---7e~~~~ j y  
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND SUDICIAZ, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 MOTION TO QUASH 
PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants, 1 BROWER SUBPOENA 
v. 1 
/ 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
1 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs. 1 
COME NOW DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS, (herein sometimes referred to as 
Green) by and through their attorneys, ROBERT M. MAGYAR and ANDREW SCHWAM, and 
Move the Court to quash the Subpoena Duces Tecuin served by PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants, 
(herein sometimes referred to as Weitz), upon Robert L. Brower, Attorney. 
Mr. Brower was and is the attorney representing the Rogers Trnst, (herein sometimes 
MOTION TO QUASH 
BROWER SUBPOENA - 1 424  
referred to as Rogers), Green's predecessor in interest to the property claimed by Weitz. Mr. Brower 
negotiated the Rogers - Green Settlement Agreement with attorney Magyar, which agreement has 
been submitted to the Court and Weitz in this matter. Weitz has subpoenaed Mr. Brower, and his 
entire file regarding the Rogers - Green Settlement Agreement, and wishes to inspect that file. 
Green objects to the confidential settlemeilt negotiations between Green and Rogers being 
made public, or being made available to Weitz. Such settlement negotiations should be kept private 
pursuant to well developed law that says such negotiations shouldnot be subjected to Court inquiry. 
Green and Rogers have agreed to and have made the legally operative document that 
determines the legal relationship between Green and Rogers, and explains the consequences of that 
settlement as it relates to the property claimed by Weitz, available to Weitz herein. That document 
speaks for itself, and the negotiations undertaken to reach the settlement are merged into that 
document. See the Rogers - Green Settlement Agreement. 
It is inappropriate in this matter to go behind the settlement agreement, to the settlement 
negotiations that took place that resulted in that agreement. Those negotiations are irrelevant to this 
matter. Allowing Weitz to pursue those negotiations would be a complete waste of the parties' time 
and resources, put an unnecessary burden upon the Court and parties, and undennine anyone's 
willingness to reach a negotiated settlement. 
This Motion is supported by the record, and the Affidavit of Robert M. Magyar, attached 
hereto and incorporated herein. 
Leave of Court is requested to permit DefendantsICoui~terplaintiffs to argue at the Hearing of 
this Motion. 
Dated this 24" day of June, 2005. 
r?+ 
Robert M. Magyar V ' 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterplaintiffs 
MOTION TO QUASH 
BROWER SUBPOENA - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of June, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA to be served on the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
mJLiAp 
Robert M. Magyar ' 
MOTION TO QUASH 
BROWER SUBPOENA - 3 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
,@$ Facsimile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
cAsENI; .- I!u04/fi --- ------- 
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SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwain #I573 
5 14 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantsICouuterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 




1 I.R.C.P. 6 (d) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs. ) 
COME NOW DEFENDANTS/COUNTE@LAINTIFFS, (herein sometimes referred 
to as Green) by and through their attorneys, ROBERT M. MAGYAR and ANDREW SCHWAM, 
and Move the Court to shorten the time for Hearing on Green's Motion to Shorten, and Motion to 
Quash the Subpoena of Robert L. Brower, and to allow hearing of said Motions on June 27,2005, at 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME - I 427 
2:30 p.m., in the above Court. This Motion is based upon ail the filings with the Court, and because 
the subpoena is for July 1,2005, and the time requirements for motion practice can not be met. 
Leave of Court is requested to permit Green to argue at the I-learing of this Motion. 
DATED this 24" day of June, 2005. 
W n  A- 
Robert M. Mamar -. 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24" day of June, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME to be served on the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Robert M. Magyar U v 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME - 2 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882- 1908 Facsimile 
SCENIiAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF LATAI-I 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO j 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
~laintiffs/~ounterdefendants, ROBERT M.MAGYAR 
v. 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOIC, j 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., j 
1 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss: 
County of Latah 1 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of attorneys for the Defendants - Counterplaintiffs in this matter. 
2. I represented Todd and Tonia Green (herein sometimes referred to as Green) in the 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. MAGYAR - 1 429 
negotiation of the Rogers - Green Settlement Agreement, which has been submitted to the Court and 
Weitz herein. 
3. Mr. Brower was and is the attorney representing the Rogers Trust, (herein sometimes 
referred to as Rogers), Green's predecessor in interest to the property claimed by Weitz. Mr. Brower 
negotiated the Rogers - Green Settlelnellt Agreement with me. 
4. PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants (herein sometimes referred to as Weitz) have issued a 
Subpoena Duces Tecum (copy attached) to Mr. Brower, and wish to examine Mr. Brower's entire 
file concerning the negotiation of the Rogers - Green Settlement Agreement. 
5. Green objects to the confidential settlement negotiations between Green and Rogers 
being made public, or being made available to Weitz. Such settlement negotiations should be kept 
private pursuant to well developed law that says such negotiations should not be subjected to Court 
inquiry. 
6 .  It is inappropriate in this matter to go behind the settlement agreement, to the 
settlement negotiations that took place that resulted in that agreement. Those negotiations are 
irrelevant to this matter. 
7. While nothing in Mr. Brower's file will be harmful to Green in the case at bar, 
allowing Weitz to pursue the settlement negotiations would be a complete waste ofthe parties' time 
and resources, put an unnecessary burden upon the Court and parties, and undermine anyone's 
willingness to reach a negotiated settlement. 
8. The Rogers - Green Settlement Agreement speaks for itself, and the negotiations 
undertalcen to reach the settlement are merged into that document. See the Rogers - Green 
Settlement Agreement. 
9. Green and Rogers have made the legally operative docu~nents that determine the legal 
AFFIDAViT OF ROBERT M. MAGYAR - 2 
relationship between Green, Rogers, Shooks and Castles available to Weitz and the Court. 
10. Mr. Brower has informed me that Rogers will assert the Attorney - Client privilege as 
it relates to his file. This, and the general unwillingness of Courts to get into settlement negotiations 
should prevent Weitz from examining Mr. Brower's file, or questioning Mr. Brower with regard to 
the settlement process. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2005. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 24th day of June, 2005. 
L M  A@&/' 
MlrCMELLE I.. ST 
& 
Notary Public in and for thk State of Idaho, 
residing in Moscow, Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: @//Jc'@ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24" day of June, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA to be served on the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
flu fl& 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
k3(1 Facsimile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. MAGYAR - 3 
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and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 
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GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 




1 Case No. CV 2004-000080 
1 
) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO 
1 ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 
1 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO: ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 
Jones, Brower & Callery, PLLC 
1304 Idaho Street 
Lewiston. Idaho 83501 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before an authorized court reporter 
of the above-entitled Court at the Conference Ce~lter of Charles A. Brown, 312 Main Street, 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO 
ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 1 
Lewiston, Idaho, on Friday, the 1st day of July, 2005, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. for the taking of your 
deposition in the above-entitled action. 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following items and 
docume~~ts: your entire file in regard to your client The Inez 13. Rogers Trust alkia The Inez Rogers 
Family Trust and/or Sharon McCadam andlor Thomas L. Rogers concerning Todd A. Green and 
Tonia L. Green, and/or Steven R. Shook and Mary E. Silvemale Shook, and/or Danial T. Castle and 
Catherine C. Castle which is inclusive of any and all correspondence, notes, e-mails, documents, 
pleadings, memorandums, settlement documents, andlor releases. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you fail to appear at the place and time 
specified above, that you may be held in contempt of court and that the aggrieved party may recover 
from you the sum of $1 00 and all damages which the party may sustain by your failure to attend said 
deposition. 
DATED this 2211d day of June, 2005. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT. ' 
LA.-- 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO 
ROBERT L. BROWER, ESQ. 2 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantslCounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS TO 
1 DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
PlaiiitiffslCounterdefendants, 1 RESPONSE TO MOTIONS: 
v. 1 
1 FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) TO EXAMINE PROPERTY 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) IN LIMINE 




Defendants - Comterplaintiffs (herein sometimes referred to as Green) hereby add the 
following additional attachments to their response to the Motions filed by Plaintiffs - 
Counterdefendants (herein sometimes referred to as Weitz), For Leave to Amend, To Examine 
Property, and In Limine, that were omitted froin their initial filing, as follows. 
ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS TO 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLANTIFFS 
RESPONSE TO MOTIONS - 1 
1. MAPS. Latah County, Idaho Assessor's official maps, including: a current map, a post 
1972 map, and a map dated sometime between 1964 and 1977. 
2. TAX ASSESSMENT NOTICES. Latah County, Idaho real property tax assessment 
notices for the SE ?4 of Section 8, Township 40, Range 5, the Green property, for the years 1994, 
1995, 1999, 2001 and 2004. [Note that 42.11 acres of the 160 acre of the SE '/4 is owned by 
"Wiggins" who are not a part of this lawsuit.] 
3. These Maps and Notices show that Green and Green's successors in interest (Shook, 
Castle and Wiggins) have paid all taxes on the SE ?4 of Section 8, Township 40, Range 5, the Green 
property. Weitz have paid no taxes on any land lying in the SE ?4 of Section 8, Township 40, Range 
5, the Green property. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2005. 
/zLd- &. 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs (Green) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of June, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ADDITIONAL ATTACHMENTS TO RESPONSE TO MOTIONS to be served on the 
following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
MsL\"-kFp- 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
fi Facsimile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: June 27,2005 
Jodi M. Stordiau 
Court Reporter 
Tape: 05-3-75/ 
Time: 230 P.M. 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. ) 
WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ & ) Case No. CV-04-00080 







) Plaintiffs present with counsel, 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. ) Charles Brown, Lewiston, ID 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE ) Defendants Todd Green and Steven R. 
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and ) Shook present with counsel, 
CATIlERINE C. CASTLE, and U.S. ) Andrew M. Schwam, Moscow, ID 
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1 
) 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE ) 
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Subject of ~ 'voceed in~s:  Motion hearing 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
This being the time fixed pursuant to written notice for hearing of the various 
motions in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties. 
Mr. Brown informed the Court that plaintiffs have no objection to the defendants' 
Motion to Permit Access by Defendants and Their Experts to Plaintiffs' Property for the 
Purpose of Dating Fence Remnants That Follow the True Boundary Line Between the 
Parties' Property. Court granted the motion, directing Mr. Schwam to prepare an order in 
accordance with its ruling, allowing Mr. Brown to review the proposed order prior to 
submitting the same to the Court for signature. 
There being no objection from the plaintiffs, Court granted the defendants' Motion 
to Shorten Time of hearing of defendants' Motion to Quash Brower Subpoena. 
There being no objection from the defendants, Court granted the plaintiffs' Motion 
for Leave to Amend Complaint to Correct Typographical Error, instructing Mr. Brown to 
prepare an order in accordance with its ruling, allowing Mr. Schwam to review the 
proposed order prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Mr. Brown argued in support of plaintiffs' motion to examine the disputed property 
in this case. Mr. Schwam argued in opposition to the motion, indicating defendants would 
have no objection to Mr. Brown alone viewing the property. Mr. Brown argued in rebuttal. 
Court granted Mr. Brown's request to examine the disputed property, but denied, without 
prejudice, Mr. Brown's request to take whomever he wished up to the property. Court 
instructed Mr. Brown to prepare an order in accordance with its ruling, allowing Mr. 
Schwam to review the proposed order prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Mr. Brown argued in opposition to defendant's Motion to Quash Brower Subpoena. 
Mr. Schwam stated that he thought it was premature to argue this motion at this time. 
Mr. Brown argued in support of the plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim on the doctrine of adverse possession. Mr. Schwam 
argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Brown argued in rebuttal, waiving a jury in this 
case. Mr. Schwam argued in surrebuttal. Mr. Brown argued further in rebuttal. 
Mr. Brown argued in support of the plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Mr. Schwam 
argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Brown argued in rebuttal. Mr. Schwam 
responded to inquiry from the Court and argued in surrebuttal. Mr. Brown argued further 
in rebuttal. Mr. Schwam argued further in surrebuttal. Mr. Brown argued further. 
I 
I For reasons articulated on the record, Court denied the plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
in its entirety. Court instructed Mr. Schwam to prepare an order in accordance with its 
ruling, allowing Mr. Brown to review the proposed order prior to submitting the same to 
4 the Court for signature. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
Mr. Brown argued in opposition to the defendants' Motion to Quash Brower 
Subpoena. Mr. Schwam argued in support of the motion. For reasons articulated on the 
record, Court denied the Motion to Quash Brower Subpoena. Court informed counsel that 
it is available by phone if counsel need a ruling during the process of deposing Mr. Brower. 
Court instructed Mr. Brown to piepare an order denying the Motion to Quash Brower 
Subpoena in accordance with its ruling. 
Mr. Brown argued in support of the plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, wherein they seek 
an order of the Court excluding any and all witnesses or evidentiary material of any nature 
that would go to support the bona fide purchaser defense that the defendants/counter- 
plaintiffs in this matter made reference to at the preliminary injunction hearing. Mr. 
Schwam argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Brown argued in rebuttal. For reasons 
articulated on the record, Court denied the Motion in Limine. Court instructed Mr. 
Schwam to prepare an order in accordance with its ruling. 
Mr. Brow11 argued in support of plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Witness List and in 
opposition to the Defendants' Objection to Supplemental Witness List and Motion to 
Strike. Mr. Schwam argued in opposition to the motion and in support of defendants' 
Motion to Strike. For reasons articulated on the record, Court granted the plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend Witness List, overruling the Defendant's Objection to Supplemental 
Witness List and denied defendants' Motion to Strike. Court instructed Mr. Brown to 
prepare an order in accordance with its ruling. 
Court recessed at 4:12 P.M., subject to call. 
APPROVED BY: 
\ Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 3 
J ~ H N  R. STEGNER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
CLERK OF UiSTil'iCT COURT 
LAT,AIi C&
BY __......-_ P U P  
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantslCounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability j 
company, 1 
1 
PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants, 1 DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS' 
j 
LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURES 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, j 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
1 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs. 1 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs (herein sometimes referred to as Green), through their counsel 
of record, hereby disclose the following names, and if known, the addresses and/or phone numbers, 
of all lay witnesses who are expected to testify at trial, with a brief summary of the issues which 
each witness will address, to Plaintiffs - Counterdefendants (herein sometimes referred to as Weitz). 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS' 
LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURES - i 
Thomas L. Rogers, 600 S. Walnut, Boise, ID 83707,208-323-8335. trustee of the Rogers 
Trust, will testify about property ownership and boundaty issues, the condition, nature and history 
of the "fence remnants" claimed by Weitz as the boundary, the Rogers' family use of their property, 
and neighboring property, and his usage, activities and observations made upon the property. 
Sharon (Rogers) McCadam, 2901 E. Section, Mt. Vernon, WA 98274. trustee of the Rogers 
Trust will testify about property ownership and boundary issues, the condition, nature and history of 
the "fence remnants" claimed by Weitz as the boundary, the Rogers' family use of their property, 
and neighboring property, and her usage, activities and observations made upon the property. 
Todd and Tonia Green, 1418 4 Mile Road, Viola, Id 83872, 208-883-2555. The Greens 
purchased the Green property from the Rogers trust, and can testify about property ownership and 
boundary issues, the condition, nature and history of the "fence remnants" claimed by Weitz as the 
boundary, and the use, activities and observations made upon the property, and neighboring 
property. Todd Green will testify regarding the following: that he did not see any fence claimed by 
Weitz as the boundary when he purchased his property; that he relied upon the quarter corner IDL 
boundary marker as establishing his boundary when he purchased the property; the Rogers - Green 
Agreement; the Green - Shook and Green - Castle Agreements; all of the issues raised by the 
Pleadings herein; his usage of the Green and Weitzproperties prior to this lawsuit; Weitz changing 
the evidence. 
Steve andMary Shoolc, 966 Pheasant Run, Moscow, ID 83843,208-885-6802. The Shooks 
purchased their property from Green, and can testify about property ownership and boundary issues, 
the condition, nature and history of the "fence remnants" claimed by Weitz as the boundary, and the 
use, activities and observations made upon the property, and neighboring property. Steve Shook will 
testify regarding the following: that he did not see any fence claimed by Weitz as the boundary prior 
to Weitz making their claim against Green; the Green- Shook Agreement; all of the issues raised by 
the Pleadings herein; his usage of the Green and Weitz properties prior to this lawsuit; Weitz 
changing the evidence. 
Dan and Catherine Castle. The Castles purchased their property from Green, and can testify 
about property condition, ownership, and boundary issues, the condition, nature and history of the 
"fence remnants" claimed by Weitz as the boundary, and the use, activities and observations made 
upon the property, and neighboring property, and regarding all of the issues raised by the Pleadings 
herein. 
Homer Ferguson, Orofino, LD, 208-476-4274. Mr. Ferguson will be able to testify to the fact 
that he maintained the cattle fence as a lessee of Rogers to facilitate cattle pasturing, and the use, 
activities and observations made upon the properties. 
Erol Barbut, 1128 Nearing Road, Moscow, Idaho 83843, 208-882-2391. Mr. Barbut will 
testify to using the property in dispute without permission from the Schoepflins or Weitz since 1971, 
and the use, activities and observations made upoil the properties. 
Willemina Kardong, Nearing Road, Moscow, Idaho 83843, UNLISTED PHONE NUMBER. 
Mrs. Kardong will testify to using the property in dispute without permission from the Schoepflins 
or Weitz, and the use, activities and observations made upon the properties. 
Wayne Fox, 1009 Karen Lane, Moscow, Idaho 83843,208-882-7975. Mr. Fox will testify to 
using the property in dispute without permission from the Schoepflins or Weitz for more than 25 
years. Mr. Fox will testifL regarding his usage, activities and observations made upon the disputed 
property, including but not limited to the placing of No Trespassing signs at the request of Mrs. 
Rogers. 
Linda Kirk Fox, 1009 Karen Lane, Moscow, Idaho 83843,208-882-7975. Linda Kirk Fox 
will testify to using the property in dispute without permission from the Schoepflins or Weitz. Mrs. 
Fox will testify regarding her usage, activities and observations made upon the disputed property. 
Daniel W. Green, 1155 Nearing Road, Moscow, Idaho 83843,208-882-6650. Mr. Green will 
testify to using the property in dispute without permission from the Schoepflins or Weitz, and his 
usage, activities and observations made upon the disputed property. 
R. Gerald Wright, 11 17 Nearing Road, Moscow, Idaho 83843,208-882-4166. Mr. Wright 
will testify to using the property in dispute without permission from the Schoepflins or Weitz for 
more than 25 years. Mr. Wright will testifL regarding his prior coi~versations with Weitz, and his 
usage, activities and observations made upon the disputed property. 
Harley Wright, 11 17 Nearing Road, Moscow, Idaho 83843,208-882-4166. Mr. Wright will 
testify to using the property in dispute without permissioii from the Schoepflins or Weitz for more 
than 25 years, and her usage, activities and observations made upon the disputed property. 
Michael O'Neal, 1060 Saddle Ridge Road, 83843,208-892-83 15. Mr. O'Neal will testify lo 
using the property in dispute without permission from the Schoepflins or Weitz. Mr. O'Neal will 
testify regarding his prior conversations with Weitz, and his usage, activities and observatioiis made 
upon the disputed property. 
DEPENDANTS/COUNTERPLAINTEFS' 
LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 3 
Laurie O'Neal, 1060 Saddle Ridge Road, 83843,208-892-83 15. Mrs. O'Neal will testify to 
using the property in dispute without pernlission from the Schoepflins or Weitz, and her usage, 
activities and observations made upon the disputed property. 
Raymond L. Yeatts, Daniel W. Yeatts and Merilyn Welch. These witnesses will testify 
regarding their dealings with Weitz, particularly regarding real property, and boundary and 
ownership issues, and their usage, activities and observations made upon the disputed property. 
Randall Buck, Sandpoint, ID. Mr. Buck will testify regarding his activities upon the Green 
and Weitz properties, and his dealings with Rogers, and his usage, and observations made upon the 
disputed property. 
Dana Townse~ld, 447 East Eighth St., Moscow, ID 83843. Mr. Townsend will testify 
regarding fence building activity on Green property, his usage, activities and observations made 
upon the disputed property, and his discussions with Weitz. 
DATED this 1' day of July, 2005. 
~ ~ / c c c ~  
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this IS' day of July, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURES to be served on the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Rdt$MA* 
Robert M. Magyar " 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAWTIFFS' 
LAY WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 4 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(8 U.S. Mail 
@) Facsiinile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for DefendantslCounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE! 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAI-I 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 





EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, j 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
1 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs. 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs (herein sometill~es referred to as Green), through their counsel 
of record, hereby disclose the following experts who are expected to testify at trial, to Plaintiffs - 
Counterdefendants (herein sometimes referred to as Weitz). 
1. Northwest Management, Inc. personnel, Tom Richards, Bob Coats and William E. Schlosser, 
Ph.D., Foresters. Copies of professional information for Northwest Management, Inc., and each 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS' 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 1 
expert are attached hereto and incorporated herein. Telephone number: 208-883-4488, Address: 233 
Palouse River Drive, Moscow, ID 83843. 
1.1. Mr. Richards, Mr. Coats and Dr. Schlosser are each expected to testify on the 
following subject matter and opinions. 
A. Their qualifications, education, experience, and training, and their work for the 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs as consulting foresters. 
B. No fence exists upon the Green property that would alert a professional forester in 
the process of setting up a timber harvest on the Green property that the true 
boundary between the GreedWeitz properties is anything other than the true 
surveyed boundary between Green and Weitz. In particular, that there is nothing in 
the "fence remnants" claimed by Weitz as a boundary that would put anyone on 
notice that the any boundary might exist other than the true quarter section line as 
indicated by the pink Idaho Department of Lands marker. The approximate date of 
construction of the remnants of an old fenceline near the true boundary between the 
NE % (Weitz property) and the SE% (Green property) of Section 8, T40N, R 5 
W.B.M., which old fenceline runs east and west within approximately 30 feet of the true 
surveyed boundary. This includes tree sampling. 
C. The cost to restore the "road" bladed by Weitz to a single track trail, as it was prior 
to Weitz' blading the road in 2002. 
D. The value of the trees cut by Weitz when Weitz constructed a "new" fence upon 
Green's property. Our experts will value the trees lost to Green in appropriate and 
conventional ways. 
E. The value of timber on the Green property claimed by Weitz (approximately 8.6 
acres). 
F. Review and comment upon the reports, affidavits and testimony of the Weitz experts. 
G. All observatioils of the experts of the old "fence remnants" and what it tells them as 
experts about the character of the fence remnants and other fences in the area. 
H. The experts will identify, describe and interpret photographs of the area. 
I. The reasons why landowners rationally decide to selectively log portions of their 
land, and how that relates to Green's predecessor's (Rogers) behavior. 
J. The experts will use their expertise in combination with their observations of the 
property and the experts' reports to testify about logging and other activities in the 
past on the Green and Weitz properties. 
1.2 The underlying facts and data upon which the above experts' opinions are based are 
as follows. 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS' 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 2 
A. The experts' work for Green as consulting foresters in connection with the above. 
B. The expert's personal visits to and around the Green and Weitz properties, including 
sampling of trees. 
C. Maps, photographs, surveys, correspondence, reports and other documentary 
evidence. 
D. The experts' specialized training, education and experience. 
E. Various forestry related data, treatise, books, etc. 
F. Tree sampling and timber and tree value calculations. 
2. Latall County Assessor's Office personnel, including: Cynthia Steuben, Cartographer; Vic 
Racicot, Appraiser; Pat Vaughn, Assessor; Laura Walker, record keeper; and Steve Fiscus, recently 
retired Assessor. Telephone number: 208-882-8580, Address: P.0. Box 8068, Moscow, ID 83843. 
2.1 These experts are each expected to testify on the following subject matter and 
opinions. 
A. Their qualifications, education, experience, and training, and their work as Assessors 
for Latah County, Idaho. 
B. Interpretation of Latah County Tax records. 
C. Interpretation of Latah County Maps, including taxing maps. 
D. Interpretation of property ownership issues as they relate to their area of expertise. 
2.2 The underlying facts and data upon which the above experts' opinions are based are 
as follows. 
A. The experts' work as Assessors in connection with the above, and the Weitz and 
Green properties. 
B. The expert's personal visits to and around the Green and Weitz properties. 
C. Maps, photographs, surveys, co~espondence, reports, tax records and other 
documentary evidence. 
D. The experts' specialized training, education and experience. 
E. Various Assessor related data, treatise, books, etc. 
3. Ronald P. Monson, PLS, Professional Land Surveyor. Telephone number: 208-877-7729, 
Address: 1081 Forks Rd., Deary, ID 83823. 
3.1 Mr. Monson is expected to testify on the following subject matter and opinions. 
DEFENDANTS/COLrNTERPLAINTIFFS' 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES 
A. His qualifications, education, experience, and training, and his work for the 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs as Surveyor. 
B. No fence exists upon the Green property that would alert a reasonable person or a 
professional surveyor in the process of surveying the Green property that the true 
boundary between the GreenlWeitz properties is anything other than the true 
surveyed boundary between Green and Weitz. Zn particular, that there is nothing in 
the "fence remnants" claimed by Weitz as a boundary that would put anyone on 
notice that the any boundary might exist other than the true quarter section lime as 
indicated by the pink Idaho Department of Lands marker. In particular, that there is 
nothing in the "fence remnalts'' claimed by Weitz as the boundary that would show 
evidence of an ownership claim against the Green property. 
C. The location, condition, and nature of the "fenceremnants" claimed by Weitz as the 
boundary, zu~d how the condition and nature changed after he began his survey work. 
D. Review and comment upon the calculations, documents, reports, afiidavits and 
testimony of the Weitz experts. 
E. All of his observations of the old fence remnants and what it tells him as an expert 
about the character of the fence remnants and other fences in the area. 
I?. Identify, describe and interpret photographs of the area. 
G. The reasons why landowners rationally decide to selectively log portions of their 
land, and how that relates to Green's predecessor's (Rogers) behavior. 
H. He will use his expertise in combination with his observations and the experts' 
reports to testify about past activities, including fence locations, on the Green and 
Weitz properties. 
3.2 The underlying facts and data upon which the above expert's opinions are based are 
as follows. 
A. The expert's work for Green as a land surveyor in connection with the above. 
B. The expert's personal visits to and around the Green and Weitz properties, including 
survey work. 
C. Maps, photographs, surveys, correspondence, reports and other documentary 
evidence. 
D. The experts' specialized training, education and experience. 
E. Various surveying related data, treatise, books, etc. 
4. Dave Hash, Hash Tree Company. Telephone number: 208-875-1000, Address: 1 199 Bear Creek 
Rd., Princeton, ID 83857. 
4.1 Mr. Hash is expected to testify on the following subject matter and opinions. 
A. His qualifications, education, experience, and training, and his work for the 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs, and for Northwest Management, Inc. 
B. The value of the trees cut by Weitz when Weitz constructed a "new" fence upon 
Green's property. Our experts will value the trees lost to Green in appropriate and 
conventional ways. 
C. Review and comment upon the reports, affidavits and testimony of the Weitz experts. 
4.2 The underlying facts and data upon which the above expert's opinions are based are 
as follows. 
A. The expert's work for Green and Northwest Management, Inc., in coimection with 
the above. 
B. The expert's personal visits to and around the Green and Weitz properties', 
C. Maps, photographs, surveys, correspondence, reports and other documentary 
evidence. 
D. The experts' specialized training, education and experience. 
5. Nolan Noren, Supervisor - Ponderosa Area Office, Idaho Department of Lands, 3 130 Highway 
3, Deary, Idaho 83823, (208) 877-1 121. 
5.1 Mr. Noren is expected to testify on the following subject matter and opinions. 
A. His qualifications, education, experience, and training, and his work for the Idaho 
Department of Lands. 
B. The existence of the record concerning the placement of the IDL quarter comer pin 
between Sections 8 and 9 of T40N R5W. 
C. Review and comment upon the reports, affidavits and testimony of the Weitz experts. 
5.2 The underlying facts and data upon which the above expert's opiiiions are based are 
as follows. 
A. The expert's work for the Idaho Department of Lands in connection with the above. 
B. The expert's personal visits to and around the Green and Weitz properties. 
C. Maps, photographs, surveys, correspondence, reports, records and other documentary 
evidence including records of the Idaho Department of Lands. 
D. The experts' specialized training, education and experiei~ce. 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTERPLAn\lTIFFS' 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES - 5 
6. Robert Barkley, Supervisor - Ponderosa Area Office, Idaho Department of Lands, 3130 
Highway 3, Deary, Idaho 83823, (208) 877-1 121. 
6.1 Mr. Barkley is expected to testify on the following subject matter and opinions. 
A. His qualifications, education, experience, and training, and his work for the Idaho 
Department of Lands. 
B. The existence of the record concerning the placement of the IDL quarter corner pin 
between Sections 8 and 9 of T40N R5W, and who placed the quarter comer pin. 
C. Review and comment upon the reports, affidavits and testimony of the Weitz experts. 
6.2 The underlying facts and data upon which the above expert's opinions are based are 
as follows. 
A. The expert's work for the Idaho Department of Lands in connection with the above. 
B. The expert's personal visits to and around the Green and Weitz properties. 
C. Maps, photographs, surveys, correspondence, reports, records and other documentary 
evidence including records of the Idaho Department of Lands. 
D. The experts' specialized baining, education and experience. 
7. Steven R. Shook, Professor of Forestry, University of Idaho, 966 Pheasant Run, Moscow, ID 
83843, Telephone, (208) 885-6802. A copy of Mr. Shook's resume is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
7.1. Mr. Shook is expected to testify on the following subject matter and opinions. 
A. His qualifications, education, experience, and training, and his work for the 
DefendantsICouilterplaintiffs as a consulting forester. 
B. There is nothing in the "fence remnants" claimed by Weitz as a boundary that would 
put anyone on notice that any boundary might exist other than the true quarter 
section line as indicated by the pink Idaho Department of Lands marker. The 
approximate date of the remnants of an old fenceline near the true boundary between 
the NE % (Weitz property) and the SE% (Green property) of Section 8, T40N, R 5 
W.B.M., which old fenceline runs east and west within approximately 30 feet of the tnle 
surveyed boundary. This includes tree sampling. 
C. The cost to restore the "road" bladed by Weitz to a single track trail, as it was prior 
to Weitz' blading. 
D. The value of the trees cut by Weitz when Weitz constructed a "new" fence upon 
Green's property. Our experts will value the trees lost to Green in appropriate and 
coilventional ways. 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTiFFS' 
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E. The value of timber on the Green property claimed by Weitz (approximately 8.6 
acres). 
F. Review and comnent upon the reports, affidavits and testimony of the Weitz experts. 
G. All his observations of the old fence remnants and what it tells lrim about the 
character of the fence remnants and other fences in the area. 
H. He will identify, describe and interpret photographs of the area. 
I. The reasons why landowners rationally decide to selectively log portions of their 
land, and how that relates to Green's predecessor's (Rogers) behavior. 
J. He will use his expertise in colnbination with his observations of the property and the 
experts' reports to testify about logging and other activities in the past on the Green 
and Weitz properties. 
7.2 The underlying facts and data upon which his opinions are based are as follows. 
A. The expertss' work for Green as consulting foresters in connection with the above. 
B. His personal visits to and around the Green and Weitz properties, including sampling 
of trees. 
C. Maps, photographs, sweys,  correspondence, reports and other documentary 
evidence. 
D. His specialized training, education and experience. 
E. Various forestiy related data, treatise, books, etc. 
F. Tree sampling and timber and tree value calculations. 
8. Experts named by Weitz in the Weitz list of expert witnesses 
DATED this lSt day of July, 2005. 
/;?MP~Y~- 
Robert M. Mamar / fl 
Attorney for l%fendantsl~ounter~laintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 011 this 1'' day of July, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES to be served on the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
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Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
R& fl/2-29* 
Robert M. Magyar 
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( ) Overnight Mail 
@ US. Mail 
00 Facsimile ( E K C U T  A ~ 3 d f i ~  s / v ' T ~ G )  
( ) Hand Delivery 
Thomas M, Richards 
Northwest Management, Inc.-Vice President 
SilviculturelEcologist 
Professional Forester 
Professional Memberships and Awards: 
Western Forestry and Conservation Association 
Craig MountainlCamas Prairie Forest Stewardship Council 
lnland Empire Reforestation Council 
lnland Northwest Growth and Yield Cooperative 
0 ldaho Tree Farm Executive Committee-District 2 Chairman 
Education: 
Bachelor of Science; 1980, Forest Resource Management; College of Forest, Wildlife and 
Range Resources, University of ldaho, Moscow. 
Secondary Education Teaching Certificate, 1983, University of ldaho, Moscow. 
Continuing Education: 
Forest Biometries Research Institute, University of Montana, Forest Projection and 
Analysis, annual course 2000-2004. 
e IS0  14001-Environmental Lead Auditing Course provided by MGMT Alliances, Inc., 
Vancouver D.C., Canada. February 2001. 
"New Perspectives Workshop: A Forum for Creating a Common Vision of "New 
Perspectives" for the lnland Northwest," College of FWR, University of Idaho. 1992. 
Forest lnsect and Disease Management Training, Northern Region, Cooperative 
Forestry and Pest Management. USDA, Forest Service, ldaho Department of Lands, 
lnsect and Disease Control. 1996. 
"Ecosystem Management-Principles and Applications." Washington State University 
Cooperative Extension and the USDA Forest Service-PNW Research Station, the 
Center for Sustainable Forest and Rangeland Ecosystems. 1996. 
Professional Experience: 
1984 -- Present; Vice PresidenUDepartment Manager, Northwest Management, Inc. 
Mr. Richards has more than 20 years of experience in forestry and forest management. As a 
partner and vice president of Northwest Management, Inc., he is responsible for the project 
management and technical content of silviculture, forest inventory and growth and yield projects 
and the overall management of projects and quality control. 
InventoryIGrowth & Yield AnalysislHarvest Scheduling & Modeling 
Mr. Richards is responsible for the administration, development, implementation and quality 
assurance of forest inventory projects for the company. He has considerable experience in 
forest inventory sampling design to characterize the forest vegetation in an efficient and 
statistically reliable manner. He has extensive experience in vegetation mapping, utilizing aerial 
photography and ground truthing techniques. 
During the past five years, Northwest Management, Inc. has inventoried approximately 150,000 
acres of forest land each year. The types of inventories range from reforestation surveys to 
complete stand level ecological and timber surveys for input into growth projection models. 
Inventory information is used in determining growth and yield and stand projection analysis for 
future stand prescriptions. Harvest scheduling uses a modeling technique to determine harvest 
volumes and stand activities over rotation periods. 
Silvicultural Diagnosis and Prescriptions 
Mr. Richards is the primary Silviculturist/Ecologist for Northwest Management, lnc. He is 
responsible for the desian, implementation and feasibilitv review of silvicultural prescriptions and - -  . 
plans prepared by the company. Mr. Richards has broad experience in characterizini the forest 
condition, assessing site potential, assessing insect and disease problems and developing 
regeneration strategies. He has provided consultation to develop long-term silvicultural 
prescriptions on a landscape basis in order to achieve desired forest outputs and a desired 
target forest for both the present and the future. 
Mr. Richards uses computerized growth projection models as a tool in developing silvicultural 
prescriptions and for evaluating the effectiveness of various stand cultural treatments. Growth 
models utilized by Mr. Richards are the U.S. Forest Service Vegetation Simulator, Jim Arney's 
Forest Projection System, and Mason, Bruce and Girard's Stand Projection System. 
Silvicultural prescriptions prepared by Northwest Management, Inc. and Mr. Richards have been 
assessed and critiqued by silviculturists from the University of Idaho, Washington State 
University, the ldaho Department of Lands, and the U.S. Forest Service. 
Imagery Analysis 
Mr. Richards incorporates imagery interpretation techniques to develop estimates of volume and 
cover type utilizing satellite imagery, aerial photography and other digital imagery formats. 
Several projects have utilized this technique to provide our clients landscape level analysis for 
timber volumes, site productivity and land use planning. 
Sample Presentations: 
e "Silviculture for Non-Industrial Private Forestland in the Inland Northwest," Douglas-fir 
Symposium, Washington State University, Spokane, WA. April 1990. 
Sample Publications: 
Richards, T.M. 1991. Silviculture for Non-Industrial Private Forestland in the Inland 
Northwest, pgs 201-202, in "Interior Douglas-fir: the Species and its 
Management" Symposium Proceedings, Cooperative Extension, Washington 
State University, Pullman, WA. 
William E. Schlosser, Ph. D. 
Northwest Management, Inc. Geographic Information Systems Director 
Natural Resource Economist 
Financial Analyst 
Professional Forester 
Professional Memberships and Awards: 
Affiliated Faculty, University of Idaho, College of Natural Resources 
Past Faculty, Washington State University, Department of Natural Resource Sciences 
Forester of the Year 2004 (SAF) 
Society of American Foresters (SAF) member since 1990 
Communicator of the Year 2000 (SAF) 
Outstanding Forestry Communications Award, Best Forestry Video of 1994 (Forestland 
Taxes) from National Woodland Owner's Association 
Epsilon Sigma Phi, member of the ldaho State Team Award for the Strengthening Forest 
Stewardship Skills Team (1993). 
Certificate of Appreciation (2000) from Vladimir Michaelovich Kolomytsev, Deputy 
Director of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, Far Eastern Directorate, for 
contributions to advancing the science and practice of Russian Forestry. 
Certificate of Appreciation (1 993) from Jack Ward Thomas, Chief of US Forest Service, 
for contributions to President Clinton's Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. 
Rotary International (past member) District 5080 
Education: 
Doctor of Philosophy; 2002, Natural Resource Sciences Department and the Program in 
Environmental Science and Regional Planning; Washington State University, Pullman. 
Summa Cum Laude. 
Master of Science; 1990, Natural Resource Economics; Washington State University, 
Department of Natural Resource Sciences, Pullman. Magna Cum Laude. 
Bachelor of Science; 1989, Forest and Range Management, minor in Business and 
Economics; Washington State University, Department of Forestry and Range 
Management, Pullman. Cum Laude. 
Associate of Science; 1987, Geology, Olympic College, Bremerton, WA. 
Professional Experience: 
Dr. William E. Schlosser has been a professional forester since 1989 and has worked in the 
natural resources industry of the Pacific and Interior Northwest since 1982. He has extensive 
experience working with non-industrial private forestland owners, industrial forestland owners, 
tribal forestlands, and government agencies in the administration of projects. Although his 
advanced degrees are in natural resource economics, finance, and regional planning, he also 
possesses advanced skills in geographic information systems (GIs), global positioning systems 
(GPS), forest and range management. 
Dr. Schlosser has instructed professional foresters in timberland finance and economics. He 
was the lead coordinator on the ldaho Forestland Taxation Committee which developed the land 
and timber values and analysis to determine forest land taxes for the state of ldaho. The new 
ldaho Forestland Tax was approved by the ldaho legislature in 2005. Dr. Schlosser also 
provides financial analysis for property loss due to all hazards including fire, storm, and flood 
damage. 
Dr. Schlosser has extensive international forestry experience including over six years working 
and living in the Russian Far East and Siberia. While there he served as Chief Forester and 
then as Project Director for various USAlD projects (Environmental Policy and Technology 
Project and the Russian Environmental Partnership Project). He was the Chief Operations 
Officer and General Director for the US-Russian joint venture JSC Forest Starma which 
managed a long-term lease of forestlands harvesting 360,000 cubic meters of timber annually 
from the Russian Far East which was marketed into Japan, Korea and other Asian ports. As 
President and CEO of Pacific Rim Taiga, Inc., he operated in the USA and Russia from 1996- 
2001 administering and serving as forestry specialist on various projects for the US Forest 
Service, the Russian Federal Forest Service, private companies (Russian, American and 
others), and international organizations. He has also advised on various projects in Canada and 
Europe. 
Dr. Schlosser is a recognized and respected educator with 8 years of experience working with 
Universities (University of ldaho, Michigan State University, Washington State University). He 
has delivered over 150 seminars and short courses on a variety of forestry topics in the US and 
Russia. Attendees to his classes have been estimated at well over 5,000 individuals. He has 
also taught undergraduate and graduate classes in natural resources and specifically, in forest 
and range management. 
Dr. Schlosser has extensive experience implementing GIs analysis projects; in addition to being 
the Director of the NMI GIs Lab in Moscow, he provides leadership for all of the company's 
Wildland-Urban Interface Fuels Management Plan projects, and FEMA compatible All Hazard 
Mitigation Plans. He was the Project Director of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan for Shoshone 
County, ldaho (2.2 million acres), the fire risk analysis for the North Central ldaho Area (8.8 
million acres), the Wildfire Mitigation Plan for the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana 
(500,000 acres), the West Central Highlands of ldaho Wildfire Mitigation Plans (Adams, 
Washington, Gem, and Valley Counties-4.8 million acres), and the Southwestern ldaho Wildfire 
Mitigation Plans (Ada, Canyon, and Elmore Counties-3.1 million acres), which all used GIs and 
on-site evaluations to assess fire risk for ignition and spread based on land features, vegetation 
cover, and locale of home sites. He is the Project Director in charge of developing an 
environmental assessment of fire risk on two regions for the Bureau of Land Management in the 
Cottonwood, Idaho, and for the Duck Valley lndian Reservation of ldaho and Nevada. He is also 
leading the Lewis County, Idaho, All Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
Presentations: 
Dr. Schlosser has developed and delivered over 205 presentations in forestry and natural 
resources. He wrote and produced two forestry videos on the topic of forestland taxes. Sample 
presentations follow: 
Fire Prone Landscapes; An Integrated Approach to Developing a Wildfire Hazard 
Assessment. Presented at the regional symposium "Risk Assessment for Decision- 
Making Related to Uncharacteristic Wildfire" November 17-19, 2003. Portland, Oregon 
(approx attendance 250). 
The Wildfire Situation in California. October 27, 2003, Boise, Idaho. Gave a live, on-air 
interview with Brenda Buttner of FOX NEWS on the Your World wifh Neil Cavuto show 
discussing the economic impacts of the Southern California wildfires. 
WUI Wildland Fuels Management Plans. September and October 2003. Idaho. Led 
presentations and discussions during 10 public meetings in Elmore County, Adams 
County, Washington County, and Gem County as part of 4 county Fuels Management 
Plans to gather and facilitate public involvement. Each county's presentation was 
tailored to that county's plan. 
Fuels Management Planning: A Framework to meet FEMA & NFP Standards. 2003 (March 
24-25). Moscow, ID. Presented during the NlPF Landowner's Conference to 200 
individuals as a 20 minute presentation and again as a 30 minute presentation to the 
Inland Empire Society of American Foresters (SAF) during an evening meeting. 
Developing Regional and Local Fueis Management Risk Assessments in California. 2003 
(March 22). Sacramento, California. Presented to State-wide Fire Safe Councils in 
California how to develop FEMA and NFP Fuels Management plans that allow for the 
prioritization of mitigation projects. 
Financial Analysis for Forest Resource Managers. 2003 (March 20). Eureka, California. Full 
day training program delivered in cooperation with the Western Forestry Conservation 
Association (Portland, Oregon). Attended by 30 professional land managers. 
Publications: 
International Peer Reviewed Publications: 16 publications 
lnternational Peer Reviewed Publications in process & in review: 4 publications 
Other Reviewed Publications: 48 publications 
English: 36 publications 
Russian: 12 publications 
Slide Series Development: 105 programs 
Sample Publications: 
Schlosser, W.E. 2003. Wildfire Mitigation Plan for the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, 
Montana. Completed for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Billings, MT. Moscow, 
Idaho. 155 pp. 
Schlosser, W.E., V.P. Corrao. 2003. Little Salmon River Management Area Fuels 
Management Plan Environmental Assessment DRAFT. Completed for the 
Bureau of Land Management, Cottonwood Field Office. EA and Appendix in 
separate documents. 
Schlosser, W.E., V.P. Corrao. 2003. Elk City Management Area Fuels Management Plan 
Environmental Assessment DRAFT. Completed for the Bureau of Land 
Management, Cottonwood Field Office. EA and Appendix in separate 
documents. 
Schlosser, W.E., V.P. Corrao. 2002. Shoshone County, Idaho, Wildfire Mitigation Plan. 
Moscow, Idaho. Completed for the Shoshone County Fire Planning Committee, 
Shoshone County Commissioners. 130 pp + appendices. 
Schlosser, W.E., J.A. Bassman, F.G. Wagner, P.R. Wandschneider. 2002. Increasing 
Long Term Storage of Carbon Sequestered in Russian Softwood Logs Through 
Enhanced Lumber Recovery. Forest Prod. J. 52(9):51-59. 
Chapman, R.C., K.A. Blatner, W.E. Schlosser, and R. Fight. A Sampling Methodology 
for Inventorying Noble Fir Stands Prior to Bough Harvest. Western Journal of 
Applied Forestry. In Press. 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
University of Idaho 
NAME: Shook. Steven R. DATE: June 6,2005 
RANK OR TITLE: Associate Professor, Forest Products and Marketing 
DEPARTMENT: Forest Products 
OFFICE LOCATION AND CAMPUS ZIP: CNR, Room 102A, 1132 OFFICE PHONE: (208) 885-6802 
FAX: (208) 885-6226 
DATE OF FIRST EMPLOYMENT AT UI: December 1,1998 EMAIL: shook@uidaho.edu 
WEB: www.uidaho.edu/-shookishook.htm 
DATE O F  PRESENT RANK OR TITLE: July 1,2004 
EDUCATION BEYOND HIGH SCIIOOL: 
Degrees: 
Doctor of Philosophy in Forestly (Ph.D.), December 1997, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. 
Concentration areas: Marketing, Marketing Research, Forest Products Marketing. Simpson 
Centennial Fellow in Forest Products Business. Dissertation title: Innovation and the U.S. 
Residential Construction Indnstry-An Integrated Model of Determinants of Firm Innovativeness for 
Engineered Wood Products. 
Master of Science in Forestry (M.S.), May 1993, University of Illinois, UrbandChampaign, Illinois. 
Concenhation area: Wood Science and Engineering. Spaeth-Boggess Fellow in Forestry. Thesis 
title: The Mechanical and Physical Properties of Dry-Process Hardboard Made from Recycled 
Newsprint Paper Fiber. 
Bachelor of Science in Forestry (B.S.F.), May 1991, Pnrdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana. Majors: 
Forest Products. Forest Manacement. Senior thesis title: Interlamiliar Shear Strengtb of LVL Via 
Three Test ~ e & o d s .  
- - 
Certificates and Licenses: 
Professional Celtiiied Marketer (PCM), June 2001-present, American Marketing Association, Chicago, 
Illinois. 
Certificate, Integrated Business Administration (School of Business Administration), August 1994, 
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. 
EXPERIENCE: 
Teaching, Extension and Research Appointments: 
Associate Professor, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho - College of Natural Resources, Department of 
Forest Products, July 2004-present. 
Adjunct Associate Professor, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho - College of Business and Economics, 
Department of Business, July 1,2004-present. 
Adjunct Associate Professor, Washington State Unive~sity, Pullman, Washhtgton- College ofEngineering 
and Architecture, 2003-present. 
Assistant Professor, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho - College of Natural Resources, Depaltment of 
Forest Products, December 1, 1998-2004. 
Research Associale Professor, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, College of Forest 
Resources, December 1997-December 1998. 
Consulting: 
Crestview Capital Fnnds -due diligence research concerning an investment in a timberland investment 
management organization, 2005 
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Consulting (coilt.): 
Oaktree Capital Management, LLC -analysis of U.S. potential investment market for forest products re- 
manufacturers, 2005 
Mendocino Forest Products Company, LLC - developed and executed marketing research surveys 
concerning redwood lumber product markets, 2003. 
Steptoe & Johnson, Softwood Lumber Agreement Litigation - prepared submissions for petitioners and 
respondents in international trade litigation matters and administrative agency proceedings 
concerning softwood lumber substitution, 2001. 
Silvaris Corporation, Wood Products Internet Exchange -multiple projects focusing on implementation 
and market opportunities for a wood products Internet exchange, 2000-03. 
Elsevier Science, Forest Products Marketing - senior editor of online service focusing on the production 
and marketing of paper and paper-based products, 1998-2003. 
L.E.K. Consulting, Siding Market Evaluation - assessment of the current market situation for wood fiber- 
cement siding materials in North America, 2001,2005. 
Pacific Growth Partners, Venture Capital Opportunities - identificafion ofprivatcly held Pacific Northwest 
wood products f ims in need of venture or growth capital, 2001. 
uc2i, Low Grade Lumber Market Assessment - analysis ofthe size and structure of the low grade lumber 
market and market opportunities, 2000. 
Delta Group of Companies, Burmese Teak Markets - analysis of market opportunities for teak from 
Myanmar, 2000. 
Pacific Northwest Fibers, Grass-based Particleboard Markets - assessment of market opportunities for 
particleboard made from rye grass straw, 2000. 
E-Valuations, Marketing Research Techniques - preparation of analysis methodology to be used in 
Internet-based surveys, 1999. 
ForestCraft Marketing Cooperative, Membership and Consumer Surveys - executed membership survey 
and consumer survey to assess market oppol~nities, 1999. 
Evergreen Partnership, Membership Survey - executed survey of association membership to assess 
intematiol~al trade opportunities, wants, aud needs, 1998. 
Weyerhaeuser Companv, Substitution-Diffusion Modeling, development of dynamic models to assess 
substitution &d diffusiou of engineered wood into fhe marketplace, 1998. 
National Association of Home Builders Research Center WAHB), Substitution Research Study - research 
focusine on the substitution of eneineered wood uroducts and steel-based for softwood lumber in the " ~ - 
US residential construction industry, 1998. 
Hartman Group, Multiple Projects - development of market diffusion/sales models for products in the 
pharmaceutical industry, 1997-98. 
BankBoston, Investments in Forest Products Industry - analysis of investment opportunities in US forest 
products industry, 1998. 
Stewart & Smith, Chilean Forest Products Industry Investment Opportunities- analysis of investment 
opportunities in the Chilean forest products industry, 1998. 
APA - Engineered Wood Association, Adoption of Engineered Wood Products - adoption and diffusion 
research focusing on engineered wood products in the US residential consbuction industry, 1996- 
98. 
United States Ageilcy for International Development (USAID), Ukraine Forest Products Market - 
assessment of market oppoitunities for the Ukrainian forest products industry, included in-country 
work in Uluaine, 19977 - 
Management Systems international (MSI), Ukraine Forest Products Market - employed under USAID 
contract to assist in the market develooment of the forest oroducts industrv in Ukraine. included in- 
country work in Ukraine, 1997. 
American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA), AdoptionDiffusion Research Study - research 
focusing on the adoption and diffusion of engineered wood products and steel-based products into 
the US residential constmction industry, 1997. 
American Institute of Architects (AIA), 2x4 Housiug in Japan - technology transfer of 2x4 framing 
technology in Japanese residential construction industry, included in-country work in Japan, 1997. 
Washington State Department of Commuuity, Trade, and Economic Development (WA CTED), 2x4 
Housing in Japan - technology transfer of 2x4 framing technology in Japanese residential 
construction industry, included in-country work in Japan, 1997. 
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Consulting (cont.): 
Washington Public Forest Institute, Firelog Market Study, assessment of the Pacific Northwest firelog fuel 
market, 1996-97. 
Westem Red Cedar Lumber Association (WRCLA), Western Red Cedar Market Surveys - development 
and execution o f  market surveys assessing the deck and siding markets for western red cedar, 1995- 
96. 
Kenrnuir & Company, Western Red Cedar Market Analysis - assessment o f  the current status o f  the 
western red cedar market in the US, 1995. 
American Elardboard Association (AHA), Hardboard from Recycled Fibers -research focusing on the use 
o f  waste newsprint, office paper, and magazine paper as feed stock in the production o f  hardboard 
products, 1993. 
TEACHING ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
Areas of Specialization: 
Forest Products Marketing, Pricing Theory, Distribution Theoly 
Involved in teaching o f  the College o f  Natural Resources' capstone course - Product and Process 
Development. 
Students Advised: 
Graduate Students, Major Professor, Completed: 
Jonathan M. Songster, MS.,  Forest Products, 2005 -Profile of the Distribution Structure for 
Materials Used iiz Waterkont Applicafions: Implications for Innovative Wood-Plnstic 
Composites 
Jason P. Brandt, M.S., Forest Products, 2003 -Attribute Elicitation for Paper-Based Producis 
Liliya S. Yaremchuk Hogaboam, M.S., Forest Products, 2002 - Capital Investment Strategies of 
American Forest Products Comuanies 
Y u n  Zhang, MS.,  Forest Products, 2062 - The Perceived Value ofStructura1 Lumber in the Home 
Builder Market: A Conjoint Analysis Using a Polynomial Regression Modeling Approach 
Gary L. Kedish, M.N.R., 2002 
Charles W. Baun, M.N.R., 2001 
Jerald Lockhart, M.N.R., 1999 
Graduate Students, Major Professor, In Progress: 
Carla Blengeri-Oyarce, MS.,  Forest Products 
Daniel Monem, M.S., Forest Products 
Nataliya Plesha, Ph.D., Forest Products 
Jorge Soria, M.S., Forest Products 
Graduate Students, Committee Member, Completed: 
Lacey Price Manesco, M.S., Agricultural Economics, 2005 - Trade and Traceability in the Cattle 
Market 
Y e n  Le, Ph.D., Consemation Social Sciences, 2005 - Perceptions of Vietnamese Tourism 
Businesses Toward Sustainable Tourism Development 
Angel 14. Aguiar, M.S., Agricultural Economics, 2004 - Effects of the US-Canadian Bilateral 
Dispute and Global Trade Liberalization on the 1Vorld Sofhuood Lzimbw Marlcet 
Chet Crowser, MS., Resources Recreation andTourism, 2004 -An Evaluation ofBLMInformation 
Sources for Boaters on the Lower Salmon River 
Douglas R. Turner, M.S., Forest Products, 2004 - Productivity of a Small Cut-to-Length Harvester 
in Northern Idaho 
Aldo G. Cisternas, MS.,  Forest Products, 2002 - Mechanical Properties of Ponderosa Pine 
Dimension Lumbevfiom Small-Diameter, Overstocked Stands in Arizona 
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Students Advised (cont.): 
Graduate Students, Committee Member, In Progress: 
Travis Allen, M.S., Forest Products 
Heidi Bigler Cole, Ph.D., Conservation Social Sciences 
AIdo Cisternas, Ph.D., Forest Products 
James S. Fahiyi, Ph.D. Forest Products 
Lance Gallagher, M.S., Forest Products 
Chris Knowles, Ph.D., Forest Products Marketing, Oregon Stafe Upriversify 
Yen Le, MS., Statistics 
Jacqueline R. Maximilliao, Ph.D., Forest Resources 
Katherine J. Pavia-Jones, Ph.D., Forest Products 
John E. Potter, M.S., Interdisciplinary Studies 
Audres Soria, Ph.D., Forest Products 
Smith Sundar, M.S., Forest Products 
Courses Taught: 
University of Idaho: 
De~artnlent of Forest Products. Colleee of Natual Resources: 
A 
Structural Analysis of Forest  yod ducts Industry, 2cr. (FORP 2041404), 2001 
Principles of Forest Products, 2cr. (FORP 250), 1999,2000 
Pricing Strategy and Tactics, 2cr. (FORP 4041504), 2000 
Forest Products Marketing, 3cr. (FORP 425), 1999,2001,2003,2005 
Forest Products Business Management, 3cr. (FORP 4771577), 1999,2000,2004 
Seminar in Forest Products, Icr. (FORP Sol), 2003 (Spring, Fall), 2004 
Advanced Forest Products Marketing, 3cr. (FORP 502), 1999 
Statistical Modeling, 2cr. (FORP 502), 2000 
Forest Products Colloquia, 2cr. (FORP 504), 2000 
College of Natural Resources: 
Interdisciplinary Natural Resource Planning, 3cr. (FORP, RRT, WLF 470), 2001,2002 
Biomaterial Product and Process Development, 2cr. @OW 490), 2005 
Department of Business, College of Business and Economics: 
Pricing Strategy and Tactics, 3cr. (BUS 424), 2001 (Spring & Fall), 2003,2004 (Spring & 
Fall), 2005 
University of Washington: 
College of Forest Resources: 
Marketing of Forest Products, 3cr. (FM 422), 1998 
Marketing Research and Survey Methods in the Forest Products Industry, 3cr. (FM 5221, 
1997 
Teaching Assistant, College of Forest Resources: 
Introduction to Business from a Forest Products Perspective, 3cr. (FM 520), 1994, 1996 
Teaching Assistant, School of Business Administration: 
Sales Force Management, 3cr. (MKTG430), 1994 
Market Research and Survey Methodology, 3cr. (MKTG 490), 1994 
Materials Developed: 
Biomaterial Product and Process Development, 3cr. (FORP 4901491), 2004 
Forest Products Business Management, 3cr. (FORP 4771577) 
Pricing Strategy and Tactics, 3cr. (BUS 424; FORP 4041504) 
Stmctural Analysis of Forest Products Industry, 2cr. (FORP 2041404) 
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Courses Developed: 
Biomaterial Product and Process Development, 3cr. (FORP 5901591), 2004 
Forest Products Business Management, 3cr. (FORP 4771577) 
Forest Products Marketing, 3cr. (POW 425) 
Interdisciplinaiy Natural Resource Planning, 3cr. (FORP, RRT, WLF 470), 2001,2002 (co-developed) 
Pricing Strategy and Tactics, 3cr. (BUS 424; FORP 4041504) 
Structural Analysis of Forest Products Industry, 2cr. (FORP 2041404) 
Non-credit Classes, Workshops, Seminars, Invited Lectures, Etc.: 
College of Natural Resources' Sustainable Development Seminar Series (Spring 2001) - co-alranged 
semester-long seminar series that involved 8 lccturcs from sustainable development experts 
nationwide with an average audience size of 100. 
Provided, on a semester basis, a presentation on forest certification issues to the Inlegrated Natural 
Resource Planning course. 
SCHOLARSHIP ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
Publications: 
Brandt, Jason P. and Steven R. Shook. 2005. "Attribute Elicitation: Implications in the Research Colrtext," 
Wood & Fiber Science 37(1):127-146. 
I-logaho3ii~, Llliya S ;md Sii.\.cn K. Shook. 2b04 "Capit;il Budgeii:~g I'racti~es in rhc United Si:itcs 1:orest 
Prod~i.~s Induit!).: .2 I<c3ppr.1isal," R>>,c,.YI f ' w r l ~ , ~ ~ ,  J,II.).IIN~ 51(I?,: 149-1 58. 
Shook, Steven R., Richard P. Vloshy, and Sanna Maria Kallioranta. 2004. "Why Did Forest Industry 
Dot.coms Fail?" Forest Products Journal 54(10):35-40. 
Shook, Steven R., and Leslie C. Ganus. 2004. "Adoption of Innovations in Tradition-bound Industries: 
Uncertainty and Competitive Rivalry Effects on Adoption of Wood Products," J m n a l  of Forest 
Products Business Research l(Artic1e 1):22 p. <http:llwww.fores~rod.orgljfpbrljfpbr-a.asp>. 
Shook, Steven R., Yun Zhang, Rosemarie Braden, and John Baldridge. 2002. "The Use of e-Business in 
the Pacific Northwest Secondary Forest Products lndustry,"EorestProducts Journal 52 (January), 
59-66. 
Eastin, Ivan L., Steven R. Shook, and Samuel 3. Fleishrnan. 2001. "Material Substitution in theUS Residential 
Construction Industry, 1994 versus 1998," Forest Products Jouinal51 (September), 30-37. 
Shook, Steven R., Yun Zhang, and Francis G. Wagner. 2001. "Wood Products Cooperatives: Overview 
and Exploratory Analysis," Forest Products Journal 51 (March), 25-33. 
Shook, Steven R. and Ivan L. Eastin. 2001. "A Characterization of the U.S. Residential Deck Material 
Market," Forest Products Journal 51 (April), 28-36. 
Shook, Steven R. 1999. "Profile of the Pacific Coast Manufactured Firelog Market," Fop.est Products 
Journal 49 (NovemberiDecember), 35-44. 
Eastin, Ivan L., Steven R. Shook, and Douglas D. Simon. 1999. "Softwood Lumber Substitution in the 
U.S. Residential Construction Industry in 1994," Forest ProduclsJoumal, 49 (May), 21-27. 
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Shook, Steven R. 1999. "Forecasting Adoption and Substitution of Successive Generations of Structural 
Wood Panel Products in the United States," Forest Science, 45 (May), 232-248. 
Paun, Dorothy A,, and Steven R. Shook. 1997. "An Empirical Exploration of the Role of Marketing in 
Forestry Education," The Forestry CJzronicle, 78 (NovemberIDecember), 685-692. 
Hunt, Michael O., Steven R. Shook, and James P. Bradtmueller. 1993. "Longitudinal Shear Strength of 
LVL Via Five-Point Bending Test," Forest Products Journal, 43 (JulyIAugust), 39-44. 
Krzysik, Andrzej M., John A. Youngquist, Roger M. Rowell, James H. Muehl, Poo Chow, and Steven R. 
Shook. 1993. "Feasibility of Using Recycled Newspapers as a Fiber Source for Dry-Process 
Hardhoards," Forest Products Journal, 43 (JulyIAugust), 53-58. 
RefereedIAdjudicated (in press): 
Deutschlander, Heidi M., Francis G. Wagner, Richard L. Folk, Steven R. Shook, and Dale 0. Everson. 
2005. "Impacts of High-Temperature and Restraint on Kiln-Dried Grand Fir Studs Curve Sawn from 
Small-Diameter Logs," Forest Products Journal (in press) 
Devadoss, Stephen, Angel Ayiar, Steven R. Shook, and Jim Araji. 2005. "A Spatial Equilibrium Analysis 
of US-Canadian Disputes on the World Softwood Lumber Market." Canadian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. (in press) 
Plesha, Nataliya, and Steven R. Shook. 2005. "Ukraine Forest Policies for Sustainable Global 
Environmental Development," in Proceedings of the International Conference on the 
Mult$unctional Role ofForests: Policies, Method8 and Case Studies, Universiti degli Studi di 
Padova, Padua, Italy (in press). 
Peer ReviewedIEvaluated: 
Shook, Steven R., Ivan L. Eastin, and Samuel J. Fleishman. 2001. A Characterization of the Residential 
DeckMarket in the US, Center for International Trade in Forest Products (CINTRAFOR) Working 
Paper 78, Seattle, Washingtoll: CINTRAFOR, 53 pp. 
Eastin, Ivan L., Steven R. Shook, and Samuel J. Fleishman. 2000. "Material Substitution in the US 
Residential Constmction Industry: 1995 versus 1998," in Proceedings ofthe 34th International 
Particleboard/Composite Materials Symposium, Pullman, Washington: Washington State 
University, 7-2 1. 
Fleishman, Samuel J., Ivan L. Eastin, and Steven R. Shook. 2000. Material Substitution Trends in 
Residential Construction Industry, 1994 vs. 1998, Center for International Trade in Forest Products 
(CINTRAFOR) Working Paper 73, Seattle, Washington: CWTRAFOR, 76 pp. 
Eastin, Ivan L., Steven R. Shook, and Wendy Sammarco. 1999. An Assessment of the PNWHardwood 
Lumber Industry, Center for International Trade in Forest Products (CINTRAFOR) Working Paper 
72, Seattle, Washington: CINTRAFOR, 45 pp. 
Eastin, IvanL., Tom C. Ossinger, Roger B. Williams, Steven R. Shook, Robert Hashizumne, and Joseph A. 
Roos. 1999. A Technical Assessment ofthe North American-style 2x4 Residential Construction 
System in Japan, Center for lnternational Trade in Forest Products (CINTRAFOR) Working Paper 
70, Seattle, Washington: CINTRAFOR, 96 pp. 
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Peer ReviewedEvaluated (cont.): 
Shook, Steven R., WilliamR. Turner, and Ivan L. Eastin. 1998. "Forecasting Adoption and Substitution of 
Structural Panel Prodncts in North America," in Proceedings of the 32"d International 
Particleboard/ Composite Materials Symposium, Pullman, Washingtoil: Washington State 
University, 29-42. 
Shook, Steven R., William R. Turner, and Ivan L. Eastin. 1998. Adoptioiz, Diffusion, andSubsfifzrtion of 
Structured Wood Panels, Center for International Trade in Forest Prodncts (CINTRAFOR) Working 
Paper 65, Seattle, Washil~gton: CINTRAFOR, 32 pp. 
Shook, Steven R., and Ivan L. Eastin. 1998. Marketing Strategy Effects on Contractor Perceptions of 
Residential Siding Materials, Center for Intemational Trade in Forest Prodncts (CINTRAFOR) 
Working Paper 64, Seattle, Washington: CINTRAFOR, 70 pp. 
Eastin, Ivan L., Steven R. Shook, Robert Hashizume, and Joseph Roos. 1998. A TechnicalAssessmenf of 
!he North American-style 2x4 Residential Constructioiz System in Japan, Report for Washington 
State Department of Community Trade, and Economic Development (CTED), Olympia, 
Washington: CTED, 167 pp. 
Lippke, Bmce, Rose Braden, lvan L. Eastin, Steven R. Shook, and Robert FIashinirne. 1997. Ifowing 
Export Opportunities to Japan: A Synopsis, Center for International Trade in Forest Products 
(CINTRAFOR) Special Paper 24, Seattle, Washington: CINTRAFOR, 54 pp. 
Eastin, Ivan L., Douglas D. Simon, and Steven R. Shook. 1996. SofONood Substitution in the US 
Residential Construction Industry, Center for Internatioi~al Trade in Forest Products (CmTRAFOR) 
Working Paper 57, Seattle, Washington: CNTRAFOR, 54 pp. 
Shook, Steven R., and Ivan L. Eastin. 1996. The Norfh American ResidenfialDecliing andsiding Markets, 
Center for International Trade in Forest Products (CIKTRAFOR) Working Paper 56, Seattle, 
Washington: CINTRAFOR, I21 pp. 
Paun, Dorothy A,, Steven R. Shook, and Gerard F. Schreuder. 1996. "Educational Mindsets: Forest 
Prodncts Marketing and Forest Economics," Journal of Forestiy, 94 (September), 29-33. 
Briggs, David G., Lee Bialozynski, and Steve11 R. Shook. 1994. The US. Millwork Industry: Historical 
Trends Based on US. Department ofCommerce Stafistics, Center for Inte~national Trade in Forest 
Prodncts (CINTRAFOR) Working Paper 48, Seattle, Washington: CINTRAFOR, 76 pp. 
Youngquist, John A., Brent E. Englisb, Roger C. Schmer ,  Poo Chow, and Steven R. Shook. 1994. 
Literature Review on Use of Nonwood Plant Fibers for Building Materials andpanels, General 
Technical Report FPL-GTR-80, Madison, Wisconsin: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest 
Service, Forest Prodncts Laboratory, 146 pp. 
Knysik, Andrzej M., John A. Youngquist, James H. Mnehl, Roger M. Rowell, Poo Chow, and Steven R. 
Shook. 1992. "Dly-Process Hardhoards from Recycled Newsprint Paper Fibers," in Materials 
Interactions Relevant to the Recycling of Wood-Based Materials, Materials Research Society 
Symposium P~oceeding, Vol. 266, edited by R.M. Rowell, T.L. Lanfenherg, and J.K. Rowell, 
Materials Research Society, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, pp. 73-79. 
Other: 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Jason P. Brandt, Francis G. Wagner, K. Joey Favia, Steven R. Shook, and Keith 
Blatner. 2005. Idaho S WoodProducfs Industry: Current Conditions andForecast - 2005, Station 
Bulletin 83, Moscow, Idaho: Idaho Forest, Wildlife and Range Experiment Station, 4 pp. 
SHOOK, Steven R. 
Other (cont.): 
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illel~geri Opircc., Carla U., .inJ \leven K. Siiook. 290.1. Dire, tory <,j.lJoho H ou./I'r~~d~rcrs .\fo~rl!rhcrur.ers. 
2uG4 Ststlor, Publlcstiun '\fis:ellnneuu~ 22 .  .\loscow. I~ldlio. Ida110 I<,r:itrv. Wildllfc and Ronae 
Experiment Station, 78 pp. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Todd A. Morgan, Francis G. Wagner, K. Joey Pavia, Steven R. Shook, and Keith 
Blatner. 2004. Idaho's WoodProducts Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast - 2004, Station 
Bulletin 81, Moscow, Idaho: Idaho Forest, Wildlife and Range Experiment Station, 4 pp. 
Blatner, Keith A,, Charles E. Keegan, 111, Steven R. Shook, and Francis G. Wagner. 2004. Washington's 
Forest Products Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast 2004, Pullman, Washington: Washington 
State University, Department of Natural Resource Sciences, Cooperative Extension Publication 
MISC053I, 8 p. 
Blatner, Keith A., Charles E. Keegan, 111, Steven R. Shook, andFrancis G. Wagner. 2003. Washington's 
Forest Products Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast 2003, Pullman, Washington: Washington 
State University, Department ofNatural Resources, Cooperative Extension Publication MISCOS 11, 
8 PP. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, StevenR. Shook, Todd A. Morgan, Francis G. Wagner, and Keith Blamer. 2003. 
Idaho's Wood Products Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast - 2003, Station Bulletin 78, 
Moscow, Idaho: Idaho Forest, Wildlife and Range Experiment Station, 4 pp. 
Shook, Steven R. and Richard Folk. 2002. "Inland Empire Section Co-Hosts Symposium on Small- 
Diameter Timber," Forest Products Journal 52(5):6-7. 
Litan, Robeit E., Steven R. Shook, Richard D. Boltuck, Seth T. Kaplan, David Riker, Shihua Liu, and 
Jeffrey O'Hara. 2002. Evidence andAnalysis: The Role of Canadian Sofmood Lumber in the U.S. 
Mauket, Washington, D.C.: United States International Trade Colnmission Final InvestigationNos. 
701 -TA-414 and 73 1-TA-928, Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada, Post-Conference Brief of 
the Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance. 53 pp. 
Blatner, Keith A,, WilliamE. Schiosser, Charles E. Keegan, 111, Steven R. Shook, and Francis G. Wagner 
2002. Washington's Forest Products Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast 2002, Pullman, 
Washington: Washington State University, Department of Natural Resources, Cooperative 
Extension Publication MISC0484,X pp. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Todd A. Morgan, Steven R. Shook, Francis G. Wagner, and Keith Blamer. 2002. 
Idaho S Wood Products Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast - 2002, Station Bulletin 77, 
Moscow, Idaho: Idaho Forest, Wildlife and Range Experiment Station, 4 pp. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Todd A. Morgan, Steven R. Shook, Francis G. Wagner, and Keith Blatner. 2002. 
Montana's Wood Products Industy: Current Conditions andForecast - 2002, Missoula, Montana: 
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 3 pp. 
Lilan, Robert E., Richard D. Boltuck, Steven R. Shook, and Seth T. Kaplan. 2001. Evidence andAnalyss: 
The Role of Canadian Softwood Lumber in the US. Market, Washington, D.C.: United States 
International Trade Commission Preliminary Investigation Nos. 701-TA-414 and 731-TA-928, 
Certain Softwood Lumber Froin Canada, Post-Conference Brief of the Canadian Lumber Trade 
Alliance. 43 pp. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Krista Gehert, Steven R. Shook, Francis G. Wagner, and Keith Blatner 2001. 
Idaho 's Wood Products Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast - 2001, Station Bulletin 75, 
Moscow, Idaho: Idaho Forest, Wildlife and Range Experiment Station, 4 pp. 
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Blatner, Keith A,, William A. Schlosser, Charles E. Keegan, Ill, StevenR. Shook, and Francis G. Wagner. 
2001. Washington 3 Forest Products Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast 2001, Pullman, 
Washington: Washington State University, Department of Natural Resources, Cooperative 
Extension Publication MISC0345,7 pp. 
Ganus, Leslie C., Steven R. Shook, and Thomas M. Go'rman. 2001. Alternative WoodProducts Feasibility 
Study - City of Cascade, Idaho, Moscow, Idaho: University of Idaho, Department of Forest 
Products. 68 pp. 
Shook, Steven R. 2001. "Will Lumber Substitutes Continue to Take Market Share?' in World Wood 
Summit20OI Conference Proceedings, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: Papedoop.com, 20 
PP. 
I<eegan, Charles E. 111, A1 Chase, Steven R. Shook, and Dwane D. Van Hooser. 2001. "Montana's Log 
Home Industry: Developments Over the Last Three Decades," Montana Business Quarterly 38 
(Winter), 2-9. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Steven R. Shook, Francis G. Wagner, and Keith A. Blalner. 2000. Idaho's Wood 
Products Industry: Current Conditions and Forecast 2000, Station Bulletin 71, Moscow, Idaho: 
Idaho Forestry, Wildlife and Range Experiment Station, 3 pp. 
Shook, Steven R. 2000. "Market Dynamics and Competitive Position of Wood Fiber-Cement Siding 
Prodncts," in Inorganic-Bonded Wood and Fiber Composife Materials, Volume 7, Sun Valley, 
Idaho: University of Idaho, 258-274. 
Eastin, Ivan, Sam Fleishman, and Steve Shook. 2000. "Change of Plans: Material Substitution in the 
Residential Construction h~dustry," Engineered Wood Journal 3 (Fall), 34,35, and 37. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Steven R. Shook, Francis G. Wagner, and Keith A. Blatner. 2000. "Montana's 
Forest Products Industry," Montana Business Quarterly 38 (Spring), 34-36. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Steven R. Shook, Francis G. Wagner, and Keith A. Blatner. 2000. "Idaho Forest 
Industry Report," TimberIWest 25 (March), 36-38. 
Fleishman, Sam, Ivan Eastin, and Steven R. Shook. 2000. "Material Substitution in the U.S. Residential 
Construction Industry," CINTXAFOR News, 15 (Spring), 1 and 6. 
Shook, Steven R. andFrancis G. Wagner. 2000. Directory ofldaho WoodProducts Manufacturers: 2000, 
Station Publication Miscellaneous 21, Moscow, Idaho: Idaho Forestry, Wildlife and Range 
Experiment Station, 105 pp. 
Keegan, Charles E. 111, Francis G. Wagner, Keith A. Blatner, and Steven R. Shook. 1999. Idaho's Wood 
Productslndustiy: Current Conditions andForecast, Station Bulletin 69, Moscow, Idaho: Idaho 
Forestry, Wildlife and Range Experiment Station, 3 pp. 
Eastin, Ivan L., Steven R. Shook, and Douglas D. Simon. 1996. "Softwood Lumber Substitution in the 
U.S. Residential Construction Industry," CINTRAFOR News, 11 (Autumn), 3 and 6. 
Paun, Dorothy A,, Steven R. Shook, and John Dirks. 1995. "Study Assesses Marketing Education in 
Foresay Schools," CINTRAFOR News, 10 (January), 1 and 6. 
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RefereedIAdjudicated Publications (currently scheduled or submitted): 
Menasco, Lacey, John Foltz, Joseph Guentlmer, and Steven Shook. 2005. "Perceptions of New Zealand 
Cattle Producers Toward U.S. Countiy of Origin Labeling Requirements," Under review at 
Journal of Food Distribution Research. 
Keegan, Charles E., Todd A. Morgan, Francis G. Wagner, Patricia J. Cohn, Keith A. Blatner, and Steven 
R. Shook. 2005. "Capacity for Utilization of Small-Diameter Timber Within the USDA Forest 
Service, Region I Processing Area." Under review at Forest Products Journal. 
Presentations and Other Creative Activities: 
Plesha, Nataliya, and Steven R. Shook. 2005. "Uluaine Forest Policies for Sustainable Global 
Environmental Development," International Conference on the Multifunctional Role of Forests: 
Policies, Methods, and Case Studies, UniversitB degli Studi di Padova, Padna, Italy. 
Soria, Juan Andres, Amando G. McDonald, Steven R. Shook, and Bingjui~ He. 2005. Alternative 
Chemical and Fuel Feedstocks from Ponderosa Pine Wood Treated in Supercritical Methanol. 
American Chemical Society (ACS) National Meeting. Washington, DC: ACS. 
Soria, Juan A,, A m n d o  G. McDonald, Steven R. Shook, and Bingjun He. 2005. "Supercritical Methonal 
Treatment of Ponderosa Pine Residues for Chemical Production," Bioenergy 2005: International 
Bioenergy in Wood Industry Conference, Bioenergy Association of Finland (FINBIO), Jyvasiskylii, 
Finland. 
Soria, Juan A,, Armando G. McDonald, Steven R. Shook, andBingjun He. 2005. "Supercritical Methanol 
for Conversioi~ ofPonderosaPine into Chemicals andFnels. 59*Annual Conference andExhibitio11 
(APPITA), incorporating the 13Ih International Symposium on Wood Fiber and Pulp Chemistry 
(ISWFPC) Proceedings, Aukland, New Zealand. 
McDonald, Arn~ando, Steven R. Shook, Bingjun He, and Juan A. Soria. 2004. "Supercritical Methanol 
Treatment of PonderosaPine Residues for Chemical Production." 58"' Annual Meeting of the Forest 
Products Society, Grand Rapids, Michigan. 
Yadama, Vikram, and Steven R. Shook. 2004. "Wood-Plastic Composites: A Viable Option for Small- 
Diameter Timber." SmallWood 2004: Creating Solutions for Using Small Trees, Sacramento, 
California. 
Yadama, Vikram, and Steven R. Shook. 2004. "Market Evaluation of Wood Plastic Building 
Components." Progress in Woodfibre-Plastic Composites 2004, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
Soria, Andres, Armando G. McDoi~ald, and Steven R. Shook. 2003. "Response Surface Model for 
Optimization of Supercritical Treatment of Biomass for Fuel and Chemical Production." Small 
Timber Products and Markets Outlook: A Focus 011 Energy - A Technology in Transition 
Workshop. Inland Northwest Forest Products Research Consoitium, Post Falls, Idaho. 
Folk, Richard L., Steven R. Shook, Francis G. Wagner, Heidi M. Deutschlander, and Dale Everson. 2003. 
"Steam Use and Warp Occurrence during High Temperature and Restraint Drying InlandGrand Fir 
Curve Sawn from Small Diameter Trees." Small Timber Products and Markets Outlook: A Focus on 
Energy - A Technology in Transition Workshop. Inland Northwest Forest Products Research 
Consortium, Post Falls, Idaho. 
Shook, Steven R. 2003. "Impacts of Material Substitution in the North Ainerica Forest Products Industry." 
2003 Oregon Society of Certified Public Accountants Forest Products Conference, Eugene, Oregon 
[invited]. 
SHOOK, Steven R. Page I I 
Presentations and Other Creative Activities (cont.): 
Wagner, Francis G., Steven R. Shook, Dale Everson, andHeidi M. Deutschlander. 2003. "Steamuse and 
Warp Occurrence During High Temperature and Restraint Dying Inland Grand Fir Studs Cnwe 
Sawn fiom Small Diameter Trees." 57" Annual Meeting of the Forest Products Society, Bellevue, 
Washington. 
Shook, Steven R. 2002. "Marketing Forest Products to Developers and Construction Companies," 
SmallWood 2002: Community and Economic Development Oppoihinities in Small Tree Utilization 
Conference, Albuquerque, New Mexico. [invited] 
Zhang, Yun, Steven R. Shook, Rosemarie Braden, and John Baldridge. 2001. "The Use of e-Business in 
the Pacific Northwest Secondary Forest Products Industry," 55"' Annual Meeting of the Forest 
Products Society, Baltimore, Maryland. 
Ganus, Leslie C. and Steven R. Shook. 2001. "Uncertainty and Competitive Rivalry Effects 011 the 
Adoption of Ir~novatioi:~ in Tradition-Bound Industries," 55" Annual Meeting of the Forest Products 
Society, Baltimore, Maryland. 
Shook, Steven R. 2001. "Will Lumher Substitutes Continue to Take Market Share?" World Wood Summit 
2001, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. [invited] 
Si i~~ok,  Stcvcii I<. 2 U U O  343rhcr 1))nanii-s 3nJ Co~npetitivc I'osi~idl~ or' \Vuuil Fiber-Ce:iic,nr Siding 
Produc~s." "rh 111renr.ir10ntil nure~n;:-I3or~~led Wood oiid Fibzr Cumvozile \I:tter~nls Conference, - 
Sun Vallky, Idaho. [invited] 
Eastin, IvanL., StevenR. Shook, arid Samuel J. Fleishman. 2000. "Material SnbstitutionTrends in theUS 
Residential Construction Industry: 1995 versus 1998," 34Ih International ParticleboardiComposite 
Materials Symposium, Puilman, Washington. [invited] 
Shook, Steven R. and Ivan L. Eastin. 2000. "A Competitive Assessment of the Hardwood Lumher Industry 
in the PacificNorthwest," Forest Products Society 54ti' Annual Meeting, South LakeTahoe, Nevada. 
Shook, Steven R., TVilliam R. Tumer, and Ivan L. Eastin. 1998. "Forecasting Adoptiorl and Substitution of 
Structural Panel Products in North America," 32nd International Particleboard/ Composite Materials 
Symposium, Pullman, Washington. [invited] 
Shook, Steven R. 1998. "A Marketing Assessment of the Hardwood Lumber Industry in the Pacific 
Northwest," 26"' Amual Hardwood Symposium, Nationai Hardwood Lumber Association, Cashiers, 
North Carolilia. [invited] 
Shook, Steven R. 1997. "The Adoption and Diffusion of Engineered Wood Prodncts Within the United 
States Residential Construction Indushy," Joint Meeting of the Puget Sound and Willamette Valley 
Chapters of the Forest Products Society, Spring Meeting, Portland, Oregon. 
Shook, Steven R. 1996. "Forest Products Marketing and the World Wide Web," Forestry-Wood Products 
Infozmation Consortium Annual Meeting, Federal Way, Washington. [invited] 
Shook, Steven R. 1995. "A Comparative Assessment of the North American and Japanese 2x4 Residei~tial 
Construction Systems," Forest Products Society, Puget Sound Chapter, Fall Meeting, Anbum, 
Washington. 
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Presentations and Other Creative Activities (conk.): 
Shook, Steven R. 1995. "An Investigation of the Importance of Marketing Education in Schools of 
Forestry," Marketing Educators Fo~um, Forest Products Society 4gih Annual Meeting, Portland, 
Oregon. 
Shook, Steven R., Poo Chow, John A. Youngquist, and Louis E. Wagner. 1993. "Experimental Design and 
Analysis of Hardboards Made From Recycled Newsprint Paper Fiber," Technical Session 
Presentation, Forest Products Society 47'h Annual Meeting, Cleanvater Beach, Florida. 
Hunt, Michael O., Steven R. Shook, James P. Bradtmueller, and Kenneth J. Fridley. 1992. "Interlaminar 
Shear Strength of LVL via Three Test Methods," Technical Session Presentation, Forest Products 
Research Society 46Ih Annual Meeting, Charleston, South Carolina. 
Chow, Poo, Steven R. Shook, Melissa A. Migut, Jobn A. Youngquist, Andrzej M. Krzysik, James H. 
Muehl, and Roger M. Rowell. 1992. "Dimensional Stability of Dry-Process Hardboard from 
Recycled Newsprint Hydro-Pulp Fibers," in International Union of Forestry Research 
Organizations, All-Division 5 Conference Proceedings, Vol. 2, Nancy, France, p. 610. 
Professional Meeting Papers, Workshops, Showings, Recitals: 
Shook, Stevcn R. 2001. "Will Lumber Substitutes Continue to Take Market Share?" in World Wood 
Summit 2001 Conference Proceedings, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: Papedoop.com, 20 
pp. [invited] 
Shook, Steven R. 2000. "Market Dynamics a ~ ~ d  Competitive Position of Wood Fiber-Cement Siding 
Products," 7"' International Inorganic-Bonded Wood and Fiber Composite Materials Conference, 
Sun Valley, Idaho. [invited] 
Eastin, Ivan L., StevenR. Shook, andSamuel J. Fleishrnan. 2000. "Material SubstitutionTrends in theUS 
Residential Construction Industry: 1995 versus 1998," 34Ih International Particleboard/Composite 
Materials Symposium, Pullman, Washington. [invited] 
Shook, Steven R., William R. Turner, and Ivan L. Eastin. 1998. "Forecasting Adoption and Substitution of 
Structural Panel Products in North America," 32"" International Particlehoardl Composite Materials 
Symposium, Pullman, Washington. [invited] 
Chow, Poo, Steven R. Sl~ook, Melissa A. Migut, John A. Youngquist, Andrzej M. Krzysik, James H. 
Muehl, and Roger M. Rowell. 1992. "Dimensional Stability of Dry-Process Hardboard from 
Recycled Newsprint Hydro-Pulp Fibers," in International Union of Forestry Research 
Organizations, All-Division 5 Confirence Proceedings, Vol. 2, Nancy, France, p. 610. 
Grants and Contracts Awarded: 
Wagner, Francis G. and Steven R. Shook (co-PIS), Future Timber Demands: USDA Forest Service Region 1: 
USDA Forest Service (Region I), 2004, $16,187. 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), Directory of Idaho Wood Products Manufacturers, Idaho Forest Products Commission, 
2004, $800. 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), Development ofan Outreach Program Regarding Manufacturing of Extruded Wood-Plastic 
Products for Economic Development in the State of Wasl~ington, USDA Forest Service - Pacific 
Northwest Research Station, 2003, $7;589. 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), Market Alternatives and Drivers for Lateral Loading Solutions in Light-Frame 
Construction, US Department of Defense - Navy, 2003, $1 12,127. 
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Grants and Contracts Awarded (cont.): 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), US-Canadian Softwood Lumber Trade: A Case of Perfectly Fungible Products? USDA 
National Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program, 2003, $130,689. 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), Environmentally Labeled Paper-BasedProducts: Understanding Product-Level Preference 
Structures, Washington-Idaho-Montana Wood Utilization Research Program, 2003, $16,112. 
Yadama, Vikam, Robert Tichey, and Steven R. Shook (Co-PIS), Development of Novel Oriented Strand 
Substrate for Furniture and Case goods Applications, Washington-Idaho-Montana Wood Utilization 
Research Program, $6,342. 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), Commercialization of Navy Advanced Wood Composites, US Department of Defense - 
Navy, 2002, $68,726. 
Shook, Steven R., and Thomas M. Gorman. (Co-PI'S), Alternative Wood Products Feasibility Study. City of 
Cascade, Idaho, 2001, $14,897. 
Shook, Steven R. PI), Overview of New Growth Markets in the Westem Forest Products Industry, Pacific 
Growtlt Partners (institutional consulting), 2001, $678. 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), Assessment of Cement-based Wood Composites Market in the United States, L.E.K. 
Consulting (institutional consulting), 2001, $200. 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), US-Canadian Softwood Lumher Trade Dispute: Economic Analysis ofMarket Substitution 
for S o h o o d  Lumber (institutional consulting), Steptoe & Johnson, 2001-2002, $9,469. 
Keegan, Charles E., Steven R. Shook, Krista Gehert, and Francis G. Wagner. (CoPl's), Analysis of the Inland- 
Northwest Wood Products Industry (continuation funding), Washington-Idaho-Montana Wood Utilization 
Research Program, 2001, $37,324. 
S l ~ ~ ~ o k .  Ste\,s:1 I< .and l)s\id E.  S11rotr ((:dPl'c), I:II\ liontnenr31 L~hsliiig and Paiknging: liffccts on Consomer 
Esaluntions and l'urillaie Sclectidn of t'orcst l'rotlucrs, \Vasl~iiigton-l>;ibo-hloniacn Woo11 I:tili~atit~t~ 
Research Program, 2001, $47,163. 
Folk, Richard L., Francis G. Wagner, Steven R. Shook, James Lawrence, and Tim Lockey (CoPI's), Energy Costs 
atid Qualily Inipl~iation~ , f  lligIi-Teil~g~er~lure Kiln Scllr,dulej alld Kcitraiilt 011 It~l.md Cirdnd-fir Studs 
Slu from Snlail Tree, \\':~sliiogtc>n-IJalio-5lont;ln~ \ V u d  I 'tilii.a~lon ils\earcli Progmm, 2001, S69.012. 
Keegan, Charles E., Francis G. Wagner, Steven R. Shook, and Keith A. Blamer. (CoPI's), Analysis ofthe Inland- 
Northwest Wood Products Industry (continuation hd ing) ,  Washington-Idaho-Montana Wood Utilization 
Research Program, 2000, $32,000. 
Lee, Hany W. and Shook, Steven R. (CoPI's), Developmeal of a Professio~lal Business Management Training 
Module for Loggers in Idaho, Washington-Idaho-Montana Wood Utilization Research Program, 2000, 
$15,818. 
Shook Steven R. (PI), Assessment of the Relationship Between Softwood Lumber Quality and Material 
Substitution Behavior, Washington-Idaho-Montana Wood Utilization Research Program, 2000, $25,476. 
Keegan, Chnrles I: . Francis 6 .  \Vagncr. Srev?~i It. Sh~~uh,  iincl Keiil, .-\ Blamer ((:oPISs). Analysis utllle Inland- 
N,~nh\vesr \\'uud Produit.: Inili~srn., \\'ashr11grt~n-ld:1h~~-h10i1tn11i~ M'ood l.'tlli/.ltion Jlr~s?nrcll C'onsoniil~n 
Grant Program, 1999, $36,079. 
Shook, Steven R. (PI), Risk and Uncertainty in Residential Contractor Adoption of Innovative Techi~ologies, 
University of Idaho, University Research Office Seed Grant Program, 1999, $5,700. 
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Grants and Contracts Awarded (cont.): 
Wolcott, Michael P., Thomas M. Gorman, David G. Pollock, Steven R. Shook, andKenneth 3. Fridley (CoPI's), 
Engineered Lumber Products and Requirements from Inland Northwest Species, Washington-ldaho- 
Montana Wood Utilization Research Program, 1999, $46,598. 
Honors and Awards: 
Teaching Excellence Nomination, University of Idaho, 2004 
Apple polisher Award-Most Inspirational Professor, University of Idaho, Student Alumni Relations Board, 2004 
Siinpson Centennial Fellowship in Forest Products Business, awarded by the Seattle law firm of Ryan, Swanson 
&Cleveland and Simuson lnvesbnent Cornoanv. 1994 . ,, 
Spaeth-Boggess Fellowship in Forestry, University of Illinois, 1991-93 
Gamma Sigma Delta Fellowship Recognition, University of Illinois, 1991-93 
Purdue School of Forestry Outstanding Senior Studel~t - Swain Forestry Achievement Award, 1991 
Purdue School of Forestry Outstanding Junior Student - Swain Forestry Achievement Award, 1990 
Undergraduate Cornpetilive Research Grant Award, 1991 - Shear Behavior of Structural Composite Lumber, 
awarded by Purdue University Agricultural Experiment Station 
Recipient, Forest Products Research Society Academic Scholarship, Ohio Valley Section, 1991 
Recipient, Delta Theta Tan Academic Scholarship, 1989 
SERVICE 
Major Committee Assignments: 
University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho: 
Admissions Committee, 1999-2002 (Chairperson, 2000-02) 
Grievance Committee for Student Employees, 1999-2000 (Chairperson, 1999-2000) 
Dean Search Committee, College of Natural Resources, 2001 
Infoilnation Technology Committee, 2003-present 
Intellechial Property Committee, 2002-04 (Chairpersoil, 2002-03) 
International Affairs Conunittee, 2003-present 
UI Vision and Resource Task Force, 2004 
College of Natural Resources, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho: 
CNR Academic Redesign Committee, 2002-03 
Faculty Council Representative (alternate), 2004-present 
Faculty Search Committee, Natural Resource Economics tenure track position, 2003 
Master of Natural Resources Program Committee, 1999-2002 
Scholarship and Awards Committee, 1999-present 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho: 
Faculty Search Committee, Natural Resources Economist tenure track position, 2003 
Department of Forest Products, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho: 
Faculty Search Committee, Timber Harvesting tenure track position, 2000 
Faculty Search Committee, Wood Composites tenure track position, 2001 
Washington State University, Pullman, Washington: 
Wood Materials Engineering Laboratory Extension Position Search Committee, 2002 
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington: 
Forest Resources Library Committee, 1994-96 
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Major Committee Assignments (cont.): 
Professional: 
Accreditation Conunittee, Society of Wood Science and Technology, 2002-present 
Electronics Co~mnunication Strategic Issues Standing Committee, Forest Products Society, 
2002-04 (Chair, 2003 and 2004) 
Strategic Issues Committee, Forcst Products Society, 2002-present 
Market Potential Committee, Forest Products Society, 2002-present 
Publication Committee, Forest Products Society, 2002-present 
Organizing Conunittee - Small Diameter Timber Symposium: Resource Management, 
Manufacfuring, and Markets, Spokane, Washington, 2002 [450 attendees] 
Wood Award Selection Committee, Forest Products Society, 2000 
Host Reception Committee, Forest Products Society, 1999 International Annual Meeting 
Professional and Scl~olarly Organizations: 
Society of American Foresters, Member, 1990-present 
Forest Products Society, Member, 1989-present: 
Chair - Inland Empire Section, 2001-02 
Vice Chair - Inland Empire Section, 2000-01 
SecretaryiTreasurer - Inland Empire Section, 1999-2000 
The Acadcmy of Marketing Science, Member, 1994-2001 
American Marketing Association, Member, 1994-present 
Forest Products Society, Member, 1989-present 
Society of Wood Science and Technology, Member, 1990-present 
Alpha Zeta, International Honor Society of Agriculture, Member 
Gamma Sigma Delta, National Honor Society of Agriculture, Member 
Xi Sigma Pi, International Honor Society of Forestry, Member 
Faculty Advisor, University of Idaho Forest Products Club, 2001-present 
Faculty Advisor, University of Idaho Student Friends of Moscow Mountain, 2004-present 
Senior Editor, Ei Paper Village (owned by Elsevier Science), a leading Internet fee-based information 
resource for the pulp and paper industry, editorial focus is on product development issues in the pulp 
and paper industry, 1999-2002 
Editorial Board Member, Journal of Forest Products Business Research, 2004-present 
Editorial Review Panel: 
Prentice Hall Publishing, Pricing Strategy and Tactics textbook, 2004 
Manuscript Reviewer: 
Decision Sciences Institute, 2000present [5 reviews] 
Forest Policy and Economics, 2004-present [ I  review] 
Forest Products Journal, 1999-present [I3 reviews] 
Forest Science, 2001-present [2 reviews] 
Forestry Chronicle, 2001-present [I review] 
Journal of Forest Products Business Research, 2003-present [5  reviews] 
Oregon State UniversiQ - PorestResearch Laboratoiy, 2001-present [2 reviews] 
Western Journal ofApplied Forestry, 2001-present [2 reviews] 
Wood and Fiber Science, 2000-present [3 reviews] 
Proposal Reviewer: 
I~~ternational Foundation for Science, 2004-present [I review] 
USDA NRI Competitive Grants, 2000-present [Z reviews] 
Outreach Service: 
Popular Press Articles (Newspapers and Magazines): 
Russell, Betsy Z. (2004), "Boise Cascade Gets Out of the Woods," The@okesman-Review, July 27. 
[Interview comme~lts concerning the spin-off of Boise Cascade from Boise./OfficeMax] 
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Outreach Service (cont.): 
Popular Press Articles (Newspapers and Magazines)(cont.): 
NAPS1 (2003), "Contest Looking For Do-It-Yourself Decks," Albany Area Advertiser, March 24. 
[Article concerning decks that includes research statistics published in Forest Products 
Journal] 
IIamm, Hillary (2003), "Moscow Company Talks with Potlatch Corp. About Buying Former 
Lumber Mill Property," Moscow-Pullman Daily News, February 22. [Interview co~nmei~ts 
concerning proposed industrial park in Potlatch, Idaho] 
Bacbaracb, Alexis (2002), "Straw into Wood? Locals Like Their Chances," Moscow-Pullman Daily 
News, October 21. [Interview comments concerning straw-poly firelog product and market 
development] 
Erb, George (2002), "Perseverance Pays: Plum Creek's $3.8 Billion Deal Took Many Tums," Puget 
Sound Business Journal, March 15. [Interview comments concerning industry 
consolidations and distribution structure in the global forest products industry] 
Eckart, Kim (2002), "The Incredible Shrinking Log Export Market," The Tacoma News Tribune, 
February 3, Tacoma, Washington. [interview quotes concerning forest products advertising 
in general media outlets and Weyerhaeuser's hostile takeover bid of Willamette Industries.] 
Erb, George (2002), Weyerhaeuser May Do Some Thinning," Puget Sound Business Journal, 
January 25. [Interview quotes concerning the global supply of raw logs and its impact on 
US exporters.] 
Olstad, Adele, and John Zerbe (2001), "Softwood Lumber Losing Ground to Competitors in U.S. 
Housing Market," The Forest Products Conservation &Recycling Review, 130 1/12):3. 
Olstad, Adele, and John Zerbe (2001), "Imnportance of Wood Decks to U.S. Housing Markets," The 
Forest Products Conservation &Recycling Review, 13(9110):3. 
Smith, David A. (2001), "Small Sawmills have Trouble Making the Cut," Waterbuiy Republican- 
American, Febiuary 26, Waterbury, Connecticut. [Interview quotes concerning the US.- 
Canadian Softwood Lumber Agreement and the decline of lumber prices.] 
Kray, Peter (2001), "The First Genetically Engineered Snowboard?' Outside Magazine 26 
(January), p. 24. [Interview quotes concerning the use of wood composites in the snowboard 
market in a nationally distributed outdoor recreation publicalion.] 
Eckart, Kim (2000), "Weyerhaeuser vs. Willamette," The Tacoma News Tribune, December 20, 
T3:oms, W3sllingron. [lnrzrvie\\ qllotes concerning idresr producrs advertising in genc.ml 
mcdla ou!ets and \Ve~erliaeu;ei'i 11ouile 13ked\er bid df \Villametre 1ndusrries.l 
Eckait, Kim (2000), "New Leadership, New Attitude at Weyerhaeuser," The ~acoma News 
Tribune, December 4, Tacoma, Washington. [Interview quotes concerning Weyerhaeuser 
leadership and the hostile takeover bid of Wiilamette Industries.] 
Daly, Brenon (2000), "A Seedling, For Now," The Deal, November 30. [Interview quotes 
concerning timberland ownership conversion from limited partnership to REIT stmcture in a 
nationally distributed mergers and acquisitions newspaper.] 
Bartholdt, Ralph (2000), "Treaty Lapse Could Ilit Idaho Timber," St. Maries Gazette Record, 
November 29, St. Maries, Idaho. [Interview quotes conceming the Expiration of the U S -  
Canadian Softwood Lumber Trade Agreement.] 
Erb, George (2000), "$45 Million Facelift for Wooden Image," Puget Sound Business Journal, 
September 4. [Interview quotes concerning the forest products industry's Wood Is Good 
promotional campaign.] 
Erb, George (2000), "Lumber Cruncher: As Prices Fall, Mills Take Extra Time Off," Puget Sound 
Business Journal, July 10. [Interview quotes concerning the fall of lumber prices and effect 
on mills.] 
Miklosko, Linda (2000), "Particleboard Composite Materials Symposium Focused on Advanced 
Technologies, Emerging Trends," PanelWorld 41 (January), p. 22-24. [Coverage of 
presentation concerning the substitution of softwood lumber by engineered wood products 
and steel.] 
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Outreach Service (cont.): 
Popular Press Articles (Newspapers and Magazines)(cont.): 
AP Story (2000), "Idaho Timber Industry Could Undergo Revival," Lewiston Morning Tribune, 
March 27, Lewiston, Idaho. [Coverage of Idaho forest product industry report written by 
Steve Shook, Francis Wagner, and Charles Keegan.] 
Anonymous (2000), "Awareness May Prevent Decline in Timber Harvest on State, National 
Levels," Idaho Statesman (March 27), Boise, Idaho. [Covera~e of Idaho forest product 
indoary ISPVIT \\.rimmen by Sre\r Sli~ok, Fr~iicis \\':lgilsr, atid C'narles Keegan ! 
3liil3rd. ,\n:le (201)Uj. ".\,ling Idaho I'imhSr Ii!i~lsmry 113s Secii Bciicr I)sys." 1,ldho Slar2./ok,?zol 
l.\lsrcI1261. Pocnt:!lo. Idal~o. ICov~raee of I ~ R I I O  Io~esm nr~ducm !:idustrv rs1,on wrimtcii bv , . - , . 
Sleve Shook, Francis Wagner, and Charles Keegan.1 . . 
I'ci !i3ndes, (:liarlcs (?(,OOj, "I&tliu '\fills I lrn~z f t n l  ough 'i'iiii:c. 'righienitit. I'iinbcr Supply Could 
i\le.rti Nunli idnlio l t l l  Clorurcs." C'ozrr~d',Iltii? Pwss (hl3r;h 5). Coeur d'.\lrtie, ldr!io. 
[Interview quotes concerning the current status and near-tern future of the North Idaho 
forest products industry.] 
Anonymous (2000), "Timber Indusiq Employment Drops, But Sales Increase," Idaho Statesman 
(January 1 l), Boise, Idaho. [Coverage of Idaho forest product industry report written by 
Steve Shook, Francis Wagner, and Charles Keegan.] 
Kerstetter, Jim (1998), "IBM's Patrick: Let Us Now Praise Out-of-the Box Thinking," PC Week 
(July 15). [Article covering keynote address that focused on the forest products directory 
websile prepared by Steve Shook and its relevance, as well as that of technology, to the 
forest products industry]. 
Radio arid Television Interviews: 
KUOI (Moscow), December 13,2000 [Voice ofPalouse radio show, muitiple airings - Interview 
concerning the effects of the summer 2000 forest fires on the Idaho forest products 
industry.] 
Extension: 
Creator and Co-Editor, Directory ofForest Products, Wood Science, and Marketing Online, the 
first directory of the forest products industry on tile Internet, located online at 
http:liwww.forestdirectory.com. A nonprofit informational web site that has been featured 
in the Toronto Globe and Mail, The Vancouver Sun, The Los Angeles Times, and the Dow 
Jones Business Directory, 1995-present. 
Community Service: 
Friends of Moscow Mountain, active member since 2003. 
Palouse-Clearwater Environmental Institute, active member since 1999. 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: 
Outreach: 
Moderator - Product Development and Markets Session, SmaN Diameter Timber Symposium: Resource 
Management, Manufacturing, and Markets, Spokane, Washington. [450+ attendees] 
Instructor at the North American Wholesale Lumber Association - Wood Products Marketing Seminar, 
Moscow, Idaho, 2001,2002. 
Corporate Advisory Board Member, Silvaris Corporation, served as a corporate advisory hoard member for 
an Internet coinpany specializing in the lumber business-to-business market, 2000-03. 
